Internet Copyright Infringement and
Service Providers: The Case for a
Negotiated Rulemaking Alternative
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Internet has risen from obscurity to ubiquity virtually overnight.
Although the Internet was not opened to the public until 1990, 1 as of
February 1998, an estimated 62 million adults in the United States (30%
of the adult population) had Internet access.2 Similarly, although the
World Wide Web is only seven years old, it is estimated to already
contain over 150 million documents (some 50 to 60 billion words). 3
Electronic mail may now be sent to 186 countries around the globe. 4
The Internet promises to be the exiting new technology that will help
"build a bridge to the twenty-first century." 5
The power of the Internet lies in its ability to distribute information
around the globe with unprecedented speed and efficiency. Unfortunately, "friction-free markets and friction-free piracy run in tandem." 6
Consequently, intellectual property theft on the Internet has reached
epidemic proportions.
Pirated copies of computer software and
"cracker" utilities used to defeat software copy-protection schemes are
widely available. 7 Copyrighted images and literary works are routinely

I. Robert H Zakon, Hobbes' Internet Timeline v3.I (visited Feb. 1, 1998)
<http://info.isoc.org/guest/zakon/Internet/History/HIT.html>.
2. Latest Intelliquest Survey Reports 62 Million American Adults Access the
Internet/Online Services (last modified Feb. 5, 1998) <http://www.intelliquest.com/
about/release4 l .htm>.
3. Gus Venditto, Search Engine Showdown, INTERNET WORLD, May 1996 <http://
www.internetworld.com/ 1996/05/showdown. html>.
4. David Zgodzinski, Third-World Internet, INTERNET WORLD, Nov. 1996 <http://
lib.nmsu.edu/staff/mmolloy/lsc3 l l/3rdwrld.txt>.
5. The theme of the 1996 Clinton/Gore Presidential campaign.
6. David McCandless, Warez Wars, WIRED, Apr. 1997, at 178 <http://www.
wired.com/wired/5.04/warez/ff_ warez.html>.
7. On March 16, 1998, a Web search using the "AltaVista" Internet search page
(<http://www.altavista.digital.com>) and using the search term "warez" (Internet slang
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displayed and copied, both in intentional and unknowing violation of
their owners' rights. Bootleg copies of sound recordings, video, and
other multimedia works are increasingly being exchanged on the
Internet. 8
The software industry has been hit particularly hard since it "empowers every customer to become a manufacturing subsidiary ... the user
of each and every piece of software has all of the capability to make a
perfect copy." 9 The Internet has compounded this problem by providing
software pirates with an instant international distribution channel.
"Instead of reaching the limited number of people who can crowd
around a card table at a flea market, pirates can peddle their wares to
tens of millions of on-line users around the world." 10
The magnitude of losses due to online infringement has defied
accurate measurement. For instance, while total worldwide computer

for pirated software) produced 37,349 documents, up from 6,343 documents in
November I 996. Web sites hosting information and utility programs used to defeat
software copy protection systems can be easily found using a Web search with the terms
"cracks," "crackz," "codez," "serials," or "serialz."
Usenet (see infra Part 11.C.4) and Internet Relay Chat (see infra Part II.C.3) also have
many public groups for the exchange of pirated software, cracks, and serial numbers.
8. An increasing problem is the unauthorized distribution of music recordings,
made possible by recent advances in software that allow the songs to be more efficiently
transmitted and stored. See, e.g., Janelle Brown, Heat Turned Up on Digital Music
Pirates (last modified Feb. 12, 1998) <http://www.wired.com/news/news/culture/story/10234.html>. Further advances in technology will soon make it more
practical, and thus more common, to use the Internet to exchange other works such as
films and multimedia works.
Today, Internet piracy focuses on computer programs, video games, and
recorded music. Movies and videos are not much in evidence-yet. That's
because our audio-visual content is so rich in information that it can't yet
move easily everywhere in the digital network-the volume of flow is too
great for some of the pipes. We know that the reprieve is temporary, however.
The same technology that will smooth the way for legitimate delivery of video
on demand over digital networks will also prime the pump for copyright
pirates.
Prepared Testimony by Jack Valenti, Pres. and CEO, Motion Picture Ass'n of Am.,
Before the House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property:
WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and the Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act, Federal News Service, Sept. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Fednew File [hereinafter Valenti Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281].
9. Brain S. McWilliams, PC World Online News Radio: Pirates Among Us
(visited Feb. 11, 1998) <http://www.pcworld.com/news/newsradio/wasch/index.html>
(interview with Ken Wasch, Pres., Software Publishers Ass'n) (RealAudio-encoded
sound file) [hereinafter Ken Wasch interview].
10. Bob Kruger, Statement by Bob Kruger, BSA VP for Enforcement on the Threat
of Internet Piracy (visited Feb. 12, I 998) <http://www.bsa.org/piracy/internet/
intemet_sta.html>.
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software industry losses are estimated at over $13 billion annually, 11
various estimates have placed the contribution of online piracy at
anywhere from one third of the total losses to a relatively insignificant
portion of the total losses. 12 An inherent problem with measuring
losses due to online infringement is that each pirated copy does not
represent a lost sale. Many pirates collect copyrighted works "for the
sheer thrill of it." 13 "Pirates are like street gangs rooting around nests
of copied programs just to see what is there, and copying them like
trading card hobbyists, for show, not for any practical purpose." 14
Perhaps the biggest problem with Internet piracy, however, is that it is
an "insidious problem." 15 Widespread and open copyright abuse, it is
feared, will establish a systemic cultural disregard for authors' intellectual property rights: "The reason we go after pirates is to clean up the
Internet for commerce, otherwise anarchy reigns." 16
Internet piracy has therefore justifiably been the source of increasing
alarm among intellectual property authors. Congress has yet to decide
the issue and the few court decisions involving online copyright
violations have failed to produce a clear consensus as to how copyright
doctrine should apply to service providers. Many copyright holders and
commentators assert that the best solution is to hold Internet service

11. Business Software Alliance Statistics (visited Feb. 12. 1998)
<http://www.bsa.org/piracy/diduknow.html> (figures based on study of 1996 worldwide
losses).
12. Compare McCandless, supra note 6, at 133-34 (estimates ranging from one
third to twelve percent of total losses) with Ken Wasch Interview, supra note 9 ("I don't
think that [Internet piracy is] a big source of lost profits in the industry .... We lose
some opportunity, but [individuals are] not where the largest loss to the industry is.").
13. Deborah Shapley, Corporate Internet Police Hunt Down £-Pirates, N.Y. TIMES
CYBERTIMES (last modified May I 9, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/
week/051997police.html>. See also McCandless, supra note 6, at 135 ("They pirate
software because they can. It's a game ... It's a hobby, like stamp collecting. It's an
act of bloodless terrorism. And it's an addiction."); Statement of Sandra Sellers, Vice
Pres. of Enforcement and Education, Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives Oversight Hearing on
Electronic Copyright Piracy and Legislative Hearing on H.R 2265, The "No Electronic
Theft (NET) Act" (last modified Sept. 11, 1997) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
4025.htm> [hereinafter Sellers Statement on H.R. 2265] ("The Internet has given rise to
another type of pirate, the consummate 'hacker' or 'warez' aficionado, who copies and
distributes computer software simply for self-aggrandizement-the reputation, the thrill,
the 'fun' of having the latest programs or the biggest 'library' of 'warez' titles.").
14. Shapley, supra note 13.
15. Ken Wasch Interview, supra note 9.
16. Brown, supra note 8 (quoting Jim Griffin, Dir. of Tech., Geffen Records).

221

providers liable for user misconduct, forcing them to clean up the
Internet. Service providers counter that the growth of the Internet will
be impeded if they are held liable for harms that they are powerless to
prevent. A new legal framework is needed that will address the
concerns of both groups.
Crime is rampant out here in the new frontier of cyberspace. But unlike the
pioneers of the Wild West, you won't hear guns shots or shouts for help; the
Internet crime wave is shrouded in the silent circuitry of the global computer
network.
The law always lags behind the development of new frontiers, but both
legislation and enforcement of electronic rights will have to develop quickly if
the Internet is ever to prosper as mass medium, if cyberspace is truly to become
the planet's incubator of ideas, information and communications. Without
suitable protection, the people and companies who invest their time and
resources in creative work will have no incentive to help settle this frontier. 17

Those who wish to settle this new frontier must first understand it. A
thorough knowledge of Internet technology is crucial to arriving at
workable policies that will promote the growth of the Internet as a
content-rich and productive medium. Unfortunately, most scholarly
analysis involving online copyright infringement has exhibited a
fundamental lack of understanding of the subject matter. Similarly,
although most courts considering Internet issues have at least made a
laudable effort to become more familiar with the technology, 18 their
decisions have nonetheless frequently been grounded upon incorrect facts
and faulty assumptions and have failed to provide clear answers to the

17. Michael Baroni, Rounding Up the Posse in a Lawless Frontier, N.Y. TIMES
CYBERTIMES (last modified June 8, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/
cyber/week/060897lawless.html>.
18. The background section on Internet technology in ACLU v. Reno occupied 21
of the opinion's 59 pages (subtracting headnotes). 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-50 (E.D. Pa.
1996). The technical background section in Shea v. Reno occupied 11 of the opinion's
29 pages (subtracting headnotes). 930 F. Supp. 916, 925-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Although
not separated from the other text of the opinion, technological background material
constituted a similar proportion of the opinion in Religious Tech. Ctr v. Netcom Online
Communication Servs., Inc. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
These technological findings of fact have been so extensive as to have prompted one
reporter to describe the 2 I-page section in ACLU v. Reno as "one of the most lucid
primers about the Internet yet seen." Peter H. Lewis, Internet Primer Written by and for
Newbies,
N.Y. TIMES CYBERT!MES
(last modified June 18,
1996)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/compcol/0618compcol-lewis.html> ("newbie" is
Internet slang for "beginner"). Mike Godwin, staff attorney for the Electronic Frontier
Foundation, one of the plaintiffs in ACLU v. Reno, was similarly impressed with the
District Court's "far-reaching--even visionary - decision." Mike Godwin, Sinking the
CDA, INTERNET WORLD, Oct. 1996, at 108 (also noting that the "legally relevant facts
about how the Net works and how it is used" outlined in the opinion "seem likely to
impose strong legal and practical limits" on the Supreme Court's ability to overrule the
District Court).
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service provider liability question. Likewise, the few laws that Congress
has passed in response to the Internet have been widely criticized as
technically unworkable 19 and the Congressional testimony to date on
the bitterly divisive issue of service provider liability shows that
witnesses on both sides of the issue have frequently presented Congress
with testimony comprised of equal measures of fact and hyperbole.
This Comment argues that the Internet service provider liability debate
should be settled with a regulatory approach. Not only is the technical
expertise required to create workable policies beyond the capability of
the courts, but also the subject matter itself is wholly statutory and, thus,
appropriately resolved by Congress. In addition to providing muchneeded legal certainty, a negotiated rulemaking approach would replace
the current contentious environment characterized by litigation, blame
shifting, and positional thinking with a forum that inspires compromise
and creative thinking, thus providing the best opportunity for the
development of realistic, efficient, and fair solutions to the Internet
service provider liability debate.

19. See, e.g., Byron F. Marchant, On-Line on the Internet: First Amendment and
Intellectual Property Uncertainties in the On-Line World, 39 How. L.J. 477 (1996).
At present, it appears that many jurists and politicians, as well as the
regulators that they influence, are attempting to provide patch-work responses
to issues arising in the on-line world-responses that are likely to do more
harm than good, that may be difficult to enforce, and that are unlikely to
resolve the problem identified. Many politicians and regulators have no
personal experience with the on-line world or know how to use their
computers on the Internet.
Id. A CNN Online report described similar criticism of the negotiators at the December
1996 international copyright protection conference sponsored by the World Intellectual
Property Organization:
The group of telecommunications companies, including AT&T, MCI,
Netscape, America Online and CompuServe, said all three proposed [World
Intellectual Property Organization copyright] treaties have features that are illadvised, and that the people who are to decide on the law know nothing about
cyberspace.
"Not only do these people not understand the technology, but they actually
have no experience of Internet at all," said Barbara Dooley, head of Commercial Internet Exchange Association. "The ideas they're working with are not
21st century yet."
Communications Industry: Copyright Laws Will Ruin Internet (visited Jan. 12, 1997)
<http://www.cnn.com/fECH/9612/06/internet.copyright/index.html>.
Similarly, a
software company executive expressed little faith in the ability of a judge to deal with
these complicated technological issues: "Bringing Internet cases through the judicial
system is a nightmare ... Try talking to a judge about 'dynamically assigned IP
addresses.' We don't have a chance." McCandless, supra note 6, at 133, 177.
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Part II will introduce the fundamentals of computer communications,
distinguishing bulletin board services, Internet service providers, and
online services; describing the basic architecture of the Internet; and
identifying the primary Internet services and how each is used to
facilitate online copyright infringement. Part III will highlight the
difficulty that courts have faced in addressing this conceptually new and
technologically complex subject by providing a review and analysis of
the recent reported decisions related to service provider copyright
liability. Part IV will introduce the arguments for imposing strict
liability on service providers and will then analyze the economic and
social consequences of shifting incentives to prevent infringement on
service providers. Finally, Part V will recommend a regulatory solution
to both the service provider liability question and the larger question of
how to prevent online infringement, arguing that a comprehensive
approach involving statutory changes and regulatory oversight of Internet
service providers will provide for the optimum distribution of economic
incentives, thereby making possible the development of systems that can
minimize losses to both content providers and service providers.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNET TECHNOLOGY

To those without an understanding of the Internet, cyberspace can
seem as intimidating and threatening as it does promising. Even most
experienced Internet users do not understand the underlying technologies
of the Internet. Indeed, many Internet visionaries and computer market
leaders see information services as a future utility that will delivered by
user-friendly "information appliances" and are therefore making a
conscious effort to keep information technologies transparent to the
average user. 20 This school of thought properly recognizes that we
should not need to know how the entire telephone system works in order
to place a phone call.
While there may be little utility in requiring the average Internet user
to understand its technological architecture, it is essential that our
lawmakers have such an understanding. Knee-jerk legislative reactions
by uniformed lawmakers will only add to the growth-stifling uncertainties about the future of the Internet. As one Internet publishing
executive noted: "This legislative time-gap between what politicians

20. See infra text accompanying notes 267-70 (describing the "network computing"
movement).
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understand well enough to regulate and what is technologically operative
today is an abyss of potential legal and financial risk," 21
If the Internet is to live up to its potential, lawmakers must recognize
that "cyberspace" isn't at all like interstellar space. Whereas interstellar
space is a void, cyberspace is a finite, but complicated, system of
computers, wires, and people. Congress must avoid an overly simplistic
view of cyberspace if it is to craft effective laws that will help define
and add certainty to the unique and often delicate relationships between
the entities that collectively comprise cyberspace.
A

Distinctions between Bulletin Board Services, Internet Access
Providers, and Online Services

Before the recent rise in popularity of the Internet, most computer
communications were accomplished using bulletin board services. As
a result, much of the legal precedent and commentary involving
computer communications has been based on bulletin board service
technology. The technological architecture of Internet, however, is
dramatically different from that of a bulletin board service.

1.

Bulletin Board Services

A bulletin board service (BBS) is a central computer that serves as an
electronic message center. 22 A caller reaches a BBS by dialing in
directly to the BBS host computer, or "server."23 Since most BBSs are

21. Bill Washburn, No Slam Dunk, INTERNET WORLD. Mar. 1996, at 32, 33
<http://www.internetworld.com/1996/03/imo.html>.
Given the chaotic and free-wheeling nature of the Net, more than a few
government leaders and bureaucrats around the globe are likely to take various
drastic actions. Many people seek to preserve the familiar. The threat to the
status quo implicit in the Internet constitutes what many fear is change run
amok.
Id.
22. See generally The BBS Corner - What BBSes Are All About (last modified Jan.
I, 1998) <http://www.thedirectory.org/diamond/about.htm>; The BBS Corner Frequently Asked Questions (last modified Jan.
I,
1998)
<http://www.thedirectory.org/diamond/ faq.htm>.
23. It is, however, possible to dial in to one BBS and to use a communications
service such as Telnet to reach another BBS from there. See Adam Gaffin, EFF's Guide
to the Internet, v. 3.15, § 6.4 (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://www.eff.org/papers/eegtti/>.
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either private or commercial enterprises, a BBS operator, or "Sysop," 24
typically controls access by requiring callers to enter a user name and
password, which are provided only to those who have paid the
subscription fee and/or been approved. Callers to a BBS can play online
games, communicate with other users in "chat rooms," send ("upload")
and retrieve ("download") files, and send ("post") or retrieve messages.
The software packages used to run BBS servers are proprietary and nonstandardized, so the services available on any given BBS are defined
both by the capability of the software used and by the Sysop's choice as
to which of the available services he wishes to enable.
2.

Internet Access Providers

Although some users may be able to connect to the Internet through
schools, libraries, and even businesses, most users access the Internet
from home using a commercial service provider, 25 either an online
service or an Internet access provider (IAP). IAPs range in size from
large commercial providers like AT&T's Worldnet Service and Netcom
to small local providers with perhaps only a hundred accounts.
Connecting to an IAP is quite similar to connecting to a BBS; the caller
instructs his computer to call the IAP's remote host computer and is then
required to provide his unique user name/password combination. Once
the user is logged on to an IAP, however, the similarities end. An IAP's
communications server provides no services of its own; it merely
provides a gateway to the Internet, allowing the caller to access the
virtually unlimited range of available Internet services by connecting to
an Internet server hosting that service. IAPs, therefore, do not provide
content; they merely provide access to content located elsewhere.
Due to the vastly greater audience, reach, and flexibility of the
Internet, BBSs are becoming obsolete and their numbers are dwindling.26 Since each Internet server functions much like a BBS server,
and there are thousands of Internet servers available from a single

24. As used throughout this Comment, the term "Sysop" is intended to generically
refer to the person or organization responsible for administering a server.
25. Seventy percent of all Internet access is done from the home. Latest
Intelliquest Survey Reports 62 Million American Adults Access the Internet/Online
Service. supra note 2. See also Information Technology Association of America.
Intellectual Property Protection in Cybenpace: Towards a New Consensus, § 2 (visited
Oct. 15, 1997) <http://www.itaa.org/copyrite.htm> [hereinafter ITAA Discussion Paper].
26. See David H. Dennis, The !net-Access Frequently Asked Questions List,
§ 10.13 (last modified Dec. 23, 1996) <http://www.amazing.com/intemet/faq.html> ("The
BBS world as a whole seems to be dying with the dominance of the Internet").
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connection to an IAP, the IAP's "on-ramp" to the Information Superhighway has largely replaced the closed environment of BBSs. 27
3,

Online Services

Online services (such as America Online and CompuServe) are
somewhat of a hybrid between an IAP and a BBS. They not only
provide Internet access like an IAP, but they also provide their own
proprietary value-added services like a BBS. Once connected, the caller
has access not only to the online service's host computers, but also has
access to the other remote Internet servers. Although the number of
users connecting to the Internet through online services continues to
grow in absolute terms, they are quickly losing market share to the more
direct connection offered by IAPs, 28
As opposed to IAPs, online services allow the user access to a broad
array of content provided by the online service itself. This simple but
often overlooked distinction is critical to a meaningful analysis of service
provider liability. This Comment is primarily concerned with the legal
questions surrounding liability for user-supplier content. Therefore,
value-added service providers like BBSs and online services, to the
extent that they provide their own content, are beyond the scope of this
article, since existing legal doctrines are largely sufficient to address
issues related to provider-supplied content.
As will be discussed further, the degree to which a provider has both
the right and ability to exert control over user content is often a critical
legal distinction. At one extreme are BBSs, which provide subscribers

27. Some BBSs have begun to add "gateways" (access) to Internet services. See
id. To the extent that they do so, they begin to resemble an online service (discussed
in the next section).
28. Most of the content and services that could formerly only be found on an
online service can now be found on the Internet:
[J]ust two years ago, the common wisdom was that the future of on-line
activity would be driven by multi-faceted on-line service providers such as
Prodigy, CompuServe and America Online. Today. the focal point is no-frills
Internet access. Rapid enhancements and improved ease of use of the Internet
and World Wide Web are making the services offered directly by the access
provider far less critical.
Prepared Testimony of Ken Wasch, Pres., Software Publishers Ass 'n, Before the House
Judiciary Comm., Courts and Intellectual Property Subcomm., Federal News Service,
Sept. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Wasch
Testimony on H.R. 2180].

227

with access to content physically contained in the mass storage devices
of their servers. This access provides BBS Sysops with some ability to
control the content and, since the content has been supplied either by the
Sysop or a BBS subscriber, BBS Sysops typically have the right to
remove content.
At the other extreme are IAPs, which only provide access to content
resident on servers located outside their system. Since an IAP has no
physical access to the information resident on servers located outside its
system, it has neither the right nor the ability to control that content.
The primary shortcoming of this polar classification, however, is that
IAPs typically provide more than simple access to the Internet. Most
lAPs also operate servers in order to provide their subscribers with basic
Internet services such as e-mail, Usenet news, and Web page hosting. 29
Thus, the term "Internet service provider" (ISP) is a more accurate
description of most IAPs. "ISP," as used throughout the remainder of
this Comment, is meant to encompass both providers that offer only
access to the Internet and those that also operate Internet servers. 30
B.

What is "the Internet?"

The Internet may justifiably seem quite daunting. Although, like most
fields in high technology, Internet technology is expressed in a strange
language consisting of an alphabet soup of acronyms and complex
technical jargon,31 the basic concepts are quite simple. It is not a

29. Observations based upon an October 4, I 997 examination of "the List," a
comprehensive Internet service provider database located at <http://thelist.internet.com/>.
See also ITAA Discussion Paper, supra note 25, § 2.
Since, like BBS Sysops, ISP Sysops have access to the content resident on their
Internet servers, it may seem reasonable to equate the responsibilities of ISP Sysops and
BBS Sysops. For reasons more fully developed later in this Comment, however, such
a classification would be overly simplistic.
30. "Internet service provider" may have also have other meanings, as there are
many different organizations that provide Internet-related "services." A provider
supplying Web site hosting is often referred to as an Internet presence provider (IPP).
The regional and national commercial networks that supply network access points to
IAPs are also referred to as "service providers." Finally, the Sysops of Internet servers
are also sometimes referred to a "service providers." As used throughout this Comment,
the term "Internet service provider" is meant to encompass all of these categories.
31.
This strange language was the source of both frustration and entertainment for
the Philadelphia District Court judges who were required to decide the recent challenge
to the Communications Decency Act:
To decide who is right, the three judges last week sat through two days of
dense testimony, much of it peppered with highly technical computer terms.
The confusing array of acronyms in computer parlance-FTP, HTTP,
HTML, TCP/IP and what have you-quickly became a source of amusement
to the judges. "Oh, an abbreviation!" exclaimed a delighted Stewart Dalzell,
a Federal district court judge on the special panel, upon learning that "bot"
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commercial entity, or really even an entity at all. Like the international
telephone system, the Internet is merely a network of interconnected
networks. The Internet is the result of a series of agreements between
the institutional owners of large networks. There is no central governing
body. Operational policies and technical standards are set by three
international volunteer groups. 32
Starting in the 1960's from a single network with just a few computers, the Internet has gradually added new commercial networks. These
core networks, called the Internet "backbones," are high-speed data
pipelines, interconnected with one another to form the heart of the
Internet. 33 Although network interconnections are often made at other
intermediate points, in general, national networks connect to the
backbones, smaller regional networks connect to the national networks,
Internet service providers connect to the regional networks, and
businesses and consumers connect to ISPs. In 1992, there were less than
a million host computers and less than 7,000 networks connected to the
Internet, but by the end of 1997, the Internet had grown to almost 20
million hosts and more than 1.3 million networks. 34

was not another acronym, but merely short for "robot,"
Pamela Mendels, Awash in Cyberspace Jargon, Judges Remained Good Sports, N.Y.
TIMES CYBERTIMES (last modified Mar. 24, 1996) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/
cyber/week/0324notebook.html> (discussing American Civil Liberties Union v. Reno,
929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Penn. 1996)).
32. See generally E. Krol & E. Hoffman, RFC 1462: FYJ on "What is the
Internet?"
(last modified Apr. 15, 1996) <http://www.intemic.net/nic-support/fyi/fyi20.html> (providing overview of Internet governance). The Internet Society
(!SOC) (see (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://info.isoc.org/index.html>) is responsible for
the global cooperation and coordination of the Internet; it is the ultimate authority that
sets the overall policies that shape the future of the Internet. The Internet Architecture
Board (IAB) (see (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://www.iab.org/iab/>), specially appointed
members of the ISOC, decides on the essential hardware and software standards.
Policies that govern relations between the network owners are handled by the Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) (see (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.
va.us/home.html> ), a voluntary association of network designers, operators, vendors, and
researchers.
33. See generally Jack Rickard, Internet Architecture (visited Feb. I, I 998)
<http://www.boardwatch.com/isp/fa1l97 /intarch.html> (providing detailed explanation of
the backbone networks and their history). For a graphical map of one U.S. backbone,
as well as links to U.S. its regional and global networks, see The UUNET U.S. Backbone
(visited Feb. 26, 1998) <http://www.uu.net/lang.en/network/current/us.shtml>.
34. Tom Steinert-Threlkeld, Coming of Age: It Only Gets Tougher for the ISP (last
modified Feb. 6, I 998) <http://www.zdnet.com/products/content/articles/l 99802/
isp.challenges/>. The number oflnternet host computers exceeded 1,000 in 1984, 10,000
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The key element that made the creation of the Internet possible was
the agreement to use a common language, Internet Protocol (IP), and a
common unit of communication, the IP "packet."35 The best analogy
is to see the Internet backbones as the postal system and the IP packets
as postcards. Each computer on the Internet is assigned a unique
number, called its "IP address." Like a postcard, each IP packet is small
and of a uniform size. A large message is broken up into many small
packets. Also like a postcard, each packet is labeled with both
destination and return addresses (the IP addresses of both the origination
and destination computers). The computers at the ends of each physical
link in the Internet ("routers") act like postal workers, sorting each
packet and forwarding it another "midstream" router closer to the
destination computer. 36 Because each packet is individually addressed,
although the packets typically get bounced around from computer to
computer on their way, the routers can always determine where each
individual packet is heading (and also from where it came). As a result,
despite many different packets taking many different paths, the
destination computer can reconstruct each message by sequentially
ordering the individual packets as they arrive. 37

in 1987, 100,000 in 1989, and 1,000,000 in 1992. Zakon, supra note I.
35. See Charles L. Hedrick, Introduction to the Internet Protocols §§ 2.0 - 2.2
(1987) (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/hedrickintro.html>. Internet Protocol specifies that data must be sent in a fixed size
"datagrams," which are colloquially referred to as "packets" or "IP packets." See id.
§ 2.2. See also Richard Wiggins, How the Internet Works, INTERNET WORLD, Oct. 1996
<http://www.internetworld.com/ 1996/10/howitworks.html> (explaining packets in less
technical terms). The size of the packets will vary depending on the particular network
over which they must travel. See Hedrick, § 8.
36. See generally Routing in the Internet (visited Feb. I, 1998)
<http://www.scit.wlv.ac.uk/~jphb/comms/iproute.html> (providing details on the
mechanics of packet routing). The volume of packets traveling the Internet is
staggering-in the 24-hour period ending February 23, 1998, the routers at the New
York Network Access Point (one of the four major network interconnecting points)
carried as many as 25,000 packets per second. New York NAP Usage Statistics (visited
Feb. 23, 1998) <http://www.nlanr.net/NAP/> (Web page allowing the visitor to query the
New York NAP about its recent usage; the information is returned in graphical form).
An October 1995 estimate placed the daily data flow through Internet routers at around
a terabyte (l,000,000,000,000 bytes, or the equivalent of 700 million book pages). Paul
Samuelson, Weblock, PC COMPUTING, October 1995, at 71.
37. See Hedrick, supra note 35, § 8. This seemingly chaotic system of message
propagation was purposely designed into the Internet. The predecessor to the Internet
was a network called ARPANET, created in 1969 by the Advanced Research Project
Agency (ARPA). ARPANET was funded by the U.S. government to network the
computers of certain universities, defense contractors, and the military. This system of
dynamic routing of small packets of information would allow the network to continue
to function even if portions of the system were destroyed by a military attack. See
generally Gaffin, supra note 23, § 1.7; History of the Internet (visited Feb. I, 1997)
<http://www.hotwired.com/web IO 1/97/3 l /index4a.html>.
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Although personal computers are capable of creating the packets,
individual users cannot directly gain access to the Internet. 38 To bridge
this gap, an ISP creates an intermediate network (like the local post
office) between its dial-up subscribers and the Internet. At the
subscriber end of this network is a device called an "access server" and
at the other end is a router connected to the Internet. 39 A caller's
computer transmits and receives packets from the ISP's access server
using a standard language called Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP). 40
When a caller initially connects to an ISP, the ISP's access server
assigns to the caller's computer a 12-digit IP address from the pool of
IP addresses that the ISP has registered ("dynamically assigned
addressing"). 41 At the moment the caller's computer is assigned an IP
address, it actually becomes part of the Internet; the caller's computer
can now communicate with any other computer connected to the Internet
because the remote computer now has a return address to which it can
send its reply. The ISP's network translates the caller's incoming PPP
packets into Internet-standard IP packets and forwards them to its
routers, which in turn connect to other routers on a regional network.
Information returning simply follows the reverse procedure.
C.

Internet Services

In addition to an understanding of the Internet itself, a real-world, nutand-bolts understanding of the mechanics of how pirated works are
actually exchanged is crucial to a meaningful discussion of Internet
38. See generally Gaffin, supra note 23, §§ 1.1-1.4, 1.6 (providing thorough, but
somewhat dated, explanation of the process of connecting to the Internet).
39. See generally Dennis, supra note 26, §§ 6.24-6.26 (providing technical
overview of required telephone equipment).
40. PPP is the most commonly used protocol for transmitting TCPnP information
over standard telephone lines. See generally Drew D. Perkins, RFCl171: The Point-toPoint Protocol for the Transmission of Multi-Protocol Datagrams Over Point-to-Point
Links (last modified July 1990) <http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfcl 171.html>.
41. Service providers purchase contiguous blocks (CIDR blocks) of consecutive
IP addresses. Rather than permanently assigning each IP address to a given subscriber,
the ISP is able to maximize its fixed allocation of IP addresses by assigning them only
as needed. Most service providers use this method of "dynamically assigned addresses."
The alternative method of fixed IP addresses, whereby each user is permanently assigned
an IP address, is inefficient. Under the fixed IP address system, for instance, a service
provider with a IO0-address CDIR block is limited to 100 subscribers. By dynamically
assigning these addresses, the provider is able to take advantage of the fact that its
subscribers are not constantly connected. See Dennis, supra note 26, § 18.2.
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copyright infringement. Because the Internet only provides the link
between computers, it is necessary to use one of several Internet services
in order to actually transmit information. This section will introduce the
most commonly used Internet services, briefly illustrating how each
service works, how each is used to facilitate online copyright infringement, and the degree to which Sysops can detect and respond to these
abuses.
1.

Electronic Mail

One of the simplest and most widely used Internet services is
electronic mail, or "e-mail," a user-to-user worldwide messaging system.
In order to use e-mail, a user must arrange with a mail server Sysop to
establish a "mailbox" (a defined space on the mail server's mass storage
devices) in which to store incoming mail. The user is assigned a unique
user name/password combination to prevent unauthorized access to the
mailbox.
Although files may be sent using e-mail, its potential as a medium of
massive copyright abuse is inherently limited by its single user-to-single
user propagation-e-mail messages must be individually sent to each
user. 42 Further, mail server Sysops typically limit the size of each
mailbox, making the exchange of large files like pirated software
cumbersome since, to avoid filling up the recipient's mailbox, large files
must be split into smaller messages and sent over a period of time.
Another problem for the would-be e-mail abuser is that return
addresses are normally attached to the messages by the sending mail
server, thereby making messages relatively easy to trace back to the
sender. This problem is to a certain degree eliminated by the use of
certain mail servers known as "anonymous remailers," mail servers
designed to conceal the sender's identity by replacing the message's
return address with an address pointing to the remailer. 43 It is highly

42. Although it is quite easy using most e-mail applications to send a single
message to many separate users, the messages still inherently must be sent individually
to each recipient's mail server. There are, however, computers called "mail exploders"
or "list servers" that provide the user with the ability to send a single e-mail message
to alt users on a particular list. See generally Internet Mailing Lists: Guides and
Resources (visited Apr. 4, 1997) <http://www.nlcbnc.ca/itla/I/training/listserv/lists.htm>.
43. See generally Andre Bacard, Anonymous Remailers (visited Nov. 12, 1996)
<http://www.well.com/user/abacard/remail.html>. Any reply to that message is sent
through the same remailer, which maintains a list enabling it to reverse the procedure,
forwarding the reply to the recipient's true address. Since the remailer system is
premised on the Sysop's implicit promise not to divulge that information, faith in the
security of anonymous remailers has been shaken since the Sysop of the most popular
remailer, Finland-based anon.penet.fi, was compelled by Finnish authorities to disclose
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impractical to use anonymous remailers as a method of piracy, however,
since most remailers severely restrict the maximum individual message
size, making it impractical to exchange large works like software and
images. 44
A mail server Sysop has little ability to detect infringing messages on
its server. Since e-mail is a one-to-one messaging system, e-mail users
have an expectation of privacy. 45 More importantly, the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 makes it a federal crime to
intercept e-mail 46 or to view stored electronic communications. 47
There are, however, several provisions that allow Sysops to investigate
potential e-mail abuses in order to protect their own interests or to assist
law enforcement 48 Finally, e-mail users are increasingly relying on
encryption to ensure e-mail privacy. It is virtually impossible for the
Sysop to view the contents of an encrypted message. 49

the identities of three user's names. See Ron Newman, The Church of Scientology vs.
anon.penet.fi (last modified Sept. 30, 1996) <http://www.cyhercom.net/~mewman/
scientology/anon/penet.html>.
A user may obtain more secure anonymity by "chain-remailing," a method whereby
the user sends his e-mail message to one remailer, which in tum sends it to another
remailer, and so on. See Bacard. The only way to send e-mail with absolute anonymity,
however, is by sending the message through an anonymous remailer that removes the
original return address and inserts nothing in its place. The obvious limitation with
using such a remailer is that the sender cannot get a reply unless the recipient already
knows his return address.
44. Most anonymous remailers limit individual message size to 30,000 bytes, about
1/50"' the capacity of a single 3W' diskette. Even a small image file exceeds this
limitation.
45. E-mail sent or received from a user's place of business provides an exception
to this rule. Many companies routinely monitor the e-mail of their employees. See
generally Karen L. Casser, Employers, Employees, E-mail and the Internet, in The
Internet and Business: A Lawyer's Guide to Emerging Legal Issues (Joseph F. Ruh Jr.,
ed.) (visited Mar. 15, I 998) <http://cla.org/RuhBook/chp6.htm>.
46. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1997).
47. Id. §§ 2701-2709.
48. The Sysop may engage in random checks for the purpose of quality control.
See id. § 2511 (2)(a)(i). He may also intercept any messages necessary for "the
protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service." Id. Provided that
the government follows strict procedures, the Sysop must intercept messages at the
request of authorized government officials. See id. § 2511 (2)(a)(ii). These procedures
are detailed in sections 2516 to 2518. Similarly strict requirements apply to the
disclosure of messages stored on the Sysop's servers. See id. §§ 2702, 2703.
49. See infra notes 203-05, 260-61 and accompanying text (providing overview of
encryption).
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2.

File Transfer Protocol

Another widely used Internet service is FTP (File Transfer Protocol),
a file transfer service using remote servers as a storage medium. so
Although FTP server Sysops control access by requiring visitors to
supply a user name and password combination, many servers allow the
visitor to log on "anonymously."51 Anonymous visitors are typically
restricted as to which files they may access and are frequently not
allowed to upload files to the server. Once connected to an FTP server,
the user can navigate the directory structure of the server and select files
to transfer. File descriptions are typically not presented, although many
FTP servers provide text files briefly describing the contents of the files
in any given directory. 52
The use of FTP servers as a medium for intellectual property theft is
widespread, primarily through their use as "drop sites." 53 To create a
drop site, users log on to an FTP server, either anonymously or using a
stolen password, and then use the server to exchange pirated works.

50. See generally Gaffin, supra note 23, §§ 7.1-7.4; Perry Rovers, Anonymous FTP
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) List (visited Apr. 4, 1997) <http://hoohoo.ncsa.uiuc.
edu/ftp/faq.html>; Anonymous FTP Abuses (visited Mar. 15, 1998) <ftp://ftp.cert.org/pub/
tech_tips/anonymous_ftp_abuses>.
51. The typical anonymous login procedure allows the visitor to use "anonymous"
or "guest" as a user name and an e-mail address as a password. The typical anonymous
login procedure, however, is quite easy to fool. Since most FIP servers do not have the
ability to check the information supplied, the visitor can log in with any fictional name
and e-mail address.
52. Since most FIP servers follow the DOS convention of eight-character file
names with three-character suffixes, or "extensions," filenames are displayed in the
format xxxxxxx.xxx, inherently limiting the amount of information conveyed.
53. See McCandless, supra note 6, at 175; Noah Robischon, Filching for Fun and
Profit (last modified May 8, 1997) <http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/
0,1012,928,00.html>(describing the use of drop sites for the exchange of pirated music).
The largest FBI crackdown on software piracy to date, "Operation Cyber Strike,"
specifically targeted FIP drop site abuse. See Courtney Macavinta, FBI Hunts Software
Pirates (visited Mar. 4, 1997) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,7427,00.html>.
Software pirates also commonly exchange files over the Internet by configuring their
own personal computers as FIP servers. See McCandless. supra note 6, at 176; see also
Robischon, supra. Using currently available technology, however, these "private drop
sites" have some inherent limitations that prevent their use as a widespread medium of
abuse. First, residential phone lines do not have the capacity to support more than a few
simultaneous users. Second, maintaining a private drop site may inconvenience its
operator, since he must leave his computer constantly powered up and connected to the
ISP. Finally, the operator's ISP may become irritated by his disproportionate use of the
ISP's limited resources.
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These drop sites are only temporary, however, as FfP server Sysops
eventually discover and delete the files, 54
Most FTP abuse is difficult for Sysops to detect Since FTP servers
are designed to facilitate the anonymous transfer of large files, any
increase in activity must be exceptional to raise the Sysop's suspicions,
Most FfP sites also have a huge number of files resident on the server,
so any increase in the number of files must be significant enough to
attract attention, Further, FfP filenames are typically limited to eight
characters, making it difficult for the Sysop to monitor resident content
by simply scanning the system for suspicious filenames, Restricting
access and forbidding anonymous users to upload files are an FfP
Sysop's only practical methods of controlling abuse,
3,

Internet Relay Chat

Internet Relay Chat ("IRC") allows users around the world to send
written messages to each other in real time ("chat"), 55 Since IRC
servers are linked together into networks, connection to a single server
allows simultaneous communication with the hundreds or thousands of
users connected to any other server on that network, 56
Most IRC
servers allow anonymous access to all visitors, who are identified only
by their chosen pseudonyms, Communications are topically organized
into groups, or "channels,"
Although the IRC protocol does not directly support file transfers, IRC
is frequently used to facilitate intellectual property theft using other
Internet services, Certain IRC channels operated by software pirates
serve as the primary medium for alerting other users about new FfP

54, One method used to help delay this inevitable discovery is the use of "hidden
directories," This involves creating the drop site directories using certain attributes that
make them partially invisible to the server's Sysop. The modification of attributes is
accomplished through the use of FTP client applications that have been altered
("hacked") to allow the user to create hidden directories. The directories are invisible
to the normal visitor; only users with a hacked FTP program (typically experienced
software pirates) can see them. See generally Anonymous FTP Abuses, supra note 50.
55. See generally Nicolas Pioch, A Short /RC Primer (last modified Jan. I, 1997)
<http://www.irchelp.org/irchelp/ircprimer.html>.
56. Undernet, the largest !RC network in the world, has approximately 100,000
users, with 20,000 online at any given time. Welcome to the Undernet WWW Server
(visited Jan. 31, 1998) <http://www.nv.us.undernet.org>.
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drop sites and for inviting other users to engage in private file exchanges.57
IRC is virtually impossible for a Sysop to monitor. IRC communications are in real-time, with hundreds of channels and thousands of users
operating simultaneously. Since users log on anonymously and use
pseudonyms, the Sysop can only identify them by their IP addresses.
Further, since IRC servers are linked together in networks, only a small
percentage of the communications flowing through any individual IRC
server actually originate from users directly connected to that server.
Denial of service is not a realistic option for IRC Sysops, since denying
service to an IP address would not necessarily exclude that user, but
instead simply impose a burden upon the ISP that owns that address,
since an ISP's subscribers are typically assigned a different address each
time they connect to the ISP. 58
4.

Usenet

Usenet is a one-to-many messaging system providing a worldwide
public forum where users can read and post messages. 59 The Usenet
system is a worldwide distributed message database consisting of
approximately 200,000 servers connected to each other in a "peer-topeer" arrangement; each news server has one or more "peers" with
which it exchanges information. A message posted on one Usenet server
is therefore automatically and rapidly propagated to every other news
server in the worldwide system. As of February 1998, there were over
46,000 newsgroups,6il topically arranged to cover almost any interest

57. These private transfers are usually initiated by the use of IRC robots ("bots"),
which are programs that allow a user's computer to automatically perform certain tasks
on one or more IRC channels. Although most IRC server Sysops forbid the use of bots,
their use is widespread in groups specializing in exchanging software, music, and adult
material. Although bots can perform many functions. pirates use them to automatically
initiate private communications (a "DCC session") between the bot operator and one or
more other users. A DCC session is done directly between the computers; the
communications no longer flow through the !RC servers. Once this private connection
is established, the bot operator's computer becomes, in essence, an FfP host. Files may
then be transferred between the two computers, but, as with e-mail, the one-to-one nature
of the system limits its usefulness as a medium of mass distribution of protected works.
See generally Eric Hauser, mlRC Bot FAQ (visited Jan. 29, 1998) <http://www.indy.net/
~trekkie/botfql.html>; "Nemesisll," Frequently Asked Questions About Internet Relay
Chat roBOTS (last modified Dec. 14, 1996) <http://www.irchelp.org/irchelp/botfaq.html>.
58. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing dynamically assigned IP
addresses).
59. See generally Usenet Help (visited Feb. 25, 1998) <http://sunsite.unc.edu/
usenet-i/usenet-help.html>.
60. An exact number is impossible to accurately fix. Newsgroups are started by
users and new groups are formed daily. Additionally, users will lose interest and
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imaginable, and Usenet's daily volume, which has been doubling every
year, exceeded half a million messages 61 (over 900 million bytes, the
equivalent of 360,000 full pages of text). 62 Since any computer file
may be converted into its text equivalent, many Usenet "messages" are
actually computer programs, images, sound recordings, and other types
of computer files.
Virtually all Usenet servers restrict access, 63 either by requiring the
visitor to log on with a user name and password combination64 or by
only allowing access to visitors connecting from certain known IP
addresses. 65 Like IRC, Usenet users may choose to be identified by a
pseudonym. Once connected to a news server, the user is able to browse
the newsgroups, select messages to retrieve, and post his own messages.
Usenet is the source of widespread intellectual property theft; it is
truly the problem child of the Internet. Pirated software is openly
exchanged in many newsgroups. These groups, of which the nine most
popular are estimated to alone account for thirty to forty percent of
Usenet's daily traffic, have been called online software piracy's "pulsing

abandon established groups. The statistic cited was the group count on Newscene, a
leading Usenet provider, on February I, 1998. Welcome to the Newscene (visited Feb.
I, 1998) <http://www.newscene.com>.
61. Slurp News (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.slurp.net/>.
62. Deja News - The Source for Internet Discussion Groups (visited Feb. 14, 1998)
<http://www.dejanews.com/info/idg.shtml>.
63. Although there are some "public" news servers, which allow access to any
user, they represent less than 1/10th of one percent of the total servers. As of February
7, 1998, there were only 132 news servers open to the public. Open NNTP Servers
(visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http://www.jammed.com/~newzbot/> (Web site containing the
results of the author's computer program that automatically polls all Usenet news servers
and indexes the results). Out of the few servers that are public, many do not allow users
to post messages and most carry far fewer groups than private servers. Id. Over half
of the public news servers carried fewer than 1,000 groups out of the 45,000 in
existence.
Some private servers belong to universities or businesses and therefore restrict access
to their students or employees. Most private servers, however, are commercial and thus
restrict access to paid subscribers only. A few news servers require the user to purchase
a stand-alone subscription, but the vast majority of the servers offer access as a valueadded service provided as part of an ISP' s basic service package.
64. This is the access-restriction method typically used by most news servers that
provide service as stand-alone subscriptions.
65. News servers that either belong to businesses or universities or are offered as
part of an access provider's value-added services typically use this method, which allows
access by anyone connecting from an IP address that it owns.
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heart." 66 The regular part1c1pants in these groups are remarkably
sophisticated and organized, with established rules and procedures for
posting and requesting pirated software. 67 A large portion of the
software posted is provided by organized software piracy groups, 68
which are so well organized and efficient that they frequently make new
software available in the newsgroups even before it can be shipped to
retail stores. 69
There are also many groups specializing in the exchange of adult
images, the vast majority of which are unauthorized copies of protected
works. 70 Other newsgroups specialize in the exchange of "mp3's,"
commercial music recordings that have been specially processed to
reduce transmission time. 71 Other groups specialize in providing utility
programs ("cracks") and serial numbers used to defeat software
copyright protection schemes.

66. See McCandless, supra note 6, at I 34.
67. These piracy newsgroups have developed sophisticated protocols and
procedures for trading pirated software using Usenet. See The Usenet Warez FAQ
("PolitenessMan!," ed.) (visited Oct. 16, 1997) (current Internet location unknown, on
file with San Diego Law Review). "FAQ" is shorthand for Frequently Asked Questions.
This FAQ, like many others, is also displayed as a Web Page, but Web pages that
involve piracy are frequently removed by Web server Sysops.
68. "Suppliers" provide the programs, "crackers" defeat any copy protection
devices, "rippers" remove superfluous material from the programs to reduce transmission
time, "packagers" divide the programs into easier to transmit portions, and "couriers"
exchange these programs with couriers from other piracy groups. Finally, one or more
of the couriers will post the program to Usenet, complete with installation instructions.
The various groups compete among themselves for bragging rights for providing
software having the most trouble free installations or for being the first to distribute a
new program through files included with the pirated software. These files proudly list
the aliases of the prominent members of the organization, the group's most recent
successes, and invitations for new users to join. These pirate organizations typically
operate one or more BBSs. Distribution may be done through either through the Internet
using FTP transfers or by conventional direct computer-to-computer transfer using
proprietary software. These groups often have affiliates located throughout the world.
See generally McCandless, supra note 6. See also Prepared Statement of Kevin V.
DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Before the House Judiciary
Comm., Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, Concerning H.R. 2265, The "No
Electronic Theft (NET) Act," Federal News Service, Sept. 11, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter DiGregory Testimony on H.R. 2265].
69. These so-called "zero-day warez" are the most highly prized commodity among
Internet piracy groups. See McCandless, supra note 6, at 175.
70. "Most of the images showcased in the binaries group [sic] are scanned from
commercial adult publications, or uploaded from adult CD ROMs, many of which are
copyrighted. As a result, virtually every post on alt.binaries.pictures.erotica is a
copyright violation." Dennis, supra note 26, § 15.2. Many other images are now being
taken from commercial adult Web sites. This is evident by the display of the site's URL
along with the copyright information.
There is even a newsgroup called
"alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.commercial-websites."
71. See Brown, supra note 8 (describing extent and methods of MP3 piracy).
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Usenet has several features that make it an ideal medium for the mass
exchange of pirated works. First, Usenet messages may be posted with
a reasonable degree of anonymity. 72 Second, each message is propagated to thousands of news servers around the world within minutes,
thereby making its contents available to millions of users. Finally, in
contrast with FTP sites or Web pages, newsgroups provide a centralized
shared source for pirated works. Trading is done on a quid pro quo
system; if a user desires a specific work, he simply follows the
procedure for posting a request and other users will typically respond by
posting the desired material. That user is then implicitly obligated to
post works that he possesses.
Unlike the other primary Internet services, Usenet does have a sort of
central authority, generically called "the administrators," a voluntary
association of individual Usenet server Sysops. Although Usenet
administrators are empowered to a certain extent to correct abuses,
"abuse" in this context means abuse of the Usenet system itself; it does
not refer to the legality or appropriateness of the content of messages. 73
Usenet is extremely difficult for Sysops to monitor. Although Usenet
messages are identified by descriptive subject headers, the contents of
any given message can only be accurately determined by retrieving (and
in the case of binary files, decoding) the actual message. The massive
number of messages flowing through Usenet servers each day, however,
makes any such monitoring system practically impossible.
Likewise, a Usenet Sysop has few weapons with which to fight abuse.
Since the content resident on any Usenet server is predominantly from

72. Although users may assume any name, each Usenet message contains certain
information that can be used to help track down an uploading user's identity.
Sophisticated software pirates use a "patch" that strips away much of this information.
See McCandless, supra note 6, at 175. Further, a few news server Sysops (understandably popular with software pirates) refuse to attach identifying information to messages
originating from their servers. See, e.g., Altopia Frequently Asked Questions (last
modified Nov. 14, 1997) <http://www.altopia.com/polfaq.htm>.
73. '"Abuse' in the Usenet administrator context means forging messages or mass
commercial postings to many different groups at once; actions will only be taken for
abuse *of* the net, NOT abuse *on* the net.... To qualify as a true panic-inspiring
net-abuse, an act must interfere with the net-use of a large number of people." The Net
Abuse FAQ § 1.3 (Scott Southwick & J. D. Falk, eds.) (last modified Sept. I, 1997)
<http://www.cybernothing.org/faqs/net-abuse-faq.html>. Mass postings are known as
"spam." "The term 'spam,' ... means 'the same article (or essentially the same article)
posted an unacceptably high number of times to one or more newsgroups.' CONTENT
IS IRRELEVANT." Id. § 2.1.
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other users outside the control of its Sysop, 74 denial of service to a
Sysop's subscribers is not an effective weapon. Even if a Sysop were
to terminate the posting privileges of every one of its subscribers, it
would obviously have only a marginal effect on the content on its news
server. Since a Sysop cannot discriminate among the incoming
messages within any particular newsgroup, the only practical method of
controlling the content resident on its server is to filter out those
newsgroups that have a high level of abuse. 75 This may not be an
attractive option, however, because many potential subscribers may be
hesitant to establish service with a provider that exercises censorship. 76
Further, this would not be an effective long-term solution, as the pirates
would merely invade other groups or establish new groups. In addition,
once a harmful message is propagated out across the Usenet system, the
harm cannot be easily undone. The continued propagation of a Usenet
message can be stopped, or "cancelled," only from the originating
server. 77 Even if a message is quickly cancelled, it will have already
been made available to millions of users.
5.

The World Wide Web

The most popular Internet service is the World Wide Web, a collection
of documents, or "pages," stored on computers located throughout the

74. Usenet's distributed messaging system dictates that vast majority of incoming
content originates not from subscribers of any given server, but rather by subscribers of
other Usenet servers. As an example, assuming that there are only 100 news servers,
that each server has an equal number of subscribers, and that each subscriber posts
exactly the same number of messages, then 99% of the messages on each individual
server would have originated from subscribers of other servers. Recall, however, that
there are some 200,000 news servers.
75. There are several other reasons why Usenet server Sysops may choose not to
carry all of the available groups. Carrying the "full feed" of all newsgroups requires
tremendous mass storage space and the massive data flow required to keep the groups
current requires expensive connections. See Dennis, supra note 26, §§ 4.2-4.5, 6.16,
6.24-6.28, 9.3. News server Sysops may decide to censor some groups due to content
that they consider inappropriate or illegal. See id. § 6.16 (noting that "[m]any
newsgroups contain blatant violations of copyright law"). Businesses that maintain news
servers may carry only newsgroups relevant to their industry.
76. Since most standalone Usenet providers advertise that they have a "nocensorship" policy, it seems reasonable to infer that censorship is an important customer
criteria. See, e.g., Altopia Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 72 (last modified
Nov. 14, 1997) <http://www.altopia.com/polfaq.htm> (first section on page entitled "Q:
Do You Censor?" answered in the negative).
77. A cancel message must be sent out by either the user who originally posted the
message or by the Sysop of the originating server. An individual Usenet Sysop cannot
unilaterally cancel a message. See McCandless, supra note 6, at 178. Further, many
Usenet Sysops refuse to honor cancel messages. Id.
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world. 78 Web pages are written in HTML, a powerful text-based
computer language that allows an author to incorporate "objects" such
as graphics, sounds, or "hyperlinks" within the text of a page. 79 When
a visitor selects a hyperlink, the associated object or action is executed.
For example, hyperlinks can automatically initiate the creation of an email message, start an FTP file transfer, or display messages from a
Usenet newsgroup. If, as is more common, the selected hyperlink refers
to another Web page, the user's software, or "browser," is instructed to
seek out and display that document. Even though the linked page may
actually reside on another Web server located halfway around the globe,
hyperlinks allow the visitor to "surf the Web," transparently moving
from site to site by simply clicking on the hyperlinks.
The potential for abuse associated with Web pages is great. Although
Web site space is usually limited, 80 thus providing insufficient storage
space for stockpiles of pirated works, Web pages are frequently used to
provide links to works located on FTP drop sites. Other Web pages help
the visitor obtain pirated works by providing tools to defeat copy
protection systems 81 or by providing instructions for obtaining pirated
software from other Internet services like Usenet, FTP, and IRC.
Despite this potential for abuse, Web sites are relatively easy to
monitor. Since the pages are relatively fixed in time and are encoded in
a standard text-based format, Web server Sysops can inspect the pages
with a simple visual scan. The identity of a Web page author is usually
known to the server Sysop82 and Web servers are configured so that

78. See generally Kevin Hughes, Entering the World-Wide Web: A Guide to
Cyberspace (last modified Oct. 1993) <http://www.hcc.hawaii.edu/guide/www.guide.
html>.
Although most Web pages exist on a single server, some sites are "mirrored," meaning
that they are simultaneously housed on several servers. Additionally, many ISPs "cache"
(temporarily copy to local mass storage devices) Web pages as they are retrieved in
order to speed up subsequent subscriber requests for that page.
79. HTML stands for Hypertext Markup Language. See generally National Center
for Supercomputing Applications, A Beginner's Guide to HTML (last modified Jan. 16,
1998) <http://www.ncsa.uiuc.edu/General/Intemet/WWW/HTMLPrimer. html>.
80. Most ISPs provide their subscribers with a limited amount of space on a Web
server, thus enabling them to set up their own Web pages.
81. See supra text accompanying note 7.
82. Some Web servers allow virtually anonymous Web page creation by allowing
for a quick and free signup, which the author can get by providing false personal
information. For example, there are several popular Web site hosting companies that
allow users to upload Web pages onto their servers with no verification of identity other
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Web pages may only be modified by their author, thus making the
author solely responsible for the content of the page. This accountability
deters the subscriber from posting illegal material, which in tum makes
the Sysop's monitoring easier.

6.

Summary

Although each Internet service operates in a unique way and therefore
each has its own distinct potential for copyright abuse, these services can
be grouped and distinguished according to certain common features.
First, for each of these services, the user must gain access to a server
before he can upload infringing material. Services like FTP, IRC, and
Usenet allow some measure of anonymity and thus present a much
greater potential for abuse than services like e-mail and the World Wide
Web, where users who provide infringing material can generally be
identified. Second, as opposed to one-to-one services like e-mail, the
other services are one-to-many, thus providing for much greater potential
losses to copyright holders. Likewise, e-mail's private nature restricts
a Sysop's ability, ethically and legally, to monitor one-to-one communications. Third, real-time services like IRC present a distinct challenge
to any monitoring efforts, since the content remains on the servers only
long enough to be transmitted to other servers. Fourth, whereas the
content of a Web page is relatively easy to visually determine, other
services present much greater content identification problems. Finally,
distributed services like Usenet and IRC present much greater challenges
to Sysop monitoring than non-distributed services like FTP and World
Wide Web. The majority of the content on servers offering distributed
services is not provided by a subscriber, but rather automatically
supplied by other servers on the network. Further, and most importantly,
the distributed services have a much greater daily data flow, presenting
problems of scale to their Sysops.
Unfortunately, most of the cases and commentary regarding ISP
liability have failed to clearly distinguish the differing role that ISPs play

an e-mail address, which itself may be either false or obtained from a free e-mail service
with equally inadequate verification procedures. See Robischon, supra note 53
(describing the abuse of anonymous Web sites and FTP drop sites by software and music
pirates).
For the lay web user, five minutes and an e-mail address are all that's
required for a free web site that provides a sort of soft-core anonymity
courtesy of Geocities [a no-charge Web site hosting company]. It's protection
enough for posting copyright-infringing software. Shutting the pages down
requires a subpoena~an expensive and time-consuming process for a site that
could disappear overnight.
Id.
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in connection with each of the different Internet services. This is an
understandable oversight, given the newness and complexity of the
Internet. Application of this overly simplistic view of the role of ISPs
and Internet Sysops, however, will lead lawmakers and courts to unfair,
inconsistent and ineffective policies. As noted by one service provider
association:
Although there are no Internet-specific laws at present, it is conceivable that
each different service provided by Internet access and technology suppliers may
attract a differing policy or legal regime. For instance, point to point
communication such as email and file transfers might be treated differently by
legislators and courts than services for the creation or hosting of Web sites, or
for the storage and retransmission of content such as newsgroups, and on-line
video or audio services. 83

III.

WHEN WILL

A SERVICE PROVIDER BE LIABLE?

The rapid expansion of the Internet has understandably challenged the
courts, which have been increasingly required to apply old laws to new
technology. In applying copyright law to the unfamiliar environment of
computers and cyberspace, courts must first determine if a violation has
occurred. This involves, among other things, unsettled questions of what
constitutes a "copy," a "display," or a "distribution" in the computer
context. Next, it must be determined if that copy or display violates one
of the exclusive rights granted to the copyright owner by the Copyright
Act. 84 Finally, courts must determine the even more challenging
question of who may properly be held liable for the violation, 85
In applying copyright law to online service providers, the central issue
is whether the service provider can be held directly liable for the
infringing acts of its subscribers. If the service provider is found
directly liable, the Copyright Act dictates that the provider is strictly
liable, since knowledge is not an element of direct liability. 86 Even if

83. The Canadian Association of Internet Providers (CAIP) "Code of Conduct"
(visited Apr. 4, 1997) <http://www.caip.ca/caipcode.htm>.
84. The Copyright Act grants owners of a work, among other things, the exclusive
right to control the work's reproduction and distribution, its public display or
performance, and the preparation of any derivative works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1997).
85. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, yet another substantial question
to be resolved is where jurisdiction may properly be exercised in cyberspace.
86. The Copyright Act imposes strict liability on infringers; a defendant's intent
or knowledge is not an element of infringement. See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
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the service provider is not directly liable, the court still must consider
whether the service provider may properly be held indirectly liable for
its subscribers' actions under a theory of contributory infringement or
vicarious liability. 87
Since online communications is still in its infancy, only a handful of
cases have required the courts to apply copyright law to the online
world. Fewer yet have been asked to consider the secondary liability of
service providers for subscriber-provided infringing content. As the
following cases show, the courts have experienced considerable difficulty
in articulating consistent principles.

A.
1.

Recent Court Decisions

Cubby v. CompuServe (Oct. 29, 1991)

In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, lnc., 88 CompuServe, a pioneer
national online service, was sued for defamatory statements posted to
one of its real-time "chat rooms" (the BBS equivalent of Internet Relay
Chat). Cubby is considered a watershed decision because it was one of
the first reported cases involving potential liability for an online service
provider.
Although Cubby involved defamation rather than copyright infringement, the considerations involved are roughly parallel. If the court
found CompuServe to have been a "publisher" of the defamatory
statements, it would be held strictly liable. On the other hand, if the
court found CompuServe to have been merely a "distributor" of the
statements, it would only be liable if it knew or had reason to know of
the presence of the statements. Thus, the distinction in the defamation

Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp 1361, 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("Direct
infringement does not require intent or any particular state of mind, although willfulness
is relevant to the award of statutory damages").
87. Indirect liability may be imposed upon others who are shown to have either
benefited from or contributed to the infringement. Since the Copyright Act does not
address indirect liability, these theories of recovery for indirect infringement have been
inferred from the Act by the courts. As the Supreme Court has stated:
The absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringement on certain
parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity. For
vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept
of contributory infringement is merely a species of the broader problem of
identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual
accountable for the actions of another.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,435 (1984).
88. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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doctrine between "publisher" and "distributor" is a rough analog of the
distinction in copyright doctrine between direct liability and contributory
infringement.
The court refused to hold CompuServe strictly liable as a publisher,
finding that:
CompuServe has no more editorial control over such a publication than does a
public library, book store, or newsstand, and it would be no more feasible for
CompuServe to examine every publication it carries for potentially defamatory
statements than it would be for any other distributor to do so. "First Amendment guarantees have long been recognized as protecting distributors of
publications.... Obviously, the national distributor of hundreds of periodicals
has no duty to monitor each issue of every periodical it distributes. Such a rule
would be an impermissible burden on the First Amendment." 89

After finding that CompuServe did not have knowledge of the defamatory statements, an essential element of distributor liability, the court
granted summary judgment for CompuServe. It is important to note,
however, that, since the chat room was actually operated by a subcontractor, Cubby conceded that CompuServe did not control the content in
the chat room. 90
2.

Playboy v. Frena (Dec. 9, 1993)

Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 91 was the first major case to deal
with the liability of an online service provider for the copyright
infringement of a subscriber. Playboy magazine brought suit against
George Frena, the operator of a BBS that contained over 170 of
Playboy's copyrighted images. BBS subscribers were able to preview
these images and select those that they wished to download. Frena
claimed that subscribers had uploaded the images and that he removed
them as soon as he was made aware of their existence. Since the case
was before the court on Playboy's motion for summary judgment,
Frena's claims were accepted as true.

89. Id. at 140 (quoting Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., 745 F.2d 123, 139 (2d
Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985)).
90. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 140 n. l. The court also held that CompuServe,
since it was not an agent of the subcontractor, could not be held vicariously liable. Id.
at 142-43. There was a rather complicated business arrangement between CompuServe,
the lessor, and another company that provided the actual content to the lessor. Id.
91. 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
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The court held Frena liable for direct infringement. The court found
that Frena had "implicated" Playboy's exclusive right to distribute copies
of its protected works and thus held Frena strictly liable, finding that
"[i]t does not matter that Defendant Frena claims he did not make the
copies himself. " 92 It was sufficient that Frena "supplied a product
containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work. " 93 The court
further held that Frena had violated Playboy's public display right,
finding that Frena's subscribers constituted a sufficient audience as to
render the display of the images a "public" display. 94

3.

Stratton Oakmont v. PRODIGY (May 25, 1995)

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. PRODIGY Services Co., 95 a New York
state court decision, demonstrates the unreliability of Cubby as precedent. The Stratton Oakmont court applied Cubby to a very similar set
of facts and reached an opposite result, finding the defendant to be a
publisher and thus subject to strict liability for defamatory communications posted on its system. The Stratton Oakmont court distinguished
Cubby in two ways. First, the court found that PRODIGY had "held
itself out to the public and its members as controlling the content of its
computer bulletin boards." 96 Second, the court held that PRODIGY
actually exercised this control, stating that:
PRODIGY implemented this control through its automatic software screening
program, and the Guidelines which Board Leaders are required to enforce. By
actively utilizing technology and manpower to delete notes from its computer
bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and "bad taste," for example,
PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to content and such decisions
constitute editorial control. 97

The court conceded that "PRODIGY's conscious choice, to gain the
benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than
CompuServe and other computer networks that make no such choice,"
but dismissed the notion that its decision would "compel all computer
networks to abdicate control of their bulletin boards," suggesting that the
increased profits from attracting "family-oriented" users would compensate service providers for their increased exposure to liability. 98

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
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Id. at 1556-57.
1995 WL 323710, at *l (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995).
Id. at *4.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
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4,

RTC v, Netcom (Nov, 21, 1995)

Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services, Inc., 99 which the Copyright Office has characterized as "[t]he
most extensive judicial analysis of the issues to date," 100 has been
extremely influential, both because it has inspired considerable debate
and because it has been extensively cited by subsequent courts.
Religious Technology Center (RTC), a corporate entity affiliated with
the Church of Scientology, brought suit against Netcom, a national ISP,
Tom Klemesrud, the owner of a BBS, and Dennis Erlich, one of
Klemesrud's subscribers. Klemesrud contracted with Netcom to allow
his BBS subscribers to gain access to Usenet news. Using Klemesrud's
BBS, Erlich posted excerpts from copyrighted Scientology literature to
a scientology-related newsgroup on Netcom's Usenet server, which then
propagated the messages throughout the Usenet system. Although the
exact relationship between the BBS server and Netcom's Usenet server
was not made clear in the opinion, the facts suggest that Klemesrud's
BBS server also functioned as a Usenet server, 101 Klemesrud apparently contracted with Netcom for the limited purpose of fulfilling the
requirement inherent in Usenet that each server be connected to at least
one other server. The BBS subscribers apparently posted and downloaded Usenet messages using the BBS server, which would in turn

99. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
100. Prepared Statement Of Marybeth Peters, Register Of Copyrights, Befi,re the
House Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Propertv, On H.R. 2180
And H.R. 2281, Federal News Service, Sept. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Peters Statement on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281].
IOI. Some sections of the opinion indicate that Klemesrud's BBS was configured
as a Usenet server:
Erlich then transmits his messages to Klemesrud's computer, where they are
automatically briefly stored. According to a prearranged pattern established
by Netcom's software, Erlich's initial act of posting a message to the Usenet
results in the automatic copying of Erlich's message from K.lemesrud's
computer onto Netcom's computer and onto other computers on the Usenet.
In order to ease transmission and for the convenience of Usenet users, Usenet
servers maintain postings from newsgroups for a short period of time---eleven
days for Netcom's system and three days for Klemesrud's system. Once on
Netcom's computers, messages are available to Netcom's customers and
Usenet neighbors, who may then download the messages to their own
computers.
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
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periodically exchange messages with Netcom's Usenet server. 102 In an
action for summary judgment, RTC charged that, even though Netcom
was not the point of origin of the infringing materials, it should
nevertheless be held liable under theories of direct infringement,
contributory infringement, and vicarious liability.
The court held that Netcom did not directly infringe RTC's reproduction right, reasoning that, although the Copyright Act imposes strict
liability for unauthorized copying, "there should still be some element
of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant's system is
merely used to create a copy by a third party." 103 The court reasoned
that:
Netcom did not take any affirmative action that directly resulted in copying
plaintiffs' works other than by installing and maintaining a system whereby
software automatically forwards messages received from subscribers onto the
Usenet, and temporarily stores copies on its system. Netcom's actions, to the
extent that they created a copy of plaintiffs' works, were necessary to havin.Jl
a working system for transmitting Usenet postings to and from the Internet. 1

Since Netcom's system "can operate without any human intervention"
and "neither Netcom nor Klemesrud initiated the copying," "the mere
fact that Netcom's system incidentally makes temporary copies of
plaintiffs' works does not mean Netcom has caused the copying." 105
The Netcom court distinguished the seemingly contrary holding in the
Frena case by explaining that the plaintiff's reproduction right was not
addressed in the Frena decision. The Frena court, it explained, held
only that the defendant BBS violated the plaintiff's distribution and
public display rights. 106 Nonetheless, the court took the opportunity
to directly address the reasoning of the Frena decision:
The court is not entirely convinced that the mere possession of a digital copy
on a BBS that is accessible to some members of the public constitutes direct

102. The court seemed to acknowledge its understanding of this fact by placing the
following footnote in its opinion:
The Usenet has been described as a worldwide community of electronic
BBSs that is closely associated with the Internet and with the Internet
community .... As a Usenet user, you read and contribute ("post") to your
local Usenet site. Each Usenet site distributes its users' postings to other
Usenet sites based on various implicit and explicit configuration settings, and
in turn receives postings from other sites .... There is no specific network that
is the Usenet. Usenet traffic flows over a wide range of networks, including
the Internet and dial-up phone links.
Id. at 1366 n.4 (quoting DANIEL P. DERN, THE INTERNET GUIDE FOR NEW USERS 196-97
(1994)). See also supra Part 11.C.4 (describing Usenet in more detail).
103. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1370.
104. Id. at 1368.
105. Id. at 1368-69 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1370-71.
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infringement by the BBS operator. Such a holding suffers from the same
problem of causation as the reproduction argument. Only the subscriber should
be liable for causing the distribution of plaintiffs' work, as the contributing
actions of the BBS provider are automatic and indiscriminate. Erlich could
have posted his messages through countless access providers and the outcome
would be the same: anyone with access to Usenet newsgroups would be able
to read his messages. There is no logical reason to draw a line around Netcom
and Klemesrud and say that they are uniquely responsible for distributing
Erlich's messages. Netcom is not even the first link in the chain of distribution
- Erlich had no direct relationship with Netcom but dealt solely with
Klemesrud's BBS, which used Netcom to gain its Internet access. Every
Usenet server has a role in the distribution, so plaintiffs' argument would create
unreasonable liability. Where the BBS merely stores and passes along all
messages sent by its subscribers and others, the BBS should not be seen as
causing these works to be publicly distributed or displayed.1°7

Further, the court held that even if the Frena holding is accepted, Frena
was "factually distinguishable" because the "[u]nlike the BBS in [Frena],
Netcom does not maintain an archive of files for its users .... it merely
provides access to the Internet, whose content is controlled by no single
entity." 108 Again, the court refused to apply Frena for policy reasons:
It would be especially inappropriate to hold liable a service that acts more like
a conduit, in other words, one that does not itself keep an archive of files for
more than a short duration. Finding such a service liable would involve an
unreasonably broad construction of public distribution and display rights. No
purpose would be served by holding liable those who have no ability to control
the information to which their subscribers have access, even though they might
be in some sense helping to achieve the Internet's automatic "public distribution" and the users' "public" display of files. ' 09

The court concluded that it "does not find workable a theory of infringement that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot
reasonably be deterred." 110
Likewise, the court found that Netcom could not be held vicariously
liable for Erlich's infringing actions. The court applied the Shapiro,

107. Id. at 1372 (emphasis added).
l08. Id. Perhaps the court should have left well enough alone. This distinction is
highly questionable, as the distinction between a bulletin board and a Usenet server is
a fine one indeed. Every Usenet server contains "an archive of files." The main
distinction in this case would be that, whereas a BBS server typically only stores files
uploaded by its subscribers, a Usenet server theoretically stores files uploaded by every
single Usenet subscriber in the world. Perhaps this is the difference between merely
having "an archive of files" and maintaining that archive.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. Id.
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Bernstein test, which provides that the defendant will be vicariously
liable for the actions of a direct infringer if (1) it has the right and
ability to control the infringer's acts, and (2) receives a direct financial
benefit from the infringing activity. 111 The court found that, on
balance, the plaintiffs had raised a genuine issue of fact as to Netcom's
right and ability to control its subscribers' actions. Netcom acquired the
right to control when it required its subscribers to agree to refrain from
posting copyrighted materials and to indemnify Netcom from any
damages to third parties. Additionally, Netcom had the ability to
terminate Erlich's access, even though that would entail shutting out all
of Klemesrud's subscribers. Nonetheless, because Netcom charged a flat
fee to its subscribers, the court held that it could not be held vicariously
liable since it received no direct financial benefit from the infringing
activities. Although RTC claimed that Netcom received a direct
financial benefit from its reputation as a provider that did not take action
against infringing subscribers, the court found this argument to be
unsupported by any evidence and would constitute an insufficient benefit
even if true. 112
Although it refused to impose direct or vicarious liability, the court
held that Netcom might be liable for contributory infringement under the
Gershwin Publishing test, where liability is found when the defendant,
"with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially
contributes to the infringing conduct of another." 113 The court concluded that the fact that Netcom allowed "infringing messages to remain
on its system and be further distributed to other Usenet servers worldwide" constituted "substantial," not just "material" participation. 114
Thus, since Netcom had notice of the infringing posts, the key question
to be resolved at trial becomes whether Netcom "knew of any infringement by Erlich before it was before it was too late to do anything about
it."115

In considering Klemesrud's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
court also found that he could not be held directly liable: "There are no
allegations in the complaint to overcome the missing volitional or causal
elements necessary to hold a BBS operator directly liable for copying
that is automatic and caused by a subscriber." 116 Also consistent with

111. Id. at 1375 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. H. L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304,
306 (2nd Cir. 1963)).
112. ld.atl377.
113. Id. at 1373 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2nd Cir. 1971)).
I 14. Id. at 1375 (emphasis added).
115. ld.atl374.
116. Id. at 1381-82.
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its analysis of Netcom's liability, the court held that Klemesrud could
not be held vicariously liable since RTC had not shown a direct financial
benefit, but that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Klemesrud's knowledge was sufficient to support a finding of contributory infringement.
In summary, although the court found that both Netcom and
Klemesrud might ultimately be found liable on a contributory infringement theory, the court denied RTC's motion for a preliminary injunction:
The court finds that plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing a likelihood
of success on the merits as to either Netcom or Klemesrud. The only viable
theory of infringement is contributory infringement, and there is little evidence
that Netcom or Klemesrud knew or should have known that Erlich was engaged
in copyright infringement of plaintiffs' works and was not entitled to a fair use
defense, especially as they did not receive notice of the alleged infringement
until after all but one of the postings were completed. Further, their participation in the infringement was not substantial. Accordingly, plaintiffs will not
likely prevail on their claims. 117

Netcom and RTC later settled on undisclosed terms. 1I8 The outcome
of the case against Klemesrud is unknown.
As shall be seen in the following cases, although Netcom has been
frequently cited for the proposition that an ISP that only provides access
to the Internet should not be held directly liable for its subscribers'
infringement, this is somewhat of a mischaracterization of its holding.
Although the Netcom opinion in its opening paragraphs described
Netcom's role as the "Internet access provider that allow[ed]
[Klemesrud's BBS] to reach the Internet," and that "Klemesrud's BBS
is not directly linked to the Internet, but gains its connection through the
facilities of defendant Netcom," 119 this is a somewhat imprecise
characterization of the relationship between the BBS and Netcom.
Netcom did not allow Klemesrud's subscribers to "reach the Internet."
Netcom merely contracted with Klemesrud to provide a peer-to-peer
117. Id. at 1383.
I 18. See Rose Aguilar, No Answers in Scientology Case (last modified Aug. 5,
1996) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,2055,00.html> (noting that "Many Internet
legal analysts are disappointed by an out-of-court settlement between Netcom and the
Church of Scientology because now they'll have to wait for another case to come to
light before a court sets a firm precedent on Internet access providers' liability for online
copyright infringement"). In the days following the settlement, Netcom posted new rules
regarding its handling of material claimed to be infringing. See Netcom and Scientology
Settle (last modified Aug. 4, 1996) <http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,2040,00.html>.
119. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365-66.
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connection with the BBS's Usenet server; at no time did the Netcom
connection allow Klemesrud's subscribers to actually access any other
computer on the Internet. Any "access to the Internet" was indirect and
strictly limited to providing a Usenet news feed. Further, Klemesrud
(and, a fortiori, Erlich) was not, in the conventional Internet access
provider use of the term, a "subscriber" of Netcom. 120
The more precise holding of Netcom is that a system that "incidentally
makes temporary copies" should not subject its operator to liability for
copyright infringement, since the operator does not "cause" the copying.
In fact, it is far more significant that the court used this reasoning to
support its refusal to hold Klemesrud directly liable. Although the court
was correct in its observation that there was no "meaningful distinction
... between what Netcom did and what every other Usenet server
does," 121 the same cannot be said for Klemesrud, since the infringing
works were directly posted to his Usenet server by one of his subscribers. All other news servers, including Netcom's, merely accepted
content "automatically and indiscriminately" provided by another server
in the periodic mass exchanges of data between peers. Despite this fact,
most courts and commentators have virtually ignored Klemesrud and
focused exclusively on Netcom as "the" defendant in the case. Thus,
although one can easily extend the Netcom holding to encompass a
service that merely provides Internet access to its subscribers, it is
noteworthy that this was not the issue before the court and it did not so
hold.

5.

Fonovisa v. Cherry Auction (Jan. 25, 1996)

Although Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc. 122 did not involve
online communications, it is an important case because several subsequent courts have cited Fonovisa when considering indirect liability for
online service providers. Cherry Auction operated a swap meet where

I 20. Although the relationship between Usenet servers is described as a "peer"
relationship, this is somewhat inaccurate. Some Usenet servers are "better connected"
than others, meaning that they have more or faster peer connections and therefore
contain more messages. When a peer connection is established between Usenet sysops,
the less "well connected" server is said to "slurp" the news from the better connected
server and thus the better connected server typically charges a fee for the connection.
See, e.g., Public Data Network: A Full Newsfeed - For Less! (visited Mar. 11, 1998)
<http://www.budget.net/newsi> (home page of Usenet provider offering a peer feed).
This was presumably the "subscriber" relationship between Netcom and Klemesrud,
which is significantly different from the relationship between an ISP and its dial-up
customers.
121. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373.
122. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
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counterfeited music recordings were frequently sold. Fonovisa alleged
that Cherry Auction was liable under vicarious liability and contributory
infringement. Fonovisa lost in District Court 123 and appealed to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Applying the Shapiro, Bernstein test (right and ability to supervise and
direct financial interest), the appellate court held Cherry Auction
vicariously liable. The court found that Cherry Auction had the right
and ability to supervise the infringing activities because it required its
concessionaires to sign an agreement whereby they agreed to abide by
Cherry's rules and regulations, it patrolled the premises, and it "promoted the swap meet and controlled the access of customers to the swap
meet area." 124 The court also found a direct financial benefit from the
infringing activities since Cherry derived "substantial financial benefits
from admission fees, concession stand sales and parking fees, all of
which flow directly from customers who want to buy the counterfeit
recordings at bargain basement prices." 125
Applying the Gershwin Publishing test (where liability will be found
where "one who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces,
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another"), 126 the appellate court also found Cherry Auction liable for
contributory infringement. After finding "no question" about Cherry's
knowledge, 127 the court held that "providing the site and facilities for
known infringing activity is sufficient to establish contributory liability."12s

123. Fonovisa, Inc., v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
124. Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
125. Id. at 263 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 264 (quoting Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management,
Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2nd Cir. 1971)).
127. Id. Perhaps the most compelling evidence was the activities of local law
enforcement. In 199 I, the Fresno County Sheriffs Department staged a raid on Cherry
Auction and seized over 38,000 counterfeit recordings. In 1992, the Sheriff's
Department sent a letter to Cherry Auction after finding that Cherry Auction vendors
were still selling counterfeit recordings. Further, in 1993, the plaintiff sent out its own
investigator and found that counterfeit recordings were still being sold. Id. at 261.
128. Id. (citing Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3rd
Cir.1986) and 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW & PRACTICE 1147 (BNA 1994))
(emphasis added).
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6.

Sega v. MAPHIA and Sega v. Sabella (Dec. 18, 1996)

Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. MAPHIA 129 and Sega Enterprises Ltd. v.
Sabella 130 are remarkably similar and will therefore be considered
together. Although unrelated, both were decided by the same court, on
the same day, and involved remarkably similar facts. These two cases
are most notable for their application of the Netcom approach, even
though the cases had factual circumstances more similar to Frena. Chad
Sherman (a.k.a. "Brujjo Digital") Sharon Sabella (a.k.a. "Dirty Scum")
operated, respectively, the "MAPHIA" and "SEWER LINE" BBSs from
their homes. Evidence strongly suggested that both Sherman and Sabella
had not only known about the presence of infringing copies of Sega's
games on the BBSs, but also had actually encouraged its subscribers to
upload the infringing copies. 131 In each case, Sega alleged liability
under direct, contributory, and vicarious liability theories.
Expressly following Netcom and using identical language in both
cases, the court refused to hold either defendant directly liable. "While
[Sherman's/Sabella's] actions in this case are more participatory than
those of the defendants in Netcom, ... whether [Sherman/Sabella] knew
[his/her] BBS users were infringing on Sega's copyright, or encouraged
them to do so, has no bearing on whether [Sherman/Sabella] directly
caused the copying to occur." 132 Also, in each case the court, consistent with Netcom, concluded that "[Sherman's/Sabella's] actions as a
BBS operator and copier seller are more appropriately analyzed under
contributory or vicarious liability theories." 133
Using the Gershwin Publishing test (knowledge and material
participation), the court found no real issue with either defendants'
knowledge, thereby leaving "material contribution" as the only factor to
be decided. In each case, the court found sufficient participation,

129. 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
130. No. C93-04260, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20740 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
131. Sabella's BBS, for instance, contained a directory called "Genesis," the name
of a proprietary cartridge-based video game system produced by the plaintiff. Id. at *6.
The "Genesis" directory contained approximately 20 files with user-supplied descriptions
clearly indicating that they were copies of Sega software. Id.
Sabella provided different levels of access to the BBS. Users could increase the
amount of information that they downloaded by either paying a fee, by gaining download
credit based upon the amount of information that they uploaded, or by purchasing one
of her copying machines. Id. at *6-10. She also urged users to contribute to her
operation by proclaiming that: "You are giving very little to have HUNDRED's [sic] of
$$$$$$$$ worth of games 1" Id. at *8.
132. MAPH/A, 948 F. Supp. at 932; Sabella, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20740, at *1920 (empha~is added).
I 33. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 932; Sabella, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20740, at *20.
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suggesting that using either the "provision of site and facilities" test from
Fonovisa, or what it called "an alternative and higher standard of
'substantial participation"' (citing Netcom as authority), both defendants
would be liable since each had not only participated in, but also
encouraged, the infringing activity. 134 Since the court found each
defendant liable under contributory infringement, it did not consider
Sega's vicarious liability claims.
7.

Playboy v. Webbworld (June 27, 1997)

In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 135 the defendants
operated the "Netpics" Web site and allowed its subscribers, for a fixed
monthly fee, to access adult images stored on its Web servers. The
images were first collected on a Usenet news server that the Netpics
Sysops programmed to only accept messages from newsgroups that
contained adult images. The Sysops developed a program called
"ScanPics" that would constantly scan the downloaded Usenet messages,
extract the images, discard any text, and then automatically copy the
extracted images to thirteen other computers that they used as Web
servers. J3 6 The ScanPics program would also create smaller "thumbnail" copies of the images, which enabled subscribers to preview the
images and select only those that they wished to download. The Netpics
Web servers each contained between 40,000 and 70,000 images at any
given time.
Playboy filed suit after its "Electronic Infringement Research
Assistant" obtained a subscription to the Netpics site and subsequently
discovered that many of Playboy's copyrighted magazine images were

134.

MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. at 932; Sabella, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20740, at *24-

25.
135. No. 3-96-CV-3222-H, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21264 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11,
1997).
136. Id. at *7-8. It is unclear from the opinion what "text" was discarded from the
Usenet messages. This might mean any one of three things: (I) that the ScanPics
program discarded most messages consisting only of text, (2) that the program merely
separated the file attachments from their identifying "header" text, a nonnal part of
decoding any Usenet message that has an attached file, or (3) that the program actually
examined each image after it was decoded and removed text that was present in the
image itself (e.g., copyright information).
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contained in the "Centerfolds" directory of the Netpics Web servers. 137
Playboy named as defendants Webbworld, the corporate entity that
owned the Netpics site, Webbworld's sole shareholder, and two other
profit-sharing Webbworld employees. After obtaining a temporary
restraining order, Playboy moved for summary judgment on theories of
direct infringement and vicarious liability. 138
With little discussion, the court found Webbworld directly liable, flatly
holding that "[t]he evidence unequivocally shows that Webbworld
electronically reproduced, distributed, and displayed [Playboy's]
protected images." 139 The court rejected the defendants' argument,
based on Netcom, that "it served as a mere conduit between its
subscribers and adult-oriented newsgroups" and that "the infringing
images would have existed on the Usenet whether or not Webbworld
provided access to them or not." 140 The court distinguished Netcom:
Unlike the defendant service provider in RTC [v. Netcom], Webbworld did not
function as a mere provider of access. To visit the Netpics site, a subscriber
first was required to gain access to the Internet itself by using an Internet
service provider such as the defendant in RTC. Webbworld did not sell access;
it sold adult images.
Also unlike the Defendant in RTC, Webbworld did not function as a passive
conduit of unaltered information. Instead, Webbworld functioned primarily as
a store, a commercial destination within the Internet. Just as a merchant might
re-package and sell merchandise from a wholesaler, so did Webbworld repackage (by deleting text and creating thumbnails) and sell images it obtained
from the various newsgroups. In contrast to the defendants in RTC, Webbworld
took "affirmative steps to cause the copies to be made." Such steps included
using the ScanNews software to troll the Usenet for Webbworld's product.
Webbworld contends that it had no control over the information its software
retrieved from the Usenet and no control over the images posted therein. See
RTC (finding no liability because the defendant access provider "does not create
or control the content of the information available to its subscribers"). On the
contrary, Webbworld exercised total dominion over the content of its site and
the product it offered its clientele. As a shop owner may choose from what
sources he or she contracts to buy merchandise, so, too, did Webbworld have
the ability to choose its newsgroup sources. Clearly, a newsgroup named, for
example, "alt.sex.playboy" or "alt.mag.playboy" might instantly be perceived
as problematic from the standpoint of federal copyright law. Alternatively,
Webbworld might simply have refrained from conducting business until it had
developed software or a manual system of oversight to prevent, or at least to
minimize the possibility of, copyright infringement. In any event, having

137. These facts were only described in an earlier decision on Playboy's motion for
partial summary judgment. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171,
I I 74, 76 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
I 38. Playboy apparently did not allege contributory infringement. Playboy also
moved for summary judgment on its trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and
unfair competition claims, but these discussions have been omitted.
139. Webbworld, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21264, at *15-16.
140. Id. at *16.
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developed and launched the ScanNews software for commercial use,
Webbworld cannot now evade liability by claiming helplessness in the face of
its "automatic" operation. 141

The court also held two of the three individual defendants vicariously
liable, 142 After finding that the infringements were willful, the court
assessed joint and several liability for statutory damages of $439,000 and
plaintiff's attorney's fees, 143
Although the Webbworld court arguably came to the right conclusion,
its analysis of the direct liability issue was somewhat flawed, First,
although the court correctly distinguished Netcom, the implication that
Netcom only provides Internet access is incorrect As previously noted,
Netcom did not provide Internet access to the codefendant BBS's
subscribers, it merely provided a Usenet news peer feed, Although it
may be true that Netcom was more of a "passive conduit," Netcom's
actual role eluded the Webbworld court, which is understandable given
the Netcom opinion's confusing treatment of the subject Further, and
perhaps more importantly, the court failed to adequately note that the
defendants, in addition to creating and copying the thumbnail images,
also copied the images themselves to their Web servers, an additional
"volitional act" that would have further distinguished Netcom and added
more support to its holding,

8,

Marobie-FL v, NAFED (Nov. 18, 1997)

In Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire Equipment
Distributors ("NAFED"), 144 NAFED created a Web page that included
certain clip art files (simplified images typically used in publications like
newsletters) copyrighted by Marobie-FL. The case was before the court
on Marobie's motion for summary judgment for direct infringement
against both NAFED and Northwest Nexis, the ISP that provided
NAFED with space on its Web server. Although Marobie did not allege
vicarious liability, Northwest sought summary judgment on that issue.
Citing MAPHIA and Frena, the court held that NAFED violated
Marobie's reproduction right when it copied the clip art to the hard drive

141. Id. at *17-18 (citations omitted).
142. The third individual defendant was not entitled to receive a profit share until
a time after most of the infringing acts occurred. Id. at *24-25.
143. Id. at *18-22, 48, 53-54.
144. No. 96C2966, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18764 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1997).
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on the Northwest Web server. 145 Relying on Frena, the court also
held that NAFED violated Marobie's distribution right when it made the
clip art available for downloading, irrespective of whether anyone
actually downloaded the images. The court also indicated in a footnote
that, although Marobie did not allege violation of its right to public
display the works, "NAFED appears liable for violating this right as
well."146
The court did not, however, find Northwest directly liable. Relying
on Netcom, Northwest argued that "it cannot be held liable for direct
infringement because if any copying, distribution or display of plaintiff's
work occurred, it was caused not by Northwest, but by Internet
users." 147 The court found this argument "persuasive" and rejected
Marobie's attempt to distinguish Netcom:
Plaintiff argues that Northwest, unlike the Internet access provider in Religious
Technology Center, serves as more than just a gateway to the Internet because
Northwest actually stores the files in NAFED's Web Page in its hard drive.
Although plaintiff correctly points out that Northwest provides a service
somewhat broader than the service provided by the Internet access provider in
Religious Technology Center, the court nevertheless finds that Northwest only
provided the means to copy, distribute or display plaintiff's works, much like
the owner of a public copying machine used by a third party to copy protected
material. Like a copying machine owner, Northwest did not actually engage in
any of these activities itself. Accordingly, Northwest may not be held liable for
direct infringement. 148

Next, the court, citing Fonovisa, held that it could not grant Marobie's
motion for summary judgment on its contributory infringement claim,
since there were genuine issues of material fact as to Northwest's
knowledge of the infringing material and as to "[t]he degree to which
Northwest monitored, controlled, or had the ability to monitor or control
the contents of NAFED's Web Page." 149 The court did, however,
grant Northwest's motion for summary judgment on the issue of its
vicarious liability. Citing Netcom, the court held that, since Northwest
charged a flat fee for its hosting services, Marobie could not prove that
Northwest received any direct financial benefit from NAFED's infringing
activities. 150

145. Id. at * 10-1 I. Note that this is in variance with the Netcom court's
interpretation of the Frena decision. The Netcom court held that Frena did not address
the reproduction right. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
146. Id. at * 11 n.4.
147. Id. at *29.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *30.
150. Id. at *31-31.
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The Marobie decision contains notable errors, It was factually
incorrect when, as in Webbworld, the court incorrectly asserted that
Netcom served only as an "Internet access provider" in the RTC case.
It was legally incorrect in its consideration of Northwest's contributory
infringement. Rather than evaluating Northwest's participation in the
infringing activities, the court considered its control or ability to control,
an element that is only relevant to a vicarious liability analysis, 151
9,

Playboy v. Hardenburgh (Nov, 25, 1997)

In Playboy Enterprises, Inc, v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc,, 152 the
defendant operated a BBS containing over 40,000 adult images, The
BBS granted its subscribers additional download privileges in exchange
for their uploads. Each file uploaded by a subscriber was briefly
examined by the Sysops "to ascertain whether they were 'acceptable,'
meaning, not pornographic, and not blatantly protected by copy-

151. The court was also inaccurate in its analysis of Northwest's direct liability.
The plaintiff, in what may have simply been unartful drafting, failed to allege that the
copies on the Northwest Web server's storage devices were infringing. It instead alleged
that Northwest directly infringed whenever its server made temporary copies in its RAM
incidental to the process of transmitting the information to a visitor to the page. Id. at
*6. Northwest therefore tendered the defense that the works were not sufficiently
"fixed" since the images were sent out in individual packets, with the entire work never
being simultaneously present in the server's RAM. Id. at *26. The court analyzed this
argument as follows:
Northwest argues that this copy is not a "copy" under the Act because it is not
"fixed." Northwest argues that it is not "fixed" because the information is
transmitted "through" RAM and over the Internet at high speed in the
electronic form of bytes. According to Northwest, this process of duplication
and transmission happens so quickly that "typically only a portion of a file is
in RAM at any one time."
"A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment
in a copy ... is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration." 17 U.S.C. § 101. Yet, a "copy" under the Act need not be
potentially perceptible with the naked eye. On the contrary, a "copy" is a
"material object[] ... in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device." 17 U.S.C. § 101. In the instant case, the copy created by Northwest's
computer can be perceived with the aid of a machine or device, namely, the
Internet user's computer.
Id. at *26-27. The court clearly confused "fixation" with "perception."
152. No. l:93CV0546, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19310 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 1997).
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right." 153 After a Playboy investigator subscribed to the BBS and
discovered that it contained 412 of its copyrighted images, Playboy
brought suit and then moved for summary judgment on the issues of
direct and contributory infringement.
Noting that "the differences between Frena and this case are few," 154
the court held Hardenburgh liable for direct infringement. Although in
dicta the court noted its approval of the Netcom decision, it held that
Netcom did not apply to this case:
[T]he facts in this case, unlike Frena, Sega, and Netcom, are sufficient to
establish that Defendants themselves engaged in two of the activities reserved
to copyright owners under 17 U.S.C. § 106. The court finds that Defendants
distributed and displayed copies of [Playboy's] photographs in derogation of
[its] copyrights. This finding hinges on two crucial facts: (I) Defendants'
policy of encouraging subscribers to upload files, including adult photographs,
onto the system, and (2) Defendants' policy of using a screening procedure in
which [BBS] employees viewed all files in the upload file and moved them into
the generally available files for subscribers.
These two facts transform Defendants from passive providers of a space in
which infringing activities happened to occur to active participants in the
process of copyright infringement. 155

The court held that the defendants' actions violated Playboy's
distribution and public display rights but, curiously, as in the Frena
decision, failed to address its reproduction right. The court also granted
Playboy's motion for summary judgment on its contributory infringement. Citing Fonovisa, the court found that the defendants "clearly
induced, caused, and materially contributed" to the infringing activity
and found that the defendants "had at least constructive knowledge" of
the infringing activity, stating that it was "disingenuous" for the
defendants to deny that they were aware that images from "one of the
most famous and widely distributed adult publications in the world"
"were likely to find their way onto the BBS." 156
B.

Analysis

Firm rules defining the current limits of Internet service provider
liability are obviously difficult to state with any accuracy. There have
been few cases to directly address the issue and those that have
addressed it have often come to apparently inconsistent conclusions.

153.
154.
155.
156.
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Further, since the reported decisions have often stated incorrect
facts, 157 offered ambiguous legal conclusions, 158 or inadequately
reported perhaps crucial facts, 159 it is unclear how those cases might
be decided before a better informed court, As demonstrated by the
following list, this uncertainty presents service providers with a great
challenge in setting operating policies and procedures that limit their
potential liability,

157, E.g., the incorrect assertion that Netcom only provided access to the Internet
in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., No. 3-96-CV-3222-H, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21264, at *16-18 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 1997) (see supra text accompanying notes
140-41) and Marobie-FL, Inc. v. National Association of Fire Equipment Distributors,
Inc., No. 96C2966, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18764, at *29 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1997) (see
supra text accompanying note 148).
158. E.g., the cursory treatment of the exclusive rights in Playboy Enterprises, Inc.
v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (see supra text accompanying notes
92, 94) and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., No. I :93CV0546, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19310, at *26-30 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, I 997) (see supra text
accompanying note 155) and the incorrect treatment of Northwest's "fixation" argument
in Marobie (see supra note 151). See also Case Law on Online Transmissions of
Copyrighted Works, U.S. Copyright Office, June 1997 (appended to Statement of
Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Before the House Subcomm. on Courts And
Intellectual Property, on H.R. 2180 and H.R. 2281, I05th Congress, !st Session (last
modified Sept. 16, I 997) <http://lcweb.loc.gov/copyright/cpypub/2180_stat.html>).
In a number of these cases, the question of which rights were infringed is
less than clear. The courts often fail to differentiate among the rights, or to
conduct a thorough analysis of each separately. Thus, they may simply find
"copying" in its plain English meaning, or use words like "transmitted,"
"posted," "distributed," "uploaded," or "downloaded" without clearly indicating
what actions were sufficient to constitute a prima facie infringement, and of
which right.
id.
159. E.g., the court's failure to completely describe the nature of the "subscriber"
relationship between Klemesrud's BBS and Netcom's news server in Religious Tech. Ctr.
v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (see
supra text accompanying notes 101-02, I 19-21) and the court's failure to elaborate on
the "discarding" of text in the collected Usenet messages in Webbworld (see supra note
136).
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(1) The right to control subscriber activities may increase an ISP's
exposure to liability. 160 Therefore, more power that an ISP retains in
a subscriber's contract, the greater its potential liability.
(2) The ability to control subscriber activities may increase an ISP's
exposure to liability. 161 The longer that content is resident upon the
servers, the greater the ability to control that content, thereby encouraging ISPs to provide only more transient, and therefore less useful,
services. 162 Similarly, the hosting of content able to be displayed, such
as Web page hosting, may expose an ISP to strict liability for direct
infringement of the author's public display, distribution, or public
performance rights. 163
(3) The actual exercise of control over subscriber activities may
increase an ISP's exposure to liability. 164 If an ISP selectively filters

160. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996)
(Cherry Auction concessionaires were required to sign an agreement pledging that they
would obey Cherry's rules and regulations) (see supra text accompanying note 124);
Webbworld, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21264, at *18 (Webbworld "exercised total
dominion over the content of its site"); compare Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776
F. Supp. 135, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (CompuServe not liable because there was no
agency relationship with company that operated chat room) with Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. PRODIGY Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *6-7 (N.Y. Sup. May 24, 1995)
(PRODIGY liable because there was an agency relationship).
Service providers have argued that the reservation of removal rights by an ISP should
not be seen as an admission that it actually has the ability to monitor its systems.
[M]ost providers expressly reserve a contractual right to remove any content
uploaded by any party for any reason. They do not, however, undertake to
monitor all content actively and on a real-time basis, which both is impossible
and would destroy the speed and effectiveness of the communications tools
that they provide. However, this reservation of rights permits the service
provider to take actions that may be necessary under unexpected circumstances, such as flagrant and obvious violation of copyright rules.
NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 (Part 2), Hearings on H.R. 2441 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
105th Cong. 248 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2441] (statement of Stephen M.
Heaton, Gen. Counsel and Sec., CompuServe Inc.).
161. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2-3 (proof of past exercise of
editorial control central to the finding that PRODIGY was a publisher and thus strictly
liable).
162. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp at 1361 (that Usenet server retained messages for at
most 11 days "may be relevant to contributory infringement, where knowledge is an
element").
163. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556-57 (M.D. Fla.
1993); Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Fire Equip. Distribs., Inc., No. 96C2966, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18764, at *11 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 18, 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., No. l:93CV0546, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19310, at *29-30
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 1997) (ability of subscribers to browse files on server violates
plaintiff's public display and distribution rights); Webbworld, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21264, at *15-16 (display, distribution and reproduction).
164. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *4 (preparing guidelines for
message removal and creating an automatic system to remove messages); compare

262

[VOL. 35: 219, 1998]

Internet Copyright Infringement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

incoming content, even using automated systems, this editorial control
may increase its exposure to liability. 165 Although this increased
exposure to liability is, of course, offset by a decreased exposure to
liability for the content removed or blocked, there seems to be a clear
disincentive for ISPs to exercise editorial control.
(5) If an ISP presents itself as a concerned provider that exercises
editorial control, the corresponding commercial benefit may increase its
exposure to liability. 166 Yet, if an ISP presents itself as a provider that
does not exercise editorial control, the corresponding commercial benefit
may also increase its exposure to liability. 167
(6) An ISP may be charged with constructive knowledge of the
information resident on its servers. 168
Despite the fact that these liability-increasing factors are often in
conflict with subscriber desires, with public policy, and even in apparent
conflict with each other, some commentators have attempted to minimize
the concerns of ISPs by noting that no truly blameless providers have yet
to be found liable: "While the legal analysis has not always been
consistent, the outcomes have been appropriate, imposing liability only
on parties who clearly should have been held responsible." 169 Unfortu-

Net com, 907 F. Supp at 1368-69 (programming Usenet server accept messages from all
newsgroups) with Webbworld, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21264, at *7 (programming
Usenet server to accept messages only from selected newsgroups) and Hardenburgh,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19310, at *6, 29-30 (visually screening images to filter out
blatantly infringing images). But see Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1375 n.21 ("[Departure
from a] policy and practice of acting to stop postings where there is inadequate
knowledge of infringement in no way creates a higher standard of care under the
Copyright Act as to subsequent claims of user infringement").
165. Compare Netcom, 907 F. Supp at 1368-69 (Usenet server programmed to
accept messages from all newsgroups) with Webbworld, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21264,
at *7, 17-18 (Usenet server programmed to accept messages only from selected
newsgroups provides commercial advantage to Sysops).
166. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710 at *5 (PRODIGY's advertisement of
itself as a concerned provider increased revenues from "family-oriented" users).
167. See Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377 (reputation as a "hands-off' provider might
prove direct financial benefit from infringing activities).
168. See Hardenburgh, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19310 at *17 (Sysops charged with
constructive knowledge that adult newsgroups would contain images from famous
magazine).
169. Peters Statement on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281, supra note 100. See also Valenti
Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281, supra note 8.
Of those few cases that have gone to court, none has resulted in the imposition
of debilitating damage awards on an "innocent" [service provider] that had no
involvement, other than providing network services, in infringing activity.
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nately, decisions involving "bad actors" provide little guidance for more
responsible providers attempting to set policies and procedures that limit
their potential liability. The Netcom court's holding that "mere conduit"
services do not "cause" copying and thus should be held to a contributory infringement standard seems to be the closest thing to a "bright-line
test" to have emerged from the cases. 170 Netcom, however, was only
a District Court decision, and thus not binding authority for any other
court. Further, even if courts attempt to follow the Netcom reasoning,
the Webbworld decision illustrates that the precise contours of when an
ISP is a "mere conduit" are far from being defined.
Although Webbworld and Netcom were each arguably correctly
decided, it is difficult to articulate a rule separating them. Netcom was
not directly liable because it acted as a "mere conduit" when it
configured its news servers to automatically make copies of all messages
from all newsgroups. Webbworld, on the other hand, was directly liable
because it "functioned primarily as a store" when it "repackaged" and
"sold" the images automatically obtained from its news server. 171 It
is unclear, however, which action or actions were sufficient to transform
Webbworld from a "conduit" to a "store." Was Webbworld's configuring of its news server to only accept images from certain groups, it's
filtering of these messages to remove text, it's copying of these filtered
images to its Web servers, or it's creation of the thumbnail images that
was the transforming action or actions? What if a provider configured
a news server to accept only images from the adult newsgroups and
offered access to these unaltered images as a standalone service? What
if it filtered out text messages and offered only the images? What if
automatically copied these filtered pictures to its Web servers without
creating thumbnails?
Even assuming that the Netcom contributory infringement approach is
followed by all courts, a dubious assumption at best, the application of

Where providers have been held liable, it's quite clear from the facts of
specific cases that they were well aware of, or were even active participants
in. the violations enabled by their services.
Id.

170. The Netcom court found contributory infringement to be the only "viable
theory" of recovery. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs.,
Inc., 907 F. Supp 1361, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In Sega v. MAPHIA 948 F. Supp. 923,
933 (N.D. Cal. 1996) and Sega v. Sabella, No. C93-04260, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20740, at *25 (N.D. Cal. 1996), while the court did not find that contributory
infringement is the only viable theory, it did not address the defendants' vicarious
liability, halting the inquiry after finding contributory liability. This can be fairly seen
as an implied assertion by the court that contributory infringement was the most suitable
theory.
171. See supra text accompanying note 141.
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the doctrine to the complex fact patterns that will undoubtedly continue
to present themselves will be a persistent problem, For example, what
is proper notice? Is actual notice required? If actual notice, how
specific must the notice be? This technological slippery slope is
presented by Hardenburgh, where the defendant was charged with "at
least constructive knowledge" that Playboy's images "were likely to find
their way onto the BBS," 172 Couldn't the same thing be said of every
Usenet server Sysop? Any news server that accepts the full news feed
will contain far more than 412 of Playboy's copyrighted images,
What if a service provider did the opposite, configuring its news
server to filter out those groups that have a high level of copyright
abuse? Might it also thereby increase its liability for infringing content
in the remaining groups, since it has now ceased to be a "mere conduit"
and has undertaken to exercise editorial control? The defendants in
Hardenburgh claimed to have made a good faith effort to screen out
obviously infringing content, yet the court held that fact against them by
using it to establish their knowledge,
The inability of the courts to articulate consistent rules is undoubtedly
due in part to the fact that they have been required to carry out the
objectives of copyright in an unfamiliar, complex, and often confusing
factual setting, In addition to raising difficult legal and factual issues,
the question of ISP liability inherently implicates important social,
economic, and constitutional policy considerations, Further, although
courts must necessarily consider these policy issues, copyright is
statutory in nature, thereby forcing the courts to render decisions that are
not only fair, but also simultaneously consistent with both the express
provisions of the Copyright Act and its underlying policy goals,
Because of these practical difficulties and inherent policy implications,
many commentators reason that service providers should be held strictly
liable, In addition to removing the judgment of the courts, it is argued
that strict liability is most consistent with the policy goals of copyright
The following section examines some of these policy arguments,
IV,

THE STRICT LIABILITY OPTION

In September 1995, the Clinton administration's Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) issued Intellectual Property and the National

172.

See supra text accompanying note 156.
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Information Infrastructure (commonly referred to as "the White Paper"),
a controversial report recommending changes to American policy in
response to "[t]he special intellectual property concerns and issues raised
by the development and use of the NII [national information infrastructure]."173 The report concludes that ISPs should be subjected to strict
liability for infringing material transmitted through or resident upon their
computers. 174
The White Paper is significant in the discussion of online service
provider liability for several reasons. First, although it was disappointingly cursory in its specific examination of ISP liability, it is one of the
most comprehensive studies yet produced regarding the application of
intellectual property doctrines to cyberspace. Second, it is more than
just a study; the White Paper makes specific recommendations about
future policy for the Internet, including ISP-related issues, and these
recommendations carry with them the implicit endorsement of the Oval
Office, thus giving them inherent credibility. These recommendations
were, in fact, without significant change, quickly codified and introduced

]73. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, it-.TELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, at 1 (1995) [hereinafter IITF WHITE
PAPER]. Some authors have supported the White Paper as a balanced treatment of the
issues. See, e.g., Mark C. Morril & Sarah E. Eaton, Protecting Copyrights On-Line:
Copyright Liability for On-Line Service Providers, 8 NO. 4 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 3
(Apr. 1996) ("Its conclusions and recommendations ... represent a serious attempt to
balance potentially conflicting interests and to develop sound public policy in connection
with the NII.").
Other commentators have been critical of the report. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R.
2441, supra note 160, at 258 (statement of Stephen M. Heaton, Gen. Counsel and Sec.,
CompuServe Inc.).
[The White Paper] appears to reflect only considerations of copyright owners,
without due consideration of the needs of the infrastructure that is to constitute
the [national information infrastructure]. Indeed, [the Netcom court] has
already taken issue with the failure of the White Paper to appreciate the
significance of the issues raised by the online industry and other persons
concerned about the free flow of ideas.
id. One news article even suggested that the report was the product of pro-content
provider bias on the part of Bruce Lehman, the administration official primarily
responsible for the White Paper's preparation.
Characterizing the Clinton
administration's policies as a "dogged pursuit of restrictive copyright legislation for the
digital age," the article noted that "[b]efore joining the Patent Office [as its Commissioner] in 1993, Lehman, a lawyer, represented the motion picture, telecommunications,
computer software and broadcasting industries" and that the White Paper "was widely
criticized as too restrictive and favorable to the interests of Lehman's former clients."
Denise Caruso, A Tough Stance on Cyberspace Copyrights, NEW YORK TIMES
CYBERTIMES (last modified Jan. I 9, I 998) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/
digicom/011998digicom.html>
I 74. The White Paper devoted a separate section to ISP liability. IITF WHITE
PAPER, supra note 173, at I 14-23.
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as bills in both the House and the Senate. 175 The White Paper's
endorsement of strict liability for online service providers has understandably generated tremendous controversy, with the White Paper
serving as a focal point for debate over the policy issues surrounding
service provider liability.
The White Paper asserts that strict liability for service providers is
mandated by the Copyright Act and concludes that "[t]he Working
Group believes it is - at best - premature to reduce the liability of any
type of service provider in the NII environment." 176 Although the
White Paper was, in essence, arguing for the status quo, 177 the status
quo has apparently changed since its publication. The landmark Netcom
case, pending when the White Paper was released, 178 explicitly rejected
White Paper's conclusions. The Netcom view seems to have taken root,
relegating the White Paper's recommendation of strict liability to an
apparent minority view. This is appropriate, as liability without fault is
a harsh doctrine and should be imposed only after careful consideration
and when absolutely necessary to further important policy goals. 179
The White Paper and its supporters do, however, articulate many
important policy goals that they claim would be advanced by the
imposition of strict liability on service providers. The White Paper first
identified the "arguments made by service providers wishing exemption
175. Both bills were entitled "the National Information Infrastructure Copyright
Protection Act of 1995." S. 1284 was authored by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and
Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and H.R. 2441 was authored by Representatives Carlos
Moorhead (R-Califomia), Patricia Schroeder (D-Colorado), and Howard Coble (R-North
Carolina).
176. IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 122.
177. "Simply put, the White Paper recommends that the Copyright Act maintain
traditional standards of liability for online service providers in today's emerging,
nontraditional environment. In other words, the White Paper suggests that the law
maintain the status quo." John Carmichael, Comment, In Support of the White Paper:
Why Online Service Providers Should Not Receive Immunity From Traditional Notions
of Vicarious and Contributory Liability for Copyright Infringement, 16 LOY. L.A. ENT.
L.J. 759, 763-64 (1996).
178. The White Paper identified Netcom as a pending "relevant case." IITF WHITE
PAPER, supra note 173, at 119-20.
I 79. Some authors have argued the opposite, that strict liability should be the
default standard for new technologies. See, e.g., Morril & Eaton, supra note 173, at 5.
As the law tends to hold new activities, whose safety is not well understood,
to strict liability until more is known about them, on-line services should be
held to a strict liability standard at least until we discover how best to mitigate
and prevent on-line copyright infringement through technological solutions.
Id.
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or a higher standard of liability"' 80 and then addressed them in turn,
thus implicitly placing the burden of proof upon those challenging what
it perceived as the current state of the law. Since it now appears that the
status quo has changed, the following analysis of the strict liability
option will identify and examine the justifications for strict liability
advanced by the White Paper and its supporters.
A.

The Products Liability Analogy

One central theme advanced by proponents of strict liability for
service providers is that it is necessary to provide proper internalization
of the costs of infringement. This argument is premised on the classic
products liability tort doctrine that those who produce injurious or
defective products should be held strictly liable for any resultant harm.
As Mark Morril and Sarah Eaton, attorneys for publisher Simon &
Schuster, argued in a forceful defense of the White Paper:
While the hazard at issue in the context of on-line service copyright
infringement is injury to intellectual property and not personal injury, the
traditional justifications for the application of strict liability are present here.
The commercial on-line service provider is in a position analogous to the
manufacturer as it launches into commerce a product or service with the
potential to do harm to others and the provider is best situated to prevent, or to
allocate the cost of, that harm ....
Manufacturers are held liable for injuries caused by their products in a
foreseeable manner. By analogy, on-line service providers provide services
which foreseeably lead to copyright infringement of unprecedented magnitude
- the destruction of the entire commercial value of a work through the click
of a mouse. 181

While strict liability for products manufacturers is well-settled law, it
is a flawed proposition to import products liability doctrine into the
discussion of service provider liability. Strict liability is typically
applied to force manufacturers to internalize the costs from products that
create injury because they are either inherently dangerous or defective.182 Unlike the costs properly imposed on the manufacturer of a
product "unsafe in its intended use," however, the "product" that an ISP
supplies (the provision of transmission or storage facilities) has no
"defect;" it is the intentional misconduct of a minority of the consumers

180.
I 8 I.
182.
1971).
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IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 115.
Morril & Eaton, supra note 173, at 5.
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON TORTS 659-60 (4th ed.
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of that product that creates the injury, 183 Unlike a defective automobile, unsafe power tool, or even explosives, online services do not
"cause" the risk of injury, In tort terms, the intentional act of the
infringer, even if "foreseeable," constitutes a superseding cause, thereby
breaking the chain of causation, 184 Holding ISPs strictly liable on
these grounds makes no more sense than holding an automobile
manufacturer liable for injuries caused when an automobile is
"foreseeably" used as the getaway vehicle in a bank robbery, 185
However, the White Paper asserts that, since ISPs reap some economic
benefit from the foreseeable misconduct of their subscribers, fairness
dictates that they should nevertheless be held strictly liable:
The on-line services provide subscribers with the capability of uploading
works because it attracts subscribers and increases usage-for which they are
paid. Service providers reap rewards for infringing activity. It is difficult to
argue that they should not bear the responsibilities.... The risk of infringement
liability is a legitimate cost of engaging in a business that causes harm to others
186

I 83. Even those supporting increased liability for service providers cannot dispute
that the vast majority of Internet users are not infringers. See, e.g., Valenti Testimony
on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281, supra note 8.
Let's be clear right up front. Most of the millions of customers of OSP' s
and Internet service providers (ISP' s) are law-abiding and ethical. They use
these services to reach the Net for perfectly legitimate purposes: to communicate by electronic mail; to participate in online communities of shared
interests; to access news and information; and to reach the mushrooming
number of legitimate, authorized sites that offer entertainment, including sites
affiliated with all of our studios.
id.
I 84. See PROSSER, supra note I 82, at 667.
I 85. As noted by one service provider:
Where a third party has not itself done anything to infringe a copyright, ...
it is contrary to fundamental notions of fairness to hold him responsible for
that infringement. ...
[W]here a device, system, product or service has substantial purposes and uses
that are in no way illegal or even inappropriate, and that in fact have
tremendous positive, non-infringing value, those same facilities should not be
treated as if they were in conspiracy with infringers simply because some users
of these tools decide to abuse them. And this is especially true when the
service at issue-such as an online service-actually supports one of the
fundamental objectives of the Copyright Act itself: the advancement of the
useful arts through the free exchange of ideas and information.
Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 255 (statement of Stephen M. Heaton, Gen.
Counsel and Sec., CompuServe Inc.).
186. IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 117-18.
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This view has some intuitive appeal since, after all, at least some portion
of an ISP's revenues, by definition, must be derived from its subscribers'
infringing activities. It is precisely this intuitive appeal that has resulted
in increased scrutiny for products capable of reproducing intellectual
property. 187 There are, however, many other products besides an ISP's
facilities that are essential to complete an act of online infringement-the
most obvious being modems, computers, and disk storage devices. Since
the manufacturers of these products also reap at least some benefit from
their use in acts of infringement, doesn't a consistent application of strict
liability require that they also be held strictly liable? The answer to this
question was supplied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc.: "[T]he sale of copying equipment [in this
case, videocassette recorders], like the sale of other articles of commerce,
does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely
used for legitimate, nonobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely
be capable of substantial non-infringing uses." 188 Since only a small
percentage of the data that flows through an ISP's system is infringing,
its facilities are clearly capable of substantial non-infringing uses. 189
If ISPs are viewed as producers of "products" that may cause harm
because of their foreseeable use to infringe, they must also be released
from liability by the additional doctrine supplied by Sony.
Fairness-based strict liability arguments, when applied to the supplier
of a "product" that is neither inherently dangerous, defective, nor
specifically intended to facilitate infringement, are, at bottom, merely
distributive arguments for the imposition of liability on the most
convenient deep-pockets defendant. 190 Irrespective of one's views

187. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,430 (1984)
("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying
equipment-the printing press-that gave rise to the original need for copyright
protection.")
188. Id. at 442.
I 89. But see A&M Records, Inc. v. Abdullah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1456 (C.D. Cal.
1996) (reasoning that Sony should be limited to "staple articles or commodities of
commerce" since the Sony Court relied on patent principles in arriving at its decision).
I 90. See, e.g., Morril & Eaton, supra note 173, at 5.
Elimination of the strict liability standard for on-line service and Internet
access providers would not eliminate the potential devastation of the value of
the rights holder's creation. Rather, it merely would shift the ultimate
economic loss to a partly less well-situated to bear or apportion it-generally
the author, composer, screen-writer, or other creator.
Id. Note, however, that there is virtual economic parity between the ISP industry and
the software industry, which is the most common litigant in an online infringement case.
One study found that 64% of American ISPs have annual revenues of $1 million or less.
Commercial Internet Exchange, CIX FCC filing on Access Charge Reform (last
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about the fairness of holding a relatively blameless defendant liable
simply to ensure a recovery for the plaintiff, it is disingenuous to cloak
purely distributive arguments in the seemingly logical economic concept
of "cost internalization,"
Guido Calabresi, in The Costs of Accidents, his influential text on tort
liability, provides much needed clarity to the subject by identifying
distinct "subgoals" of the tort system's general goal of reducing the costs
of injuries, 191 Calabresi distinguishes the goal of loss avoidance,
which is accomplished by distributing economic incentives where they
will best prevent the injury from occurring, from the goal of "reducing
the social costs" of accidents, which is accomplished through two
primary methods: "the risk (or loss) spreading method and the deep
pocket method," 192 Calabresi correctly observes that strict liability as
a value judgement is quite different from strict liability as a rational
economic argument and is thus more a moral or political question than
a legal question, 193
B,

The Need to Provide Incentives to Prevent Infringement

It is the first goal identified by Calabresi, loss avoidance thorough
proper distribution of economic incentives, that seems to provide the
strongest support for strict liability, The White Paper and its supporters
argue that strict liability is required to provide the incentives for ISPs to
take measures to minimize user infringement As stated by Morril and
Eaton:
modified Mar, 24, 1997) <http://www,cix.org/noi0397.html>. Similarly, 75% of the
Software Publishers Association's members have annual revenues of less than $2 million.
Ken Wasch, Statement by Ken Wasch, President of Software Publishers Association, on
Congressional Hearings to Address Software Piracy (last modified June 24, I 997)
<http://www.spa.org/piracy/releases/pirusrep.htm>. The SPA's membership represents
85% of all packaged software sales from U.S. companies. SPA Moves Against Internet
Pirate; Lawsuit Is Software Industry First (visited Feb. 21, 1997) <http://www.spa.org/
piracy/releases/butler3.htm>. Thus, strict liability for service providers would typically
only shift money from one deep pocket to another.
191. GUIDO CALABRES!, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 26-29 (1970).
192. Id. at 28. Calabresi also identifies a third subgoal, the reduction of transaction
costs associated with the first two subgoals. Id.
193. "Economists, unlike lawyers, tend to treat [reducing the social costs] under the
rubric of justice .... The reason, the same given for treating collective desires under
justice, is that reduction of secondary costs usually entails interpersonal comparisons of
utility and hence is not amenable to traditional economic efficiency analysis." Id. at 28,
n.6.
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The reasoning of the Netcom court fails to take into account the unique
ability of on-line service and Internet access providers to take measures to
prevent copyright infringement on their systems and the urgent need to incent
them to do so in order to ensure that the livelihoods of authors, composers,
screenwriters, and other creators are not destroyed. The defendants here made
an affirmative policy decision not to attempt to monitor or control infringing
material on their systems ... 194

It is this theoretical "unique ability" for a service provider to "monitor
or control" the infringing activities of its subscribers that makes Sony
inapplicable. Although it may be conceptually convenient to refer to an
ISP's machinery as a "product," the obvious reason why Sony doesn't
apply to ISPs is that they do not manufacture a product, so much as they
run a machine or provide a service, thus making Sony only tangentially
relevant. 195 Although the Netcom court analogized Netcom to the
operator of a photocopier, 196 it did not compare it to the manufacturer
of a photocopier. Had it done so, Sony would have been controlling
authority. Likewise, if ISPs were merely "wires and conduits," they
would enjoy the same common carrier immunity as telephone companies.197 ISPs, unlike VCR manufacturers and telephone companies,
have, at least theoretically, the ongoing opportunity to control both how
and by whom its system is used.
C.

What Can Service Providers Do To "Monitor" Or
"Control" Content?

Under the Netcom contributory infringement alternative to strict
liability, an ISP's knowledge of infringing activities is the touchstone of

194. Morril & Eaton, supra note 173, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
195. But see Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 256 (statement of Stephen
M. Heaton, Gen. Counsel and Sec., CompuServe Inc.) ("Inasmuch as virtually all
providers offer services that, overwhelmingly, are used for 'legitimate, nonobjectionable
purposes,' the sensible standard developed in the Sony decision for contributory liability
should be a model for the standard that would apply to OLS companies.") (emphasis
added).
196. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1995). See also Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat'! Ass'n of Fire Equip.
Distribs., No. I :93CV0546, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19310, at *29 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25,
1997) (also analogizing ISP to operator of photocopier).
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1997). The Netcom court found that "(s]ince other
similar carriers of information are not liable for infringement, there is some basis for
exempting Internet access providers from liability for infringement by their users."
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369 n.12. The court found, however, that ISPs do not fit
under the existing statutory definitions of common carrier since, among other things,
ISPs do not have to accept any customer. Id. "Whether a new definition should be
carved out for online service providers is to be resolved by Congress, not the courts."
Id.
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liability,
This knowledge requirement, it is argued, provides a
disincentive for ISPs to control content on their systems, since selfdiscovery can provide liability-creating knowledge, 198
This
disincentive is compounded by the fact that past instances of selfmonitoring by an ISP might be used as proof that the ISP in fact has the
ability to monitor resident content, Therefore, under any system with a
knowledge element, ISPs that are diligent are subjected to greater
liability than those that make an "affirmative policy decision" to remain
ignorant Although service providers argue that their need to preserve
a business relationship with the content providers whose works they host
supplies sufficient motivation, 199 the White Paper and its supporters
maintain that strict liability is necessary to supply ISPs with the proper
incentives to exercise editorial control, 200
The argument that strict liability is required to supply economic
incentives for service providers to control user activity and monitor
content, however, presupposes that ISPs in fact possess significant ability
to exercise editorial control, The following sections will challenge that
assumption,

I 98, "It would be unfair-and set a dangerous precedent-to allow one class of
distributors to self-determine their liability by refusing to take responsibility, This would
encourage intentional and willful ignorance." IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at
122.
199. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 260 (statement of Stephen
M. Heaton, Gen. Counsel and Sec., CompuServe Inc.).
[The lack of incentives argument] ignores two fundamental truths: (I) OLS
[online service] companies are copyright owners too and therefore already have
this incentive; and (2) there are many practical business pressures on OLS
companies for them to continue to provide the copyright assistance currently
provided. OLS companies must work very closely with copyright owners of
all kinds in connection with content-related alliances, ventures, licenses and
other transactions that fuel the very business in which OLS companies find
themselves: distributing content and providing network access to information
sources. Thus the considerable and persistent anti-infringement efforts already
undertaken by OLS companies are not in risk of extinction.
Id.
200. See, e.g., IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 122-24; Morril & Eaton,
supra note 173, at 4-6; Joseph V. Myers m, Note, Speaking Frankly About Copyright
Infringement on Computer Bulletin Boards: Lessons to Be Learned From Frank Music,
Netcom, and the White Paper, 49 VAND. L. REV. 439, 474-75 (1996).
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1.

Service Provider Control Over Resident Content

Let us assume for the purposes of discussion that an ISP has notice,
actual or constructive, that infringing content may be physically resident
in the mass storage of one of its servers. Unlike material in transmission, the ISP has at least some "possession" of the material and it is
therefore at least theoretically possible for the ISP to exercise control
over it. Several obstacles, however, severely restrict an ISP's ability to
actually effectuate this potential.
First, an ISP must be able to identify a potentially infringing work.
Second, even if an ISP is able to identify a potentially infringing work,
it may not be able to determine if further distribution of the work would
violate one of the author's exclusive rights. Finally, even if the work is
identified as an unauthorized copy, an ISP may experience difficulty in
judging the validity of any potential fair use defense.
a.

Identification of Potentially Infringing Content

Although some file names or types may be obviously suspect as
potentially infringing201 or the files may be presented in circumstances
suggesting piracy, 202 in many cases an ISP may have great difficulty
simply identifying whether a file contains protected material. The
disguise of a digitally encoded work, whether intentional or accidental,
is a simple matter and may occur in a several ways.
Simply renaming a file, for example, can be a quite effective method
of disguise. Since the only visual identification information conveyed
by a file is its name, changing a file's name defeats any attempt to

201. The distinctive file types associated with sound recordings are an example of
file types that might raise suspicion:
[l]f an !AP notices that one of the web sites it is hosting for someone who
is not affiliated with the music industry is taking up a tremendous amount
of server space (because sound files are large), or numerous files on this
site that are known to be sound files-. WA V, .AU or .MP3-reside on
that server or are evident in the IAP's activity logs. shouldn't that IAP at
least notify us so we can check out whether the recordings on that site are
authorized or not?
Prepared Testimony of Lawrence Kenswil, Exec. Vice Pres. of Bus. and Legal Affairs,
Universal Music Group, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts
and Intellectual Property, Federal News Service, Sept. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Legis Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Kenswil Testimony on H.R. 2180].
202. See, e.g., SPA Moves Against Internet Pirate; Lawsuit Is Software Industry
First, supra note 190 ("If an ISP notices that someone, particularly an anonymous user,
is uploading exceedingly large files to its FTP server or the filenames are similar to
those of commercially available software, that activity should raise a red flag and cause
the ISP to investigate further.").
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selectively filter files based on similarity of their file names to those of
known protected works,
Changing a file's format (the way its data is arranged) also hinders
identification, Many works distributed on the Internet, for instance, are
reduced in size, or "compressed," and combined into "archives" of
related files, Visual inspection of the files contained within an archive
requires that the archive first be uncompressed, Further, many files are
encoded in proprietary formats, There are hundreds of such formats in
existence today and their number is constantly increasing, Examination
of a file encoded in a proprietary format requires the use of a program
capable of recognizing that format and rendering the contents of that file,
Some proprietary formats can be recognized only by the particular
program that was used to encode them, Further, if an ISP does not
recognize a particular file format, it may not even be able to find an
application capable of rendering the file's contents,
Another simple method of file disguise, frequently used with image
files, is the removal of the copyright information, This is usually done
not for the sake of disguise, but rather to make the image more visually
appealing, The end result, however, is the same--even if an ISP were
to visually examine every single image file resident on its servers, it
would often be unable to determine whether the user that posted the file
was not its lawful owner,
There are also many methods available to intentionally disguise files,
of which the most commonly used method is encryption, The need for
privacy, data security, and secure commerce on the Internet has fueled
a rapid growth in encryption technology. A file is encrypted through the
use of sophisticated mathematical algorithms that rearrange the file's
data structure, 203 It is virtually impossible to examine the contents of

203. The most popular encryption method is the "public key/private key" method.
See generally Pretty Good Privacy, Inc. Home Page (visited Mar. 3, 1997)
<http://www.pgp.com> (Web site of PGP, shorthand for Pretty Good Privacy, the most
popular of these public key/private key systems); (visited Oct. 19, 1997)
<http://www.yahoo.com/Com pu ters/Securi ty _and_Encryption/PGP __ Pretty_Good_Pri
vacyi> (providing hyperlinks to many other PGP-related pages). Only someone in
possession of the specific "key" used to encrypt a file is able to decode it. As
illustration of this process, assume user A wishes to receive encrypted communications
from user B. First, A generates his own private key, which he reveals to no one. A then
uses his private key to make a public key, which he then sends to B or uploads to one
of many public "key servers," which are repositories of public keys. B then encrypts a
message using A's public key and sends the message to A. Since A's private key is
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an encrypted file without possession of the "key" used to encode it.
Software pirates are quickly adopting encryption technology. Several
Usenet software piracy groups have begun encrypting all of their
communications and files. 204
ISPs are completely powerless to
determine the contents of these files. 205
Finally, ISPs may not even be allowed to examine some files, such as
e-mail, that are inherently private. Not only would examination of these
messages intrude upon the author's right to privacy, as previously
described in Part II.C. l, federal law prohibits the interception or viewing
of e-mail in most circumstances.
b.

Determining if Distribution of the Challenged Work Would
Constitute Infringement

Even assuming that an ISP has been able to successfully determine
that a file on its server contains copyright-protected material, it is then
faced with the challenge of determining if allowing further distribution
of the material would violate one of the author's exclusive rights. In
order to resolve this question, the ISP first must determine whether the
person that posted the work was the owner or his agent, a determination
that is possible only in exceptional circumstances. 206 Further, even if
an ISP is able to determine that the work was not posted by an
authorized party, it still must determine if further distribution of the
wurk would violate the author's exclusive rights.
Many authors intend for their works to be distributed over the Internet.
Many images, for instance, contain a copyright notice and advertising
information, a clear sign that their authors know that their works will be
distributed. The issue for the ISP, however, is whether the authors
intend for the images to be distributed and have, in effect, granted an

required to decode the message, only A (or someone in possession of A's private key)
can decode the message.
204. The more popular of these groups has a membership that now exceeds 500.
McCandless, supra note 6, at 175.
205. The White Paper, while recommending strict liability for service providers,
conceded that "an on-line service provider who unknowingly transmitted encrypted
infringing material" could "have a good argument for an exemption." JITF WHITE
PAPER, supra note 173, at 122.
206. As noted by one commentator:
A user could easily upload a third party's copyrighted short story, for example,
claiming it as his own. How would the system administrator know whether
it was the uploader's original work or not? Any number of other such files
fall into a similar category, such as computer software that the uploader claims
to have written, art work the uploader claims to have drawn, and so on.
Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyber;pace," 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993,
1007 (1994).
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implied license to distribute the work. An even more challenging
question is presented by images that have no copyright information.
Unless an image is clearly infringing, as in the case of an image that has
obviously been poorly scanned from a printed work, there is virtually no
way for an ISP to determine if further distribution of the material would
violate the author's rights, since the ISP can not even determine the
author's identity, much less the author's intent.
Similarly, many computer program authors intended for their works
be distributed online. This is the increasingly popular "shareware"
concept where users are encouraged to try out the product and, if they
like it, to "share" it with others by distributing a copy. 207 Shareware
programs are typically provided with one or more files granting the user
a "limited license" to evaluate the product for some specified period of
time or number of uses and defining the user's right to further distribute
the product. These products are typically "crippled" in some way, either
by providing limited functionality or by becoming unusable after a
certain period of time. The user, if he likes the product, will send
payment to the publisher, who will then typically respond by sending the
user the information required to fully enable the product or defeat its
time lock.
Shareware obviously presents a multitude of problems for an ISP,
requiring them to exercise considerable technical expertise in determining if further distribution of any particular program would constitute
infringement. First, an ISP would be required to uncompress each
archive in order to examine the individual licenses contained within.
Second, shareware programs frequently contain licenses that are
ambiguous or are only visible after or during installation. Finally,
software pirates often "crack," re-archive, and redistribute shareware
programs, Even after full installation of the product, the examining ISP
might be unaware that the copy protection mechanisms have been
defeated.
Other programs are distributed as "freeware," meaning that their
authors have relinquished all claims to copyright protection. The
distinctions between retail software, shareware, and freeware, however,
are often blurry. For example, Microsoft released one of its products,
"FrontPage 97," as a series of freeware "betas" (products under
207. See generally Shareware, Freeware & Public Domain Software (visited Feb.
3, 1998) <http://www.spa.org/piracy/share.htm>.
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development), then concurrently in both limited-license shareware and
retail product versions. It is quite difficult to distinguish among these
versions without careful inspection and perhaps even actual installation.208
Therefore, even a file with the seemingly clear name
"FrontPage 97" conveys ambiguous copyright information to an ISP.
c.

Anticipating Fair Use Defenses

Even after an ISP has identified a work as potentially infringing and
determined that the work was likely not intended for online distribution,
it is then presented with the problem of anticipating any fair use
defenses which might be asserted by the putative infringer. Although for
some works such as software, fair use would rarely be a defense, for
others, such as literary works or images, the fair use defense must be
considered. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides that:
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching ... , scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in
a particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include ( 1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."''

The application of these four factors requires a balancing test. As
with any balancing test, the person examining the challenged work must
exercise judgment in applying the factors. When applied to conventionally published materials, the application of these factors may prove quite
challenging to the layperson. Application of these factors to the new
types of publishing, such as digital multimedia works, may prove even
more difficult. 210
ISPs would need a certain measure of legal expertise in order to
determine whether the fair use defense is applicable. When the matter
presents a close call for an ISP, it would be required to consult with

208. This difficulty is highlighted by a recent incident in the Usenet newsgroup
"alt.binaries.fonts." A reader had posted a large series of fonts (computer typefaces),
only to discover later that they were copyrighted. Despite subsequent apologies to the
other members of the group, presumably countless persons had already downloaded the
infringing material. Similarly, new users of the software piracy newsgroups are
frequently chastised for mistakenly posting freeware or "uncracked" shareware programs.
209. 17 U.S.C. § I07 (I 997).
2 I 0. See generally Victoria A. Cundiff, Stop Cyber Theft: Respecting Intellectual
Property Rights on the Internet, 444 PLI/PAT 93 (1996).
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legal counsel in order to make an informed decision. The best that an
attorney can provide, however, is only a more educated guess to this
complicated question. 211
[T]he difficulties associated with arriving at a conclusion of whether a set of
circumstances is likely to constitute infringement are daunting. They involve
questions of fair use, ownership, substantial similarity, validity of the underlying
copyright, merger doctrine, distinguishing facts and ideas from expression,
parody, public domain issues, license, !aches, copyright misuse and various
other issues-the stuff that has given courts and experts fits for years. It is
simply unreasonable to tell [a service provider] to make these decisions in the
ordinary course of its business day and to accept the repercussions and liability
itself if it decides incorrectly or unwisely. 212

d.

Automating the Content Screening Process

The final and most daunting problem that an ISP faces in contentbased screening is the sheer volume of data flowing through its servers
each day. Perhaps the best example of this difficulty is an ISP's Usenet
server. The Usenet data flow is crushing - for example, on one day
picked at random, a Web page providing current statistics for that
provider's news server showed that 262,762 messages passed through
that server from midnight to noon, almost 22,000 messages per
hour. 213
Manual content screening is not even remotely realistic, even for those
files and messages that are relatively fixed in time. In order to manually
inspect each item, an ISP would be required to have a huge number of
employees, each equipped with a powerful multimedia computer and
fully trained in the often complex subject of copyright law. An ISP
would also be required to purchase software programs capable of
rendering each of the hundreds of proprietary file formats. 214 Yet even
after an ISP has expended these huge sums, the inherent content

211. See, e.g., Terry Carroll, Copyright FAQ at pt. 2 (last modified Jan. 6, 1994)
<http://www.aimnet.com/-carroll/copyright/faq-home.html> ("If all this sounds like
hopeless confusion, you're not too far off. Often, whether a use is a fair use is a very
subjective conclusion .... even well-educated jurists are capable of disagreeing on the
application of this doctrine.").
212. Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 254-55 (statement of Stephen M.
Heaton, Gen. Counsel and Sec., CompuServe Inc.).
213. SlurpNet DJABLO News Statistics for 'newsjeed.kcdata.com' for Sat 14 Feb
98 (visited Feb. 14, 1998) <http://www.slurp.net/statsi>.
214. It is conceivable, however, that software producers might donate software to
ISPs as part of an anti-piracy campaign.
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identification problems discussed previously would still render the
system ineffective.
Even for services with a lesser data flow, content screening is still not
feasible. Web servers, for instance, would be easier to monitor, since
the files are mostly in a standard format, relatively fixed in time, and
originate from a subscriber of that server. Yet monitoring the traffic on
these servers would still be virtually impossible, even for a large
company. As an executive from a large Web site development and
hosting company correctly noted:
My servers regularly pass content and domain name resolution in the millions
per hour. I have no knowledge or control over any of this information. To
give you an analogy, asking me to know what my servers are doing at any one
time is like asking the federal Department of Transportation what conversation
is happening in every car on 1-66 at any one time. There are many firms
significant! y smaller than [my compan¥] that also provide this management of
services who have far less resources. 2 1.

Indeed, most service providers are "significantly smaller"; two thirds
of all American ISPs are very small firms serving primarily residential
customers. 216 Considering that a local ISP typically has only a handful
of employees but hundreds or thousands of subscribers, manual content
screening this is simply not a realistic option. 217 Commentators,
legislators, and judges would be wise to actually visit an ISP's facility.
As part of the research for this Comment, I recently visited a local
ISP. 218 This ISP had several hundred customers, yet its infrastructure
was no more than a couple of terminal servers, a router, and a T-1 line
leased from the local phone company. There were only three employees
- the owner, a part-time salesperson, and a secretary. This is by no
means atypical; according to a 1997 ISP survey, the median ISP only

215. Testimony ofTushar Patel, Vice Pres. and Managing Dir., US Web, Before the
Suhcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives (last modified Sept. 16, 1997) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
4024.htm> [hereinafter Patel Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281].
216. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (detailing average ISP revenues).
Eighty percent of a small ISP's customers are residential dial-up users. C/X FCC Filing
on Access Charge Reform, supra note 190.
217. See Richard Stiennon, Starting an Internet Service Provider (last modified Apr.
2, I 997) <http://www.knowledgetech.com/~richard/ISP/> (presenting a typical small
ISP's business plan). This business plan calls for 2,000 subscribers serviced by only two
full-time employees (a manager and a salesperson) and three part-time employees (two
to answer telephones and a third to help with Web site design). Id. § 6, "The Management Team" and § 8, "Growth Strategy."
218. Feb. 1996 visit to IO-Online, an Internet access provider in San Diego,
California.
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had six employees. 219 Any content screening program would involve
an exponential increase in costs for this or any other similarly situated
service provider. Such a provider would have two choices: (1) pass the
costs on to its customers, or (2) shut its doors. As noted by a service
provider industry representative:
The only sure effect of encouraging service providers to monitor the Internet
is to vastly increase the cost of Internet service, Monitoring would have to be
24 hours a day since a web site can be changed at any moment. Monitors
would have to be thoroughly trained since they would be asked to make legal
judgements that they cannot make. The enormous costs of this program would
be obviously passed on to the consumer. 220

It is frequently suggested, without elaboration, that these costs might
be minimized through the development of some automated system
where, presumably, a program constantly scans the information stored
on servers, examining each file to determine if it contains infringing
content. 221 Even assuming that such a system could be unilaterally
developed by an ISP, a large assumption indeed, it would still be
prohibitively expensive. 222 An automated content screening system
would still require large equipment expenditures. Although staffing
costs would be less than under a manual system, the inspection process
would still require a large measure of human judgment. No computer,
for instance, can evaluate fair use, interpret the subtleties of a software
license, or perceive written words displayed in an image. 223

219. December 1996 Study conducted by Web World magazine (on file with San
Diego Law Review).
220. Prepared Testimony of Roy Neel, Pres. and CEO, U.S. Tel. Ass 'n, Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property,
Concerning H.R. 2180, Federal News Service, Sept. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Neel Testimony on H.R. 2180] (emphasis added).
221. In Netcom, the plaintiffs made such an unsupported assertion, but the court
concluded that "plaintiffs submit no evidence indicating that Netcom, or anyone, could
design software that could determine whether a posting is infringing." Religious Tech.
Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 n.23 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
222. But see infra Part VIII.E (describing a possible system whereby content
providers develop a system of embedding digital fingerprints in protected works and
software recognizing that code is uniformly implemented by all ISPs).
223. See, e.g., Prepared Testimony of Scott Purcell, President, HLC-Jnternet, Inc.,
Irvine, California, Representing the Commercial internet Exch. Ass 'n, Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, Hearings on
H.R. 2441, Federal News Service, Feb. 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
Newfed File [hereinafter Purcell Testimony on H.R. 2441].
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Even if these costs could somehow be reduced to acceptable levels,
the screening of incoming content would impermissibly slow information
transfer. The incoming data stream from an ISP's customers would have
to be diverted to a temporary "quarantine" area. This would add an
intolerable bottleneck for communications such as videoconferencing and
chat that require real-time two-way data flow.
As summarized by one industry spokesman, "It should be self-evident
that to suddenly require us to monitor this vast amount of content for
copyright infringements would be technically unfeasible and economically unreasonable." 224

2.

Service Provider Control Over Content in Transmission

The considerable problems involved with screening content on an
ISP's servers, however, are minimal when compared with the difficulty
inherent in attempting to screen information that is merely passing
through an ISP's access servers. As previously described in Part II.B,
a subscriber's communications flow through the ISP's access server to
its router, which then forwards the packets to "midstream" routers, which
in turn forward the packets to other routers nearer the computer that the
subscriber wishes to reach.

a.

Midstream Content Filtration

Because of this propagation system, content in transmission cannot be
filtered. Routers examine each packet for the sole purpose of determining the packet's ultimate destination. Like postal workers, routers only
examine two pieces of information in the packet-the source and
destination IP addresses. 225 Further, since routers process each packet
individually, the entire message is never available to a router. 226 This

It is technologically impossible to ascertain whether a certain phrase or picture

infringes copyright; this determination is a legal one that must be made on a
case-by-case basis. It would be equally impossible economically and in terms
of response time for each service provider to hire an army of lawyers to
ascertain the viability of claims of copyright infringement as they arise.
Id.

224. Press release by Timothy D. Casey, Chief Technology Counsel. MCI Corp.,
as reported in INTERNET IT INFORMER (Web site no longer in existence; copy on file
with San Diego Law Review).
225. See Henry H. Perritt, Cyberliability, 446 PLIIPAT 173, 196 (1996); ITAA
Discussion Paper, supra note 25, § 2 ("Approach 2: Packet Filtering").
226. Routers are "stateless," meaning that they do not remember a packet once it
has been processed. See ITAA Discussion Paper, supra note 25, § 2 ("The Connection").
Additionally, recall that the TCP/IP transmission protocol sends packets out virtually
randomly, so that the chances are slim that any downstream router would process all of
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means that, unlike a postal worker, even if there is something about a
packet that were to signal that it might contain suspicious content, a
router cannot "open up" the packet and reconstruct the contents of the
message, Even if a router could examine the data in a packet, it would
not be able to determine whether the content was infringing because "a
bit is a bit and infringing bits are indistinguishable from authorized
ones. " 227
Since routers are blind to content, the only possible method of control
over content in transmission would, then, necessarily involve screening
out individual packets based solely on the IP address of the originating
or destination computer. 228 Such a system could only be implemented
at the ISP dial-up router level. If midstream routers were programmed
to reject communications to or from a particular IP address, that
computer would be completely "blacked out" from all Internet communication. Such an Internet "death penalty" cannot realistically be
implemented since it would be practically impossible to reach international agreement as to which IP addresses should be filtered out. 229
b.

Dial-up Subscriber Content Filtration

Although it would be theoretically possible to individually filter
packets by IP address at the ISP level, implementation of any such
address filtering system would cause serious bottlenecks. 230 ISPs
would have to constantly update and monitor their routers' filtering

the individual packets that make up a message (see supra Part 11.B).
227. IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 116. See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v.
Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1372-73 (N.D. Cal.
1995) ("Billions of bits of data flow through the Internet and are necessarily stored on
servers throughout the network and it is thus practically impossible to screen out
infringing bits from noninfringing bits.").
228. See ITAA Discussion Paper, supra note 25, § 2 ("Approach 2: Packet
Filtering"). For a general discussion of packet filtering, see Perritt, supra note 225, at
195-98.
229. If, for instance, only U.S.-based routers were unilaterally programmed to refuse
packets coming from or going to a certain IP address, this would create chaos on the
backbones as packet traffic was automatically re-routed in a path that avoids U.S.
routers. Additionally, if one country were to unilaterally begin to filter out computers
residing in another country, potentially serious international issues would certainly arise.
230. A packet filtering system would theoretically impose a 50% performance
penalty on all Internet traffic. Since routers currently only filter packets based on their
destination, imposing an additional requirement to examine and filter packets based on
their origin would effectively double their workload. See Perritt, supra note 225, at 197.
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algorithms, or "router tables." These router tables would become
exponentially more complex, thereby reducing system performance at a
time when system throughput levels are not even keeping pace with the
explosive growth of the Internet. 231 Further, since router tables are
used to protect ISPs and their customers from unwanted accidental or
intentional access, the quantum increase in complexity of the filtering
rules would dramatically increase the frequency of security-compromising errors. 232
An address-based filtering system could also easily be defeated.
Subscribers of a packet-filtering ISP could simply communicate with the
banned computer using "proxy servers," computers that serve as
intermediaries between the remote server and the end user. 233 As far
as the ISP's router is concerned, the subscriber is communicating with
the proxy server, not the banned computer. Were an IP address-based
filtering system to be implemented, the use of proxy servers would
undoubtedly become routine. 234 Even if the proxy server problem
could be worked around, address-based filtering would still be ineffective, since Internet content would inevitably be copied from filtered
servers to non-filtered servers. 235

23 I.

See ITAA Discussion Paper, supra note 25, § 2 ("Approach 2: Packet

Filtering").

For a discussion of the current crisis in router throughput rates, or

"bandwidth," see Jamie Murphy & Charlie Hofacker, Explosive Growth Clogs the
Internet's Backbone, N.Y. TIMES CYBERTIMES (last modified June 30, 1996)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0629backbone-money.html>; Peter H.
Lewis, An 'All You Can Eat' Price is Clogging Internet Access, N.Y. TIMES
CYBERTIMES (last modified Dec. 17, 1996) <http://search.nytimes.com/web/docsroot/
library/cyber/week/l 217aol.html>. A recent study showed that information retrieval
speed was the number one concern of Internet users. GVU's 5th WWW User Survey
(visited March 11, 1998) <http://www.gvu.gatech.edu/user_surveys/survey-04-19961>.
232. See ITAA Discussion Paper, supra note 25, § 2 ("Approach 2: Packet
Filtering").
233. A proxy server functions as an intermediary; a user communicates with a
remote server by sending the information through the proxy server, which, in turn, relays
the communication to the remote server. See id. § 2 ("Approach 3: Blocking HTTP
Proxy Servers"). Proxy servers are routinely used by businesses that have multiple
computers on their network, but wish to manage only a single Internet connection.
Other proxy servers, for the purpose of protecting user privacy, are intentionally
designed to prevent the remote server from knowing the true IP address of the user that
is ultimately receiving the information that it is sending out. See The ANONYMIZER
Home Page (visited Feb. 12, 1997) <http://anonymizer.cs.cmu.edu:8080/>.
234. To avoid a legal battle with German authorities over pornography, CompuServe
recently restricted its information feed to Germany. See Eric Berlin, CompuServe Bows
to Germany, INTERNET WORLD, Apr. 1996, at 16. German users quickly discovered how
to bypass the restrictions. See Perritt, supra note 225, at 198.
235. Content does not always flow from point A to point B. Usenet servers, for
instance, have a global propagation. Content from screened sites could be easily posted
there. Since the Usenet server itself would not be a forbidden site, an ISP-level filtering
system would be easily and automatically sidestepped. As an example, assume that an
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Address-based packet filtering is also a blunt tool, If, in the ISP's
judgment, the potentially filtered address contains objectionable material,
it is faced with a choice - to completely black out the entire site or not.
That site may, however, contain the content of hundreds or even
thousands of users, yet there would be no way to discriminate among
them, since they all share the same IP address. 236 Filtering out an
address in such circumstances would be the equivalent of the postal
service refusing to service an entire apartment building based on the
misconduct of a single tenant. Further, a wrong decision might subject
the ISP to liability for "wrongful filtration."
The difficulties inherent in an ISP's decision to filter any given
address are compounded by the reality that, as of August 1997, there
were about 1.3 million sites on the World Wide Web. 237 Even assuming that somehow an ISP could ever establish a filter database, it would
have to be constantly monitored and kept current since, like physical
addresses and telephone numbers, both the operators and the content
associated with any given IP address will change over time.
c.

Liability for Content in Transmission

The impossibility of midstream content filtration presents a doctrinal
conundrum for advocates of strict liability. Since a "copy" is created
whenever a work is duplicated in either fixed storage or RAM,
infringing "copies" of the work (or pieces thereof) are made in many

ISP has programmed its router to reject information coming from a certain site. So long
as any user in the world can get to the filtered site, he can simply download content
from that site and then post it to any Usenet server. From there, Usenet's distributed
messaging system would send that message out to every other Usenet server, including
the one operated by the filtering ISP. Content posted to the World Wide Web would
similarly defeat any such filtering system as content from the filtered sites is downloaded
then uploaded to a non-filtered Web sites. The filtering ISP's router would then accept
this content and pass it through to the subscriber, ignorant of its true origin.
236. An increasingly popular trend is free Web site hosting. The Web site host
administrator makes a profit by selling advertising, which is displayed whenever
someone visits subscriber's site. All of the individual Web pages are located at one
domain name (and therefore at one IP address). For instance, a Web site hosting
computer may have the domain name "www.freesites.com." Subscriber Joe's page
would have an address like "http://www.freesites.com/users/joe," subscriber Jane's page
would have an address like "http://www.freesites.com/users/jane," and so on. Filtering
out "freesites.com" because Joe's site contains infringing material would also block
access to Jane's site.
237. See Zakon, supra note I.
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locations when a protected work is transmitted through the Internet.
Given the Internet's random propagation system, a single infringing
message could travel through hundreds of midstream routers. Under a
logically consistent application of strict liability, however, each of these
midstream providers would be liable, despite the fact that they have no
means of preventing their systems from passing infringing content. This
result cannot be seriously advanced, as it is both unfair and impractical.
Strict liability for midstream content can only be justified using purely
distributive arguments. Since such arguments are not amenable to
rational analysis, the remainder of this comment will restrict the
discussion of service provider liability to content that is either flowing
through an ISP's access server and router or resident in the mass storage
devices one of its servers. Even this restriction, however, introduces its
own technological slippery slope. How "resident" is resident? At one
end of this range are subscribers' Web pages resident on an ISP's Web
server, which, absent intervention by the hosting ISP, will remain until
removed by their authors. At the other end of this spectrum is outgoing
e-mail, which is resident on an ISP's mail server only briefly while
waiting to be sent. Somewhere in between these two extremes are
messages on an ISP's Usenet server, which are typically kept for only
a few days or weeks. 238 Although different types of content may be
resident for different periods of time, it will be useful for the purposes
of the remaining discussion to further define "resident" information as
simply any information not in the process of transmission.
3.

Cost/Benefit Analysis of Editorial Incentives for Service Providers

Content-based screening of content resident on an ISP's servers,
although perhaps possible, is not even remotely commercially viable,
either by manual or automated systems. Further, even accepting these
costs, the benefits would be marginal since content providers have such
a limited ability to detect and control infringing content in all but the
most flagrant situations. In short, increased editorial efforts by ISPs
would be either costly, ineffective, or both.
In addition to the economic costs, strict liability for service providers
may also come with significant social costs. Civil rights groups and

238. Most Usenet servers are programmed to purge binary messages in less than a
week. A February 12, 1998 survey showed that the average length of time that binary
messages were kept on the news servers of the four largest news providers was less than
four days. Airnews Earns Its Title as "the Premium News Service," (visited Feb. 14,
1998) <http://www.airnews.net/compare/study.html>. See also Purcell Testimony on
H.R. 2441, supra note 223 ("[M]ost servers only maintain Usenet data for 7-10 days.
The material is then automatically deleted.").
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service providers believe that imposing strict liability on service
providers would negatively impact free speech. 239 It is feared that the
threat of liability may cause service providers to overreact, erring on the
side of caution by aggressively censoring their subscribers' content,
thereby removing protected content along with prohibited content. 240
This concern was a central factor that was addressed by the court in
Cubby v. CompuServe, finding that "'[t]he constitutional guarantees of
the freedom of speech and of the press stand in the way of imposing'
strict liability on distributors for the contents of the reading materials
they carry. " 241 The Cubby court elaborated that:
"Every bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself
aware of the contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether
unreasonable to demand so near an approach to omniscience." And the
bookseller's burden would become the public's burden, for by restricting him
the public's access to reading matter would be restricted. If the contents of
bookshops and periodical stands were restricted to material of which their
proprietors had made an inspection, they might be depleted indeed. 242

239. As an example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an Internet free
speech advocacy group, maintains an entire archive of documents arguing that many
proposed national copyright laws and international intellectual property treaties will
impermissibly interfere with free speech. EFF Online Intellectual Property Overview
(last modified Dec. 6, I 996) <http://www.eff.org/pub/Intellectual_property/HTML/ipoverview.html>.
240. As noted by an attorney for CompuServe:
[Increased liability for service providers] is not only patently unfair, but
because it tempts [service providers] to take the easy route of deletion of
communications, it jeopardizes the very success of the [national information
infrastructure] itself, it threatens to frustrate First Amendment-based
expectations and it is bound to strain the relationships between the [service
provider] and its customers .

. . . [T]here must be maintained not only a proper preservation of the free flow
of information and exchange of ideas unthreatened by all-too-easy deletions
of communications, but an acknowledgment of the damage that would be
imposed on the [service provider's] relationship with its customers by
compelling them to consistently take on a role that inevitably (although
unfairly) will be labeled "censor"~and to do so in lieu of the copyright
owners themselves.
Hearings on H.R. 244/, supra note 160, at 254, 262 (statement of Stephen M. Heaton,
Gen. Counsel and Sec., CompuServe, Inc.).
241. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1959)).
242. Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 139-40 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153
(1959) (citation and footnote omitted)).
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Civil rights groups also argue that strict liability will force service
providers to impermissibly intrude upon their subscriber's rights to
privacy. 243 Although the Internet is typically thought of as the most
public of all forums, many Internet communications are intended to be
private person-to-person communications. Subjecting ISPs to strict
liability, it is argued, will force them to examine such communications
(to the extent that they are legally able to do so), thereby invading their
subscriber's privacy.
Although the extent of the intrusion upon free speech and privacy is
uncertain, and may even be minimal, it seems clear that strict liability
for ISPs would have a discernable impact and thus these social costs
should be considered. 244

4.

Summary

Since ISPs have few realistic tools available to monitor content, their
"editorial abilities," as a practical matter, are limited to the blunt tools
of termination of service to known habitual infringers and removal of
flagrantly infringing material. Yet even under the most lenient liability
standard, there is no reason to believe that ISPs would not terminate
known infringers. Although an ISP can legitimately defend that it
cannot monitor all files flowing through or resident on its system, it
defies logic that it would expose itself to even the possibility of liability
to preserve the twenty dollars per month revenue stream from a known
infringer. 245

243. See, e.g., Mike Yamamoto, Policing the Internet (last modified Dec. 13, 1996)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,6193,00.html>.
244. The White Paper correctly observed that the impacts upon free speech, standing
alone, are insufficient grounds for reducing liability for service providers:
Clearly, on-line service providers play an integral role in the development of
the [national information infrastructure] and facilitate and promote the free
exchange of ideas. But that has not been grounds for removing or reducing
liability for copyright infringement. One can perform these functions without
infringing or facilitating the infringement of the copyrighted expression of
others.
IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 117.
245. In fact, Ken Wasch, President of the Software Publishers Association, the
leading anti-piracy voice for the software industry, has made it clear the SPA does not
expect service providers to engage in an expensive and futile program to monitor
content:
We are not asking ISPs to monitor that which is on every page that they host
... that's too difficult. ... What we're asking ISPs to do is ... don't draw
attention to illegal sites, ... when you find out that you're hosting an illegal
site, take appropriate action, and look for patterns of usage [on servers] that
would indicate that there's a lot of [unusual download activity].
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The threat of liability is not the only way to encourage ISPs to
monitor content. Statutory "Good Samaritan" immunization for ISPs
that take reasonable good faith measures to monitor content, would, if
not provide an incentive, at least eliminate some of the disincentive
provided under a knowledge-based standard. 246
Thus, while strict liability would increase incentives for service
providers to monitor content, it would produce questionable benefits.
Further, those benefits could only be achieved by imposing unacceptable
economic and social costs upon information consumers,
D.

What Can Content Providers Do To Prevent Infringement?

The White Paper and its supporters also identify a second incentive that
would be supplied by the imposition of strict liability on service
providers-they argue that strict liability is required to provide ISPs with
incentives to develop technological solutions to stop infringement.
Unlike editorial control measures, the benefits from technological
solutions would not be offset with significant associated negative impacts
upon speech, access, and privacy.
Although supporters of strict liability fail to specifically identify any
technical solutions that service providers can implement, they nonetheless routinely assert that ISPs should be strictly liable because they are
better equipped to prevent online infringement, typically supporting this
claim with little more than the bare assertion itself. 247 The White

Ken Wasch Interview, supra note 9, Since the SPA is well known for making examples
out of small service providers and sysops that refuse to comply, it would make no
business sense for an ISP to knowingly fail to comply with these minimal requirements,
See infra note 278.
246. The Communications Decency Act, for example, immunizes providers from
liability for indecent content if they take reasonable measures to prevent minors from
viewing such material. Pub. L. 104-I04, Stat. 56 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223). Section
223(e)(5) establishes as a defense "good faith, reasonable measures to prevent minors
from gaining access to prohibited communications." Section 223(1)(1) immunizes
providers from common law actions resulting from "attempting in good faith to restrict
or prevent access to, or the transmission of, prohibited communications." See also
Pamela Mendels, Government Defines 'Safe Harbor' Under Communications Decency
Act, NEW YORK TIMES CYBERTIMES (last modified May 8,
1996)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/0508decency.html>.
247. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 290 (statement of William
J. Cook, Attorney, Willian, Brink, Hofer, Gilson & Liane) (offering the statement that
"ISPs can utilize and implement technology, including software, that is capable of
automatically screening material posted on the network," yet providing no further
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Paper, for example, even after conceding that policing efforts and
inadequate indemnification from infringing subscribers "may add to their
cost of doing business," concluded that ISPs "are still in a better position
to prevent or stop copyright infringement than the copyright owner.
Between these two relatively innocent parties, the best policy is to hold
the service provider liable. " 248
This conclusory language is simply not supported by the facts. It is not
even supported by the White Paper itself-other than subscriber
identification and account termination, the entire 238-page report did not
identify a single technologically feasible method by which ISPs could
"prevent or stop" infringement. 249 In fact, the White Paper conceded
that "it is still virtually impossible for operators of large systems to
contemporaneously review every message transmitted or file uploaded."250 Yet the White Paper devoted a separate section, nearly
twice as long as its entire consideration of service provider liability, to
technological solutions that copyright owners can employ to protect their
works. 251 In sharp contrast with the "virtual impossibility" of an ISP's
efforts, the White Paper introduced this section with:
Technological solutions are playing and will continue to play a significant
role in meeting [the need for secure online commerce]. A wide variety of new
tools to facilitate access and use of Internet-based information products and
services are being rapidly developed and deployed. Concurrently, copyright
owners are developing and implementing technical solutions to facilitate the
delivery of protected works in an easy, consumer-friendly yet reliable and
secure way. These solutions enable copyright owners not only to protect their
works against unauthorized access, reproduction, manipulation, distribution,
performance or display, but also serve to assure the integrity of these works and
to address copyright management and licensing concerns.
Technological solutions exist today and improved means are being developed
to better protect digital works through varying combinations of hardware and
software.
Protection schemes can be implemented at the level of the
copyrighted work or at more comprehensive levels such as the operating system,
the network or both. For example, technological solutions can be used to
prevent or restrict access to a work; limit or control access to the source of a
work; limit reproduction, adaptation, distribution, performance or display of the

elaboration beyond a footnote to court cases that, in tum, provide no elaboration).
248. IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at I 17.
249. "[T]he Working Group expects the access provider to be held accountable for
a subscriber's infringing activity, yet does not provide any means to the proposed end
goal." Wendy M. Melone, Note, Contributory Liability for Access Providers: Solving the
Conundrum Digitalization Has Placed on Copyright Laws, 49 FED. COM. L.J. 491,506
(I 997).
250. IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at I 16.
251. Id. at I 77-200.
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work; identify attribution and ownership of a work; and manage or facilitate
copyright licensing, 250

],

Technological Solutions for Digital Media

Although many other solutions are still under development or
refinement, there are many solutions that content owners can, and in fact
do, use today, Some of the technological solutions discussed in the
White Paper include digital fingerprinting, digital copy protection, and
encryption, In addition, there are many other promising techniques that
the White Paper either did not identify or sufficiently elaborate
upon,2s3
One technological solution to copyright infringement identified by the
White Paper involves the use of "digital signatures," or "digital
fingerprints," unique identification codes that are embedded within the
data structure of a digitally-rendered work, 254
Although digital
signatures may be inserted into any computer file, they are currently
used most commonly with images, where they are called "digital
watermarks," 255
An author uses digital watermarking to embed
copyright information within the work, The embedded information can

252, Id. at 177-78.
253. In fairness to the White Paper, it did note that: "In April 1995, the Working
Group was compelled to place the Report in concrete form, and, thus, to stop adjusting
the text with respect to just-received news. As a result, the Working Group has elected
to ... not discuss every possible technological development of which it recently became
aware." IITF WHITE PAPER. supra note 173, at 6 n.15. Likewise, there will
undoubtedly be additional solutions developed after this Comment goes to press.
254. See IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 189-90.
255. The most common system is a proprietary technology called Digimarc. See
Welcome to Digimarc (visited Apr. 4, 1998) <http://www.digimarc.com>. Digimarc is
emerging as the de facto standard and is currently included in over 90% of all image
editing applications.
See About Digital Watennarking (visited Apr. 4, 1998)
<http://www.digimarc.com/about_wm.html>. One very promising extension of this
technology is a new system invented by Digimarc that will allow the author to
automatically search the Web for infringing copies:
Digimarc's new innovative MarcSpider™, the first service to search the
World Wide Web for digitally watermarked images, enables Playboy to track
images that have been re-posted on the Web. The MarcSpider crawls the
Web, looking at hundreds of millions of pieces of information, locating
Digimarc watermarked images and reporting back where and when they were
found.
Digimarc Technology to Help Playboy Crack Down on Image Piracy Over the Internet
(visited Feb. 21, 1997) <http://www.digimarc.com/pr016.html>. See also infra note 387
(describing several other systems that automatically scan the Internet).
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be made transparent to the end user, can survive most file alterations,
and, unless the author desires otherwise, does not interfere in any way
with the use or viewing of the work. Although digital watermarking
does not provide true copy protection, many other digital fingerprinting
systems are being developed that would also prevent the unauthorized
use or copying of the work. As digital fingerprinting technology
matures, it promises to provide a simple, unobtrusive, and effective
technological solution to infringement. 256
Another solution described in the White Paper is the use of digital
copy management systems, a technique that typically uses a combination
of software and hardware. 257 Using such systems, a digital work is
encoded to require the use of a specific combination of software and
hardware. One popular hybrid hardware/software copy protection
solution involves the use of a "dongle," a device that must be attached
to the computer in order for the software to be used. 258 Without the
required hardware device, a copy of the work itself is useless. 259
Another technological solution to copyright infringement identified by
the White Paper is the use of encryption technology to prevent
unauthorized use of copyrighted materials. 260
Encryption offers

256. See, e.g., infra note 387.
257. See IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 189-90.
258. See generally McCandless, supra note 6, at 178-79.
While generally offering quite secure protection, dongles are occasionally defeated.
The manufacturer of one recently released dongle boasted that it would take 44,000 years
to crack the hardware code. While this may be mathematically true, an ingenious
cracker defeated the system only days after a dongle-protected program's release. Rather
than attempting to actually break the code, the cracker instead altered the program to
bypass its communication with the device. See id. at 178-79.
259. One significant limitation of hybrid solutions, however, is that they inherently
prevent the online delivery of a fully functional product. This limitation is at least
partially offset if the vendor wishes to distribute a function- or time-limited version of
the product as a "try-before-you-buy" demonstration version.
Another, and perhaps ultimately more problematic, limitation of such hybrid
software/hardware solutions is that the hardware device must be constantly attached to
the computer, potentially interfering with the use of other hardware devices attached to
the computer. Since the potential for compatibility problems increases in proportion to
the number of dongles attached to any particular computer, if every program were to
implement such a solution, the problems might quickly swallow the benefits.
260. See IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 185-87.
One such system that has been successfully employed is Adobe Systems' "Type on
Call" program. Adobe is a leading publisher of fonts (computer typefaces). Using the
Type on Call system, the end user purchases an encrypted Compact Disc that contains
over 2,100 copyrighted fonts. In order to use any of these fonts, however, the user must
call Adobe or connect with them over the Internet in order to purchase an unlocking
code. The user can purchase the codes for as many of the fonts as he would like. See
Adobe Type on Call Overview (visited Oct. 18, 1997) <http://www.adobe.com/prodindex/
typeoncall/main.html>.
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virtually foolproof data security-modem encryption methods render a
work invulnerable to attack from even the most sophisticated hacker, 261
Encryption by itself, however, only prevents unauthorized access to the
original work. Once an authorized user decodes the work, it may be
copied and distributed as easily as any other work. 262
One very promising technological solution overlooked by the White
Paper is the use of "smart card" technology. 263 As opposed to the
familiar "dumb" magnetic stripe system used with credit cards, smart
cards have a tiny embedded microprocessor that can store data and
sophisticated encryption keys. Using a smart card copyright protection
system, the owner of a work would be required to insert an authorized

Encryption may also be used to protect conventional text-based works. See Ambia
Corporation - Signet Document Security (visited Feb. 17, 1998) <http://www.ambia.
com/signet.htm>.
For a detailed explanation of one proposed system using encryption technology to
provide copyright protection, see Ralf C. Hauser, Using the Internet to Reduce Software
Piracy (last modified Apr. 4, 1995) <http://www.zurich.ibm.com/pub/sti/www/gkk/publications/l995/hauser95 .html>.
261. Although theoretically one can simply generate random keys until one works
(a so-called "brute force" attack), the following excerpt describes the impossibility of a
brute force attack against a file encrypted with a relatively small 128 bit key:
Let's say that you had developed a special purpose chip that could try a billion
keys per second. This is FAR beyond anything that could really be developed
today. Let's also say that you could afford to throw a billion such chips at the
problem at the same time. It would still require over I 0,000,000,000,000 years
to try all of the possible 128 bit keys. That is something like a thousand times
the age of the known universe!
Peter Simons, Frequently Asked Questions - alt.security.pgp § 3.2 (last modified Dec.
17, 1997) <http://www.pgp.net/pgpnet/pgp-faq/>. Modern key sizes, however, can be
as large as 2,048 bits.
The security of encryption is such that all but the most elementary encryption methods
are actually classified by the United States as "munitions" and their exportation is
therefore forbidden. See Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1997);
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-30 (1994). These export
controls have been the subject of sometimes bitter dispute between the Government and
software companies. See Rory O'Conner, Encryption 'Scrambling' Plan Meets Cool
Reception (last modified Nov. 19, 1996) <http://www2.sjmercury.com/business/compute/
encrypt! 118.htm>.
262. But see Sojilock at a Glance (visited Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.softlock.
com/glance.html> (encryption system that automatically re-locks all copies, allowing
them to be run only in limited-functionality "demonstration" modes until the recipient
of the new copy purchases an unlocking code).
263. For a detailed exposition of smart card technology, see ASE - Aladdin
Smartcard Environment (last modified Jan. 27, 1998) <http://www.hasp.com/ase/
ase.htm>. The White Paper did briefly mention smart cards, but only in the context of
European personal banking systems. See IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at l 93-94.
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card before the work could be used. Copies of the work are worthless
to anyone without that user's card. Smart card systems are inexpensive,
simple, and virtually foolproof. Additionally, since the code in the
card's microprocessor can be updated, a single card could be used for all
programs, with its code being updated at the point of sale or, in the case
of online purchases, over a secure encrypted connection. Although the
card reader itself would be inexpensive and small enough to be
implemented even in laptop computers, successful deployment would
require the adoption of an industry standard card reader. 264
Finally, the changing nature of computing itself may provide a partial
solution to online infringement. One increasingly popular technology is
the concept of "rented" applications. 265 Under this method, the end
user does not actually purchase the program, but instead connects to a
remote server and runs the program on that server. This method is very
promising and offers benefits to both the end user and the program
author. First, the program owner benefits by retaining possession of his
work, making unauthorized copying impossible. Second, end users,
especially businesses, benefit by only paying for the time that they need.
Finally, a rental system enables end users to gain the benefits of even
sophisticated programs that otherwise might be unaffordable to the cost
of the applications or special hardware needed to run them. 266
Another closely related technology, which many visionaries and
market leaders believe is the future of computing, is the so-called
"network computing" or "thin-client" system, which is, in essence, the
"rented" application method taken to its logical extreme. 267 Under this
system, the end user has an inexpensive stripped-down terminal (a "thin
client" or "information appliance") consisting of little more than a

264. A single software vendor could not unilaterally employ the smart card system
because the expense of the cost of the card reader would be borne by its purchasers
alone. If, however, the industry were to arrive at a consensus on smart cards, the cost
of the card reader would not be identified with any single vendor.
265. See, e.g., Tim Clark, Hot Market for Rent-an-app (last modified Jan. 23, 1998)
<http://www.news.com/News/ltem/0,4,18368,00.html>. One such system is being
advanced by Lotus Development, a pioneer in Internet technologies and security. See
Lotus Ships Domino SPA Tools to Enable Web Developers to Create "Ren/able"
Applications Based on Lotus Domino (last modified Jan. 23, 1997)
<http://www.internet.ibm.com/news/243e.html>.
266. See Mary E. Thyfault, App Hosting Plan (last modified Feb. 23, 1998)
<http://techweb.cmp.com/iw/670/70iuhst.htm>. Additionally, the user is assured of
having access to the most recent version of the application, thereby eliminating the all
too frequent problem of upgrading local software.
267. See generally Are Thin Clients Fat Opportunities? (visited Feb. 22, 1998)
<http:// markets pace. a It av is ta.digital.com/Web Po r ti English/ I School.asp?showContent=yes&Articleld=50> (providing overview of various business
and consumer thin-client technologies).

294

[VOL. 35: 219, 1998]

Internet Copyright Infringement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

display, keyboard, and network adapter. The application programs are
run and the data is saved on a remote server, rather than on the local
user's terminal. The thin client approach is quickly gaining widespread
acceptance in both business 268 and consumer 269 markets. Network
computing possesses the same positive attributes to content providers as
rented applications-an author would either retain physical possession
of his work, requiring end users to run the program from the author's
server, or the author would license or sell the work to other server
administrators, who would presumably be far less likely to allow
infringement of the work. 270 Not only do content providers retain
better control of their works, but also the devices on the client side
(diskless "information appliances") are incapable of creating infringing
copies.

268. "Intranets," secure internal company information networks based on Internet
technology and software, are growing even faster than the Internet. See generally
Intranet - PC Webopaedia and Links (visited Feb. 22, 1998) <http://www.pcwebopedia.
com/intranet.htm>; The Intranet FAQ (last modified Feb. IO, 1998) <http://www.innergy.
com/ifaq.html>. The thin client approach is ideally suited to the Intranet environment
and several influential computer software and hardware producers have already begun
shipping low-cost network computing terminals and server-side software. See Mitch
Wagner, Wyse Drops Thin-Client Pricing to $349, TECH WEB NEWS (last modified Feb.
12, 1998) <http://www.techweb.com/wire/story/TWB l 9980212S00 10>.
269. Several consumer electronics companies have already experienced brisk sales
of low-cost, diskless TV set-top "Internet terminals." See, e.g., Christine MacDonald,
Prime Time for Net TVs (last modified Jan. 8, 1997) <http://www.news.com/News/
Item/0,4,6842,00.html>.
270. Database publishers, for instance, are reluctant to make their data electronically
available on the Internet, preferring the more secure environment of a direct subscriber
relationship (e.g., Westlaw and LEXIS):
While the bulk of information products and services are still offered and
used in hard copy formats, there is a steadily increasing demand for access to
high quality and reliable data online over the Internet. Thus far, most IIA
members producing content have limited their online distribution to secure,
dedicated systems supported by a subscriber base. Access on these networks
is generally controlled by the provider, and a relationship exists between
producer and user. Such control is much less evident in many of the networks
that constitute the Internet. Information providers are justifiably concerned
that once their materials are placed on such open networks, unscrupulous or
uninformed users will begin copying and redistributing the material without the
same regard for property rights that has been established for copyrighted works
offered in more traditional formats.
Prepared Testimony of Ronald G. Dunn, Pres., Info. Indus. Ass'n, Before the House
Judiciary Comm., Courts and Intellectual Property Subcomm., Federal News Service,
Sept. 16, I 997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File.
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2.

Technological Solutions Available for Conventional Media

Although some conventional media like prerecorded videotapes and
Compact Discs employ copy-protection systems, 271 other conventional
media like print documents and photographs remain vulnerable.
Although there are several promising methods under development, few
viable technological solutions have yet been proposed to protect works
not originally generated in electronic form. 272
Even though print media may remain vulnerable, the changing nature
of content delivery will likely reduce losses due to online infringement.
Over time, more traditional print media will migrate to electronic
delivery, thus offering at least limited protection against online
infringement since, assuming that there will be weak cross-elasticity of
demand between print media and online media, 273 there will be a
reduction in lost sales as print media migrate to online publishing. The
fact that no single solution can currently protect all media should not,
however, hinder the implementation of those systems that can provide
substantial protection. 274

271. See, e.g., Prepared Statement by Mark S. BelinsAy, on Behalf of Macrovision
Corp., on H.R. 2281, WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act (last modified Sept.
17, 1997) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/4021.htm> (describing Macrovision's
videocassette copy protection system used in the vast majority of prerecorded videotapes
worldwide, as well as satellite television, cable television, pay-per-view, and Digital
Video Disc copy protection systems); IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 190
(describing "digital subcode channel" contained in digital sound recordings and
broadcasts, used to prevent serial copying using digital audio recorders); Carol Levin,
It's a Fake! New Digital Fingerprints to Foil Software Pirates (last modified Mar. 3,
1997) <http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/news/trends/t970320a.html> (describing
"DiscGard," a system that prevents CD and DVD duplication by "etching a digital
fingerprint into the pits and lands of optical disks"; playback devices encoded with the
system do not allow duplication and will thus "stop pirates in their tracks").
272. Some progress has been made on systems that would print a very small digital
fingerprint within a print article or image. If the work is then digitized, the fingerprint
would be imported into the digital copy. See, e.g., Andrew R. Sorkin, Playboy Plans
to Use Digital 'Watermarks,' N.Y. TIMES CYBERTIMES (last modified June 30, 1997)
<http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/063097playboy.html> (describing Playboy
magazine's experiments with the digital fingerprinting of print images).
273. At least one large print publisher seemed to indicate that this is the case:
"Playboy is cracking down on suspected piracy of copyrighted property because it is
launching a new subscription-based service in the next few weeks, which is in beta
now." Macavinta, supra note 53.
274. Some users will always be able to bypass any protection methods. "Copyprotection schemes are just speed bumps." McCandless, supra note 6, at 181 (quoting
software executive). 'There will never be a foolproof solution to what is at bottom an
ethical problem." Levin, supra note 271 (quoting software industry representative). This
is a reality of cyberspace that must be recognized and accepted.
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3.

Summary

The assertion that ISPs are in a better position than copyright owners
to develop solutions to prevent infringement is simply not in accord with
the facts. Proponents of strict liability have failed to identify any
technological solutions that service providers can unilaterally implement,
instead offering only vague speculation about what might be possible.
In contrast, content providers have at their disposal many effective and
time-tested technological solutions, as well as many other new technologies capable of immediate implementation.
Many content providers, most notably software suppliers, have
successfully used technological solutions for many years. 275 Many
software producers, however, have abandoned the once routine practice
of copy-protecting their products. Although still widely used to protect
recreational software, copy protection on business applications has been
largely discontinued due to market pressures, predominantly from large
businesses, to provide easier to use products. 276 This is not to suggest

275. "To control unauthorized access, software publishers have long used passwords,
serial codes and other similar systems, which must be correctly applied to a particular
copy of a computer program before it can used." Prepared Testimony of Robert W.
Holleyman II, Pres,, Bus. Software Alliance, Before the House Judiciary Committee,
Courts and Intellectual Property Subcommittee, "Implementation of the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and the Balance of Responsibilities
on the Internet," Federal News Service, Sept. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis
Library, Fednew File [hereinafter Holleyman Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281].
276. "Not all that long ago ... most software programs came with copy protection
embedded in code, but now very few have it because consumers rebelled against the
notion that publishers would make it more difficult for them to use the software
legitimately." Levin, supra note 271. See also Barbara Cohen, Note, A Proposed
Regime for Copyright Protection on the Internet, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 401,411 (1996).
In the mid-1980s, many software creators began to use copy protection devices
in their programs. Although these methods were generally effective at
thwarting unauthorized users, users nonetheless complained of the time and
complexity involved in dealing with these devices, and they felt that the
devices interfered with legitimate use of the software. The industry responded,
for the most part, by leaving these devices off their products.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Similarly, in response to criticism that the SPA concentrates too
much on legal solutions rather than technological solutions like cryptography or
hardware dongles, Ken Wasch of the Software Publishers Association responded:
Ten years ago there was a huge battle between the industry and users over
copy protection. The last company to give up copy protection on a widespread
basis was Lotus in 1987 when they sought a large order from the Defense
Department. The users won.
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that somehow software suppliers deserve to have their products stolen,
but only to show that software producers, unlike service providers, have
made a conscious economic decision that the benefits of vulnerability to
piracy outweigh its costs. In contrast, the "affirmative policy decisions"
to remain vulnerable to piracy supposedly made by ISPs may not be
"decisions" at all, but merely the manifestation of their inability to
effectively respond to the problem. Software producers that seek to
impose liability on ISPs are, in effect, seeking to gain the benefits of
copy protection without accepting the corresponding costs, instead
shifting them to innocent parties far less capable of preventing the harm.
Most importantly, however, these technological solutions are capable
of dramatically reducing the two sources of the greatest losses to the
software industry - corporate software piracy and illegal commercial
duplication plants in areas like the Far East. Unlike Internet piracy,
whose participants frequently use and exchange pirated software "for the
sheer thrill of it," 277 corporate piracy and counterfeit copies represent
actual lost sales to software producers. Despite the Software Publishers
Association's history of strong rhetoric about the massive losses that
Internet piracy inflicts upon software producers and its well-publicized
lawsuits against small ISPs, 278 Ken Wasch, the SPA's President,
recently admitted:

Users did not want to be encumbered ... by technical forms of protection ...
You can interview ... any major company and they do not want copy
protection of any sort because it restricts their freedom of deinstalling and
reinstalling ... every copy protection system known that has come forward
somehow encumbers IS [information systems] managers from doing their job.
Ken Wasch interview, supra note 9. But see Statement by Ken Wasch, President of
Software Publishers Association, on Congressional Hearings to Address Software Piracy,
supra note 190 ("[O]ur only weapons against piracy have been litigation and moral
suasion.").
277. See Shapley, supra note 13. See also McCandless, supra note 6, at 134-35
(describing Internet software piracy as "a game," "a hobby," and "like stamp
collecting").
278. The Software Publishers Association (on behalf of its large software company
members) has filed numerous suits against very small service providers. See, e.g., Lance
Rose, SPA Copyright Bullies Shake Down the Web (visited Nov. 11, 1997)
<http://www.cyberlaw.com/spabull.html> (extremely critical article by prominent Internet
attorney and author); Jonathan Wallace, An Open Letter to the SPA (last modified Dec.
1996) <http://www.spectacle.org/1296/spa.html> (another critical article written by an
Internet lawyer); Mike Godwin, Foul Play (last modified Feb. I 997)
<http://www.internetworld.com/print!monthly/1997/02naw.html>; Will Rodger, SPA
Withdraws Piracv Lawsuits (last modified Nov. 25,
1996)
<http://www5.zdnet.com/zdnn/content!inwk/0327/inwk0031.html>. The SPA Web site
contains a page with hyperlinks to press releases detailing its current lawsuits against
ISPs, of which virtually all are small local providers. Anti-piracy Press Releases (visited
Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.spa.org/piracy/pirnews.htm>.
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We don't think that the [Internet software pirates] really affect our industry that
significantly. The biggest losses to the industry are in businesses where
companies don't put management procedures in place to protect against
software piracy. That's where the loss is ... where they buy five copies of
Lotus 1-2-3 and run it on twenty machines ... It's mostly corporate users [who
are abusing the copying privileges] ... The other big loss to our industry is
[foreign] CD pressing plants. 279

The statistics support Mr. Wasch's observation. Approximately threequarters of all software applications sold are business applications (nonrecreational software such as word processors), yet sales to consumers
only account for less than four percent of business software sales. 280
Therefore, even assuming arguendo that individual users illegally
obtained one out of every two business applications currently in use, and
Internet piracy accounted for every one of these illegal copies, completely stopping software piracy on the Internet would only increase revenues
to business software producers less than four percent. Although
providers of recreational software and other works may well be suffering
proportionately greater losses, 281 and, as previously noted, a cultural
shift towards disrespect of intellectual property rights in general would
have disastrous effects on our economy, we must be cautious about
279. Ken Wasch interview, supra note 9.
280. See Building an Information Economy: Software Industry Positions U.S. for
New Digital Era, at 18 n.12 (last modified July 1997) <http://www.bsa.org/info/
econstudy.htm>.
281. It is likely that recreational software producers suffer proportionately greater
losses from online piracy, since it is doubtful how many users would actually purchase
some of the expensive business applications that are commonly pirated on the Internet.
This increased likelihood of lost sales, however, must be weighed against the fact that
business applications are much more expensive on a per-copy basis, so, other things
being equal, more recreational applications would need to be pirated in order to produce
the same dollar losses to their producers. Perhaps the most disproportionately impacted
group of all, however, are producers of smaller applications, both business and
recreational, since their products are easier to exchange over the Internet, yet they are
typically smaller companies that can least afford to have lost sales. "[P]iracy affects the
small [software] companies most. .. there are a lot of small companies that need every
user to have actually purchased the product." Ken Wasch interview, supra note 9. See
also Prepared Statement of the Honorable Howard Coble, Chairman, Before the House
Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, Regarding Electronic
Copyright Piracy and the "No Electronic Theft (NET) Act," Federal News Service, Sept.
11, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File ("It is self-evident that this
transgression-the unauthorized access to a company's products-has even greater
potential to ruin small, start-up companies. Let us not forget that small businesses still
comprise that sector of our national economy which provides the most employment
opportunities for American citizens.").
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enacting policies that may have a significant negative impact upon all
information consumers in order to provide benefits to relatively discrete
segments of our economy. Additionally, there are signs that the
increasing threat of Internet piracy is forcing content providers to rethink
their cost-benefit analysis of technological solutions, a choice that is not
available to Internet service providers. 282
E.

Strict Liability and Incentive Shifting

Proponents of strict liability for service providers have supported their
arguments by pointing out that the economic incentives provided by
strict liability tend to automatically force producers to arrive at the most
economically efficient balance of cost and safety:
[W]e need a behavioral control that will bring about the optimal result by
forcing the relevant parties to determine the best precautions themselves ....
In fact, one of the principal differences between negligence liability and strict
liability is that strict liability removes the cost-benefit calculation from the court
and imposes it on defendants. Here that means that strict liability will force
[service providers] to determine the most advantageous mix of preventative
measures .... 283

This argument is grounded in the fundamental axiom of law and
economics that incentives to prevent harm should lie with the party best
able to prevent the harm. When applied to products liability, where the
victim cannot easily prevent the harm, this principle mandates that the
"optimum result" is obtained when manufacturers are forced to assume
absolute responsibility for the safety of their products. When applied to
the question of service provider liability, however, this principle may
dictate a different result since both "relevant parties" have the ability "to
determine the best precautions." As has been shown, however, while
service providers have few effective tools to combat infringement,
content providers have available a wide variety of effective "preventative
measures" to guard against unauthorized uses of their products.

1.

The Rationale for Strict Liability Turned on its Head

When, as with content providers, the victim is in possession of the
most efficient means of preventing the harm, the rationale for strict

282. "Today, software developers authors and publishers are increasingly relying
on encryption, scrambling, passwords, and other similar means to control access to
copies of works. These systems render the software unusable until the correct password
or process is used to render it operative." Holleyman Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R.
2281, supra note 275 (emphasis added).
283. Morril & Eaton, supra note l 73, at 5.
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liability for service providers is turned on its head,
Judge Posner:

As observed by

[P]otential injurers subject to a rule of strict liability will automatically take into
account possible changes in activity level, as well as possible changes in
expenditures on care, in deciding whether to prevent accidents, , , ,
The problem with using this analysis to support a general rule of strict liability
is that changes in activity level by victims are also a method of accident
avoidance, and one that is encouraged by negligence liability but discouraged
by strict liability, , , , Thus, strict liability encourages activity-level changes by
potential injurers but discourages them by potential victims, while negligence
liability encourages activity-level changes by potential victims but discourages
them by potential injurers,
If a class of activities can be identified in which activity-level changes by
potential injurers appear to be the most efficient method of accident prevention,
there is a strong argument for imposing strict liability on the people engaged
in those activities. And, conversely, if there is a class of activities in which
activity-level changes by potential victims are the most efficient method of
accident prevention, there is a strong argument for no liability....284

It would be an economically unsound policy to impose strict liability
on service providers. Only through distorting the distribution of
incentives calculus by ignoring the vastly superior position of service
providers to prevent the harm can one reach the conclusion that the
economic incentives to prevent infringement are best borne by service
providers.
The costs of any product, including internalized losses, are ultimately
borne by either the consumers or producers of that product. In the
absence of strict liability for service providers, the costs of infringement
are internalized by content providers. The availability of infringing
copies of a work diverts demand away from the provider's distribution
channels. Content providers must therefore either charge higher prices
for their products, thus passing the costs on to their consumers, or, if the
costs cannot be passed on, accept lower profits. These market forces
create incentives for content providers to either implement better
protection systems or suffer defeat at the hands of more capable new
entrants into the market. The current liability system properly imposes
incentives upon content providers since they have the capability to
effectively respond to those incentives.

284.

RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 177-78 ( 4th ed. 1992).
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If strict liability were imposed on ISPs, they would face similar market
pressure as they internalize the increased costs of providing information
access. ISPs would therefore face increased incentives to prevent
infringement, yet, unlike content providers, would be unable to
effectively respond. New market entrants would fare no better. Thus,
the cost of information access would increase with little prospect of
technology to bring costs back down.
Thus, while losses from infringement will always provide some level
of incentive to the copyright holder, even a massive increase in
economic incentives placed upon ISPs would not be sufficient to offset
even a small reduction in incentives to copyright holders because of the
gross disparity in their relative abilities to respond to those incentives.285 Strict liability for service providers would therefore merely
shift the costs of infringement from one group of consumers (content
purchasers) to another (information access purchasers).
Content
providers, however, have a much greater opportunity to minimize the
costs that their consumers must eventually bear.
2.

The Threat to Affordable Access to Information

It must also be remembered who will bear the ultimate costs of the
unwise incentive shifting that would result from imposition of strict
liability on service providers - information consumers. Increased
information costs would threaten the growth of an increasingly important
segment of America's economy. It is difficult to overstate the importance to our future of the continued growth in America's information
infrastructure. More than half of all America's workforce is employed
in information-related industries. 286 Communications and information
technology are the quickest-growing sectors in the American economy.287 Businesses, including those outside the information sectors, are
quickly beginning to see the potential for growth presented by participation in online commerce. 288 Affordable access to the Internet is of
special importance to small businesses, as presence on the World Wide

285. See generally Byron F. Marchant, On-Line on the Internet: First Amendment
and Intellectual Propeny Uncertainties in the On-Line World, 39. How. L.J. 477, 500-03
(1996).
286. IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 10.
287. Id.
288. A February 1998 study reported that online purchases per user increased 250%
from 1996 to 1997. Latest Intelliquest Survey Reports 62 Million American Adults
Access the Internet/Online Service, supra note 2. Further, these purchases only represent
a minority of the true economic impact of online shopping; while only 17% of users
purchased goods online, nearly 60% used the Internet to gather information about
product pricing, features, and retail locations. Id.
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Web allows smaller businesses to compete on substantially equal footing
to their larger competitors. 289
In addition to providing economic benefits, affordable access to
information provides immeasurable educational opportunities to all
Americans. Even those without the financial means to afford formal
education can have access to a wealth of knowledge and opinion.
People with disabilities can access vast amounts of information without
traveling to a library. Americans in rural communities can have access
to educational materials that they would otherwise be unable to obtain.
Impoverished children will no longer be at a disadvantage because their
parents cannot afford to furnish them with the latest educational
materials. In short, by removing economic and physical barriers,
affordable access to information can help level the playing field for all
Americans. 290
Yet universities, libraries, and other free or low cost providers would
suffer the greatest impact from the increased costs of strict liability. It
is likely that many would simply eliminate free access in order to avoid
liability for a service for which they are not receiving revenue. 291

289. The Internet allows even very small businesses to offer their goods and
services to a worldwide audience:
The biggest winners [from growth in Internet commerce], aside from
consumers, are likely to be small and mid-size businesses. Simply put,
network technologies enable all businesses to compete in national and
international markets by dramatically reducing their harriers to entry. Until
recently, only large companies could afford the costs involved in far-flung
business operations. The Internet has already changed this scenario.
Wasch Testimony on H.R. 2180, supra note 28.
290. Increased information access costs will only add to the widening gap between
the rich and poor in America:
Faced with significant financial liability, most online service providers would
simply stop providing such services. Or, for those that did continue, the added
costs of staying in business-setting up monitoring systems, hiring hoards of
copyright attorneys, and paying the damages anytime a decision to remove a
user or content from the internet was wrong-would transform the internet
from a robust low-cost competitive commodity available to many to a highcost luxury available to only a few. Even this best-case scenario widens the
gulf between the information "haves" and "have nots" in a way that ultimately
will harm the whole economy and undermine the public policy goal of
universal access to information.
Copyright Liability for Online Access Service Providers (visited Mar. 3, 1997)
<http://www.ahccoalition.org/cn/liability. htm>.
291. In addition to concerns about its chilling effect on "scholarly communications,"
educational institutions have expressed concern that strict liability will interfere with
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Further, providers of rural Internet access would be disproportionately
affected, as they face much higher costs than metropolitan area
providers. 292 Increasing costs would disproportionately affect those
most in need of affordable information access.

a.

The Magnitude of the Threat

While the potential impact of strict liability on affordable information
access defies accurate measurement, most industry analysts agree that the
cost of Internet access is virtually certain to significantly increase. 293
The White Paper and other commentators have extrapolated that, since
other businesses historically subject to strict liability for copyright
infringement have not been put out of business, the threat to Internet
service providers has been overestimated. 294 As one commentator

their role as "the public's 'on-ramps' to the information superhighway":
Without reasonable insulation from liability based solely on the activities of
school and library network users over which our institutions have no control,
educational and library institutions may be forced by the prospect of crippling
liability to call a halt to building new, or to dismantle or disable existing,
access points to the Internet.
Copyright law should uphold the principle that liability for infringing
activity in the network environment rests primarily with the infringing party
rather than with third parties. Companies and non-profit institutions should
accept responsibility for acts undertaken at their behest, but should not be held
liable for the acts of individuals-whatever their association-who act
independently.
This principle is an essential underpinning of robust
information commerce as well as academic freedom.

Prepared Testimony of Prof Robert L. Oakley, Georgetown University Law Ctr., Before
the House Judiciary Comm., Courts and Intellectual Property Subcomm., Regarding
Service Provider Liability by Library, Educational, and Scholarly Associations, Federal
News Service, Sept. 16, 1997, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File
[hereinafter Oakley Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281].
292. The U.S. Telephone Association, an organization of 1,400 local telephone
companies (of which virtually all are also ISPs), has expressed great alarm over the
continued viability of rural Internet access:
[T]he ISP service USTA [U.S. Telephone Association] members provide
particularly in rural areas, is usually the only opportunity consumers living in
these areas have to access the Internet. ... [R]ural Internet service is not a
major revenue producer. Unlike local telephone service, rural Internet access
is not subsidized ... Margins for Internet access to rural consumers are
extremely small. So, while USTA members are committed to the Internet, the
threat of copyright lawsuits is becoming an increasingly salient consideration
in offering the service at all.
Neel Testimony on H.R. 2180, supra note 220.
293. See, e.g., Elizabeth Weise, Access Providers Rethinking Flat-Rate Pricing for
Internet, N.Y. TIMES CYBERTIMES, (last modified Jan. 12, 1997) <http://www.nytimes.
com/library/cyber/week/011297flatrate.html>; Murphy & Hofacker, supra note 23 J;
Lewis, supra note 23 J.
294. See, e.g., IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note l 73, at 116-17; Charles H. Kennedy,
Is the Internet a New Legal Frontier?, 39 How. L.J. 581, 583-84 (1996).
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noted: "The risk of liability under present law appears not to have put
photo finishers, copy centers, and book stores out of business, and
certainly has not prevented the explosive growth of the Internet." 295
This argument is vulnerable to attack on several grounds. First, the
yardstick employed is unreasonably crude. The question is not whether
access to the Internet will perish, but rather whether access will remain
affordable. Simply because providers have not been put out of business
does not mean that the costs associated with liability are not significant.
Second, content providers have also enjoyed "explosive growth" as a
result of the Internet and do not appear to be in jeopardy of going out
of business either. 296 In fact, it defies logic that, if Internet piracy
were that great of a threat, content providers would not have already
responded by implementing (or re-implementing) some of the many
effective technological solutions at their disposal.
Further, the comparison of Internet providers with photo finishers,
copy centers, and retailers leaves much to be desired. Photo finishers
and retailers can more easily detect the presence of infringing materials
since they have at least some opportunity to visually examine the
products for which they are liable. In contrast, visual inspection of a
digital data stream is not possible. 297 Even for content resident on an

295. Kennedy, supra note 294, at 584. See also IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note
173, at J 16-17; Kenswil Testimony on H.R. 2180, supra note 201.
Printers make "reproductions" under the Copyright Act every minute as part
of their ordinary business, and they cannot know whether all or some of the
materials they are reproducing are infringing someone's rights .... Yet there
is no printer exemption in the Copyright Act. Bookstores, too, are technically
at risk that they are committing or contributing to copyright infringement by
virtue of their ordinary, day-to-day business operations. They cannot know the
content of every book they sell, and whether any of it is infringing .... Yet
there is no bookstore exemption in the Copyright Act. And the same can be
said for CD pressing plants, record retailers, book and magazine publishers,
TV broadcasters, and scores of others. What makes Internet Access Providers
any different?
Id.

296. "If you find me a copyright holder that's been pushed to the brink of
bankruptcy by the Internet, then we have something to talk about." Paul Heltzel, Use a
Floppy, Go to Jail (last modified August 1, 1997) <http://www.pcworld.com/news/daily/
data/0897/970801175655.html> (quoting Mike Godwin, staff counsel for the Electronic
Frontier Foundation).
297. As observed by one service provider:
In a traditional copyright situation, for example, a publisher or a distributor of
material has the ability to check and confirm whether the material is an
authorized copy, and can choose not to distribute questionable material prior
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ISP's servers, the comparison is not fair. The cover of a CD or book
reveals far greater information than does the typical eight-character
computer file name. Additionally, the potential liability for an ISP is an
order of magnitude greater than that faced by a photo finisher, retailer,
or copy center. 298 For example, assume that two infringers are simultaneously copying a copyrighted image. Infringer A is at the local copy
center, furiously photocopying the image. Infringer B is at home,
scanning the image into his computer. In just a few seconds, B can
connect to the Internet and upload the scanned image. In the same
period of time, infringer A has made only a few copies, but B may have
created liability for thousands of copies. Thus, Internet providers can be
subjected to much greater liability, yet they have far less ability to
prevent the harm.

b.

The Shortcomings of the Innocent Infringer Doctrine and
Indemnity

Advocates of strict liability also contend that the threat of ISP liability
is overstated because ISPs are protected from massive liability by the
"innocent infringer" doctrine, which allows a court to reduce a damage
award to as little as $200 for unintentional infringement. 299 This is a

to triggering any copyright liability. Many entities involved in electronic
communications do not have that luxury-millions of messages are transported
daily and pre-screening for infringing communications is both technically
infeasible and practically impossible. Service providers, like the telephone
company or an express delivery service, are conduits for information generated
and distributed by others, rather than electronic bookstores that select and
present particular texts, while declining to market other texts.
Purcell Testimony on H.R. 2441, supra note 223.
298. The White Paper recognized that the Internet could cause much greater losses
to authors than conventional copying media:
Authors are wary of entering [the online distribution market] because doing so
exposes their works to a higher risk of piracy and other unauthorized uses than
any of the traditional, current modes of dissemination. . . . Just one unauthorized uploading of a work onto a bulletin board, for instance-unlike, perhaps,
most single reproductions and distributions in the analog or print environment---could have devastating effects on the market for the work.
IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 178 (emphasis added). It seems disingenuous for
the White Paper to later minimize the fact that the Internet could also cause much
greater liability to service providers.
299. See, e.g., Morril & Eaton, supra note I 73, at 3.
[S]trict liability still permits consideration of relative culpability at the sanction
stage: the sanction imposed on an "innocent [copyright] infringer" may be
limited to a $200 fine. Therefore, ... applying direct copyright infringement
to on-line service providers in connection with the infringing activities of their
subscribers should not seriously impede the growth of the Internet ...
Id. See also IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 119-20; Kennedy, supra note 294,
at 583-84. The "innocent infringer" doctrine is defined in section 504 of the Copyright
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specious argument that ignores the realities of modem litigation; the
threat of a nominal fine pales in comparison to the thousands of dollars
required to defend even a meritless case. Successful plaintiffs are also
usually awarded their costs and attorney fees. 300 Thus, even an
"innocent" ISP will likely be saddled with paying the entire cost of the
litigation. The innocent infringer defense offers no real protection from
exposure to substantial liability, which is especially devastating for small
providers. 301
Proponents of strict liability for ISPs also frequently suggest that
subscriber indemnity agreements would substantially reduce ISP
losses. 302 This is also unrealistic, as subscribers will frequently be
unable to make good on their promise. Even if the subscriber secures
his account with a credit card, ISPs would often be unable to recover
indemnity in excess of the credit line. Even assuming minimal litigation
expenses and a minimal damage award, the costs to the ISP would
routinely be greater than it could recover. Finally, since much of the

Act:

In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the court
finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that his
or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion
may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1997).
300. Attorney's fees awards "are the rule rather than the exception and should be
awarded routinely." Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1177
(N.D. Tex. I 997). Attorney's fees, however, are only available to plaintiffs who
registered the work prior to the infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1997).
301. See, e.g., Purcell Testimony on H.R. 2441, supra note 223.
Without a clear, realistic standard, Internet access and service provision will
become the sole purview of the telecommunications giants that can afford to
absorb and settle large liability claims. The threat of legal fees alone could
exclude entrepreneurial and niche providers from the market.
As an entrepreneur in a competitive industry, I can assure you that defending
a copyright lawsuit is an expense that could easily destroy a small business.
Recently, an access-only provider in Northern Virginia was sued by a
copyright owner under a theory of copyright infringement. Although the
service provider settled before trial, just a few months of litigation preparation
represented a large chunk of its annual revenue. This is a burden that most
providers are unable to undertake, particularly if they can do nothing to
minimize their liability.
Id. (presumably referring to Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Va.
1995)).
302. See, e.f?., IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 178; Morril & Eaton, supra
note 173, at 4.
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content on an ISP's servers comes from outside its system, an ISP may
not be able to locate, much less obtain indemnity from, the actual
infringer.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument that the threat of increased costs
may be overstated is that, so far, no truly "innocent" ISP has been held
liable for copyright infringement in any reported decision. 303 This
argument ignores the fact, however, that none of these decisions have
any binding effect, as none have advanced to an appellate court.
Further, these "inconsistent federal district court decisions hardly
constitute a model for orderly relationships and business certainty." 304
3.

The Need for Alternatives to Liability-Based
Incentive Distribution

Imposing strict liability upon Internet service providers would be an
economically unwise policy choice. Most arguments in favor of strict
303. See, e.g., Prepared Statement of Michael K. Kirk, Exec. Dir., Am. Intellectual
Property Law Association, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property, Federal News Service, Sept. 17, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File.
Our threshold problem ... is that it is difficult to identify jurisprudence
which makes the issue of on-line liability a real problem as opposed to a
perceived problem.

We are not aware that a single [online service or

Internet access provider] has ever been found liable for copyright infringement
on the Internet. ... Do we have a solution in search of a problem?
Id. This sentiment was echoed by a representative from the music industry:
IAPs claim they are at risk for being held liable for "massive damages" and
"face the prospect" of being adjudged culpable for infringement. But these are
hypothetical risks only, not borne out in practice. Nor are we aware of any
onslaught of debilitating lawsuits that threaten the very foundation of the
Internet. To date, we count only a dozen or so decisions dealing with
copyright liability on the Internet-and only a couple of them have involved
lAPs. And the one decision dealing directly with the issue of !AP liability
came out on the side of the !AP.
Kenswil Testimony on H.R. 2180, supra note 201.
304. Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 250 (statement of Stephen M.
Heaton, Gen. Counsel and Sec., CompuServe, Inc.) See also Prepared Statement of
David Nimmer, Ire/I & Mane/la, LLP, Los Angeles, on Behalf of the U.S. Tel. Ass'n,
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Concerning H.R. 2265, Federal News Service, Sept. 11, 1997, available in
LEXIS, Leg is Library, Fednew File.
The lesson from that trio of cases [Frena, Sega v. MAPHIA, and Netcom]
is that standards are only beginning to emerge for the level of duty that an ISP
bears with respect to copyright infringement that crosses its services.
Moreover, the different standards articulated by the district courts have yet to
reach appellate review.
In such a climate of confusion, the danger facing an ISP is that it can have
no certainty, for example, that the standard enunciated in [Frena] will be
rejected by other courts.
Id.
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liability for service providers are grounded in the mistaken assumption
that ISPs can effectively control content on their systems. Once this
premise is stripped away, these arguments fail. Since the costs of injury
should be internalized by those parties who can best respond to the
consequential economic incentives, economically sound policy dictates
that losses from infringement should continue to be borne by content
providers, who are in a far better position to respond to the incentives.
Additional economic and social policy considerations weigh in favor
of limiting the potential liability of Internet service providers. Affordable access to information is vital to America's continued leadership in
information technologies. Potentially massive liability for service
providers could force nonprofit institutions and rural providers to
terminate free or low cost access, harming those who need it most.
This potentially massive liability to ISPs is, of course, due to the
potentially massive damages to copyright owners. Therefore, it may
properly be said that providing Americans with continued affordable
access to information should not come at the expense of copyright
owners. 305 Although all who are injured deserve compensation, any
policy that myopically focuses on compensation necessarily misses the
mark when applied to the realm of copyright. The substantive goals of
tort and copyright are fundamentally different. While the driving force
behind strict liability is the removal of the economic consequences of
accidents, compensation for injury is only a collateral aim of copyright.306 The goal of copyright is to promote innovation and creativi-

305. As noted by a major publisher:
No one-least of all those of us in the business of providing information-wants our society to devolve into segmented classes of information
"haves" and "have-nots." However, ensuring that those who cannot afford to
pay for information nevertheless have access to it is a broader societal
responsibility, not one that should be borne primarily-let alone exclusively-by copyright owners.
Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 75 (statement of Barbara Munder, Senior
Vice Pres., The McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc.).
306. The purpose of copyright is "To Promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
[C]opyright law ... makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration.
'"The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors.' It is said that reward to the author or artist serves to
induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius."
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ty. 307 The Internet, however, promises to accelerate the growth of
innovation and creativity faster than any force in the history of mankind.
The result of a policy that goes too far in pursuit of compensating
copyright holders, thereby unwisely shifting economic incentives and
costs, may therefore result in a net loss of innovation and creativity, a
result contrary to copyright's fundamental goal.
Framing the argument in this way, however, presents a false dilemma-content providers and service providers must both prosper in order
for either to prosper:
Copyright holders, content providers and Internet access providers have a
mutually dependent relationship----quality online content increases demand for
Internet access, while increased Internet access increases the demand for quality
online content. Absent significant cooperation among content and access
providers, the Internet can easily dissolve into a muddle of competing and
parochial interests. 308

Content providers and access providers, rather than viewing each other
as adversaries in a zero-sum game, must be encouraged to work together
to develop new and more secure methods to ensure the widespread
availability of online content. Both sides are becoming aware that the
key to success is the development of systems and procedures that will
minimize losses to both service providers and copyright holders.
Content providers are beginning to realize that the adversarial relationship that has in the past defined the debate is counterproductive to the
development of such systems.
On the Internet and other networks, software publishers and telecommunications service providers will be partners. and each should learn to value
the contribution the other will make to success on the Internet. Therefore, [the
Software Publishers Association] is deeply interested in any change in existing
law that could make that fight more difficult or less effective. and would
appreciate the opportunity to speak with interested Members of Congress and
organizations about such efforts. 309

Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (citations
omitted).
307. It is important to remember that the monopoly granted by copyright is also
accompanied by statutory provisions limiting that monopoly.
Copyright is at root about promoting creativity .... creativity results not just
from the financial incentive for authors and inventors codified in Title 17 of
the U.S. Code, but also from many provisions in the statute which promote
access to copyrighted information. The best measure of our copyright law's
success is whether it fairly balances those equal priorities in the service of the
Framer's commitment to the broad dissemination of knowledge and information in a democracy.
Oakley Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281, supra note 291.
308. lTAA Discussion Paper, supra note 25, at "Executive Summary."
309. Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 85 (statement of Garry L.
McDaniels, Pres., Skills Bank Corp., on behalf of the Software Publishers Ass'n).
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What is clearly needed is a liability regime that provides for the
proper distribution of economic incentives upon both content providers
and service providers. Strict liability for service providers fails to
properly distribute these incentives, as too much incentive is placed upon
the shoulders of those least able to effectively respond. Likewise,
unqualified exemption from liability for service providers also fails to
properly distribute these incentives, as too little incentive is provided for
service providers to assist copyright owners.
Rather than distributing incentives based upon inappropriate analogies
imported from products liability doctrine, we need a legal framework
that distributes the incentives in the specific areas where each party
possesses the required expertise to effectively respond to them. Service
providers specialize in the storage and transmission of data, irrespective
of its content. 310 As one Web site developer noted, "I would rather
partner with those of my clients who have intellectual property to protect
that property via TECHNOLOGY rather than be forced out of my core
competency because the law requires that I invest in hiring more lawyers
than programmers." 311
This is not to say, however, that ISPs do not play an important role in
controlling intellectual property theft on the Internet. On the contrary,
ISPs are in a unique position to assist copyright owners both in the
identification of infringing parties and in the implementation of authordeveloped protection schemes. 312 But content providers must take the

As observed by one service provider:
Even if the [online service] boldly sets out to resolve the thorny questions
of an alleged infringement, it is thereby taking on a task it is not well suited
to do (because it is in essence a distributor and network access provider, not
a creator or editor of copyrighted works )-and it inevitably becomes a de facto
arbiter of copyright disputes that are truly between others ....

310.

The intensive factual investigation and legal copyright analysis should not
be required of online companies regarding the infringement of others. OLS
companies are not particularly well equipped to do this analysis; in fact, the
copyright owner is far better equipped; and it is a completely unacceptable
shifting of the burdens of ownership of private property away from the
proprietor-who retains all the benefits of ownership.
Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160. at 254-56 (statement of Stephen M. Heaton,
Gen. Counsel and Sec., CompuServe Inc.).
311. Patel Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281, supra note 215.
312. As noted by a music industry executive:
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initiative to develop technological solutions to infringement, as only they
possess the expertise to identify whether a work is infringing.
[O]nly the content owner or his agent can ever know for sure what is an
authorized use. And even if a telco or ISP had a strong suspicion that a work
is infringing based on the title of a site, the content owner is in a better position
to make that judgement. Technology is currently available for content owners
to search for infringements, since they actually know what they are looking

for.313

As correctly observed by one entertainment industry executive: "[ISPs]
and other telecommunications companies have a key role to play ...
[and] must shoulder their fair share of this burden. Of course copyright
owners must take the lead. Our vigilance is essential. Internet piracy
demands that we become the watchmen on the tower." 314
It should be apparent that the current legal environment presents a
poor forum for the development of any such solutions. A system of
distributing incentives based on the threat of liability is antithetical to the
cooperation of the litigants, yet this cooperation is essential to the
development of the Internet as a secure and robust environment for
commerce. The answers to the current questions raised by the ISP
liability question cannot be found in existing case law or tort doctrine.
A fresh and comprehensive approach to this new and challenging
problem is needed.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

ISP regulation is not a matter that should be left to the courts. There
are too many questions, many quite technical in nature, that demand a
definitive legislation solution. Each claim brought in these relatively
uncharted legal waters therefore requires the trier of fact to attempt to
understand intensely technical issues, to render what amounts to

Just as technology has created this new threat of piracy on the Internet, so too
can it solve the problem it has wrought. Precisely how, or when, remains
unclear. But one conclusion appears inescapable: We will not be able to
protect our music entirely on our own; encryption and other unilaterallyapplied technology measures will not prevent any Internet user from taking any
of the 4.7 billion CDs already out in the marketplace and uploading the music
on them to the Internet, where it will become available to millions of
downloaders worldwide. Virtually any technology used to protect our music
will be bilateral, requiring hardware or software on the Internet or in
computers to look for and act upon the technological protection measures
encoded in our recordings. We need the cooperation of the online and Internet
service providers ... to help us protect our works. We cannot do it alone.
Kenswil Testimony on H.R. 2180, supra note 201 (emphasis added).
313. Neel Testimony on H.R. 2180, supra note 220 (emphasis added).
314. Valenti Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281, supra note 8.

312

[VOL. 35: 219, 19981

Internet Copyright Infringement
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

scientific findings, 315 and to then apply those findings to laws that do
not clearly define the rights and responsibilities of the litigants. Is it
realistic to expect judges and juries to be able to consistently decide
these complex issues?
Determining which types of ISPs should be liable in which situations for
copyright infringement requires a degree of technological sophistication that
even the federal courts do not have. To date, the courts still have not
differentiated between ISPs, BBS operators, and Web page operators. However,
Congress, with almost unlimited access to technology experts and the time to
extensively study the issues, is well-equipped to craft a technologically
sophisticated solution for the online world. 31

Even after the courts have waded through the thick technical issues
and identified the legally relevant facts, they are then confronted with
the daunting task of applying those facts to statutes that do not
adequately guide them. As noted in the White Paper:
It is difficult for intellectual property laws to keep pace with technology. When

technological advances cause ambiguity in the law, courts look to the law's
underlying purposes to resolve that ambiguity. However, when technology gets
too far ahead of the law, and it becomes difficult and awkward to adapt the
specific statutory provisions to comport with the law's principles, it is time for
reevaluation and change. "Even though the 1976 Copyright Act was carefully
drafted to be flexible enough to be applied to future innovations, technology has
a habit of outstripping even the most flexible statutes." 317

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, since the application of copyright
to cyberspace has profound policy implications, yet is wholly statutory,

315. See supra note 18 (describing the lengthy technological discussions in recent
Internet-related court opinions).
316. Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at [page] (statement of William J.
Cook, Attorney, Willian, Brink, Hofer, Gilson & Liane). "Reasonabilility" is particularly
difficult to determine in unfamiliar factual settings.
[A] broader issue related to the "cyberspace community" standards question
is what the "reasonable" person would do in a given circumstance. The
concept of reasonableness is pervasive in Anglo-American law, especially tort
law. There is no inherent reason why the concept cannot apply in cyberspace.
The problem is that in many situations, juries-and even cyberspace users
themselves-may not know and may have no basis for knowing what is
reasonable in cyberspace.
Hardy, supra note 206, at 1013.
317. IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 21 I (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-735,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6935, 6938 (report
accompanying legislation granting copyright owners of computer software an exclusive
right to control rentals)). Despite this observation, the White Paper called for only
relatively minor modifications to the Copyright Act. Id. at 2 I 1-38.
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it presents the courts with a topic that our Constitution properly has
assigned to Congress. As noted by the Supreme Court in Sony v.
Universal City Studios:
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be
granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access
to their work product. Because this task involves a difficult balance between
the interests of authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their
writings and discoveries on the one hand, and society's competing interest in
the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the other hand, our patent
and copyright statutes have been amended repeatedly.
The judiciary's reluctance to expand the protections afforded by the copyright
without explicit legislative guidance is a recurring theme. Sound policy, as well
as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress
has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate
fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably
implicated by such new technology.
In a case ... in which Congress has not plainly marked our course, we must
be circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative
enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests. 318

The troubling legal questions presented by the rapid expansion of the
Internet should be settled legislatively. Congress is the only body
capable of answering the specific technical questions and reconciling the
often competing policy interests associated with the question of liability
for online copyright infringement. Congress is uniquely qualified not
only to perform the required "calculus of interests," but also to perform
the required assessment of what ISPs can and cannot realistically do and
the costs associated with those actions.
The rate at which technological developments are growing coupled with the
complexity of technology is beyond many laypersons' ken. A uniform system
of managing information technology and computer networks is needed to cope

318. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-31 (1984).
Courts considering other issues related to cyberspace have also called for Congressional
action to bring statutes in line with current technology. See, e.g., It's in the Cards, Inc.
v. Fuschetto, 535 N.W.2d 11, 14 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) ("Applying the present libel laws
to cyberspace or a computer network entails rewriting statutes that were designed to
manage physical. printed objects, not computer networks or services. Consequently, it
is for the legislature to address the increasingly common phenomenon of defamation on
the information superhighway."); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom Online Communication
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. I 361, 1370 n.12 (N.D. Cal. I 995) (noting the similarity of
ISPs to common carriers, but declining to summarily exempt them from liability on this
basis; reasoning that such a determination "is to be resolved by Congress, not the
courts"); United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994) (reluctantly
dismissing criminal charges against an admitted infringer due to the inadequacy of the
former criminal liability provisions of the Copyright Act).
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with the impact of the information age. It is the responsibility of the legislature
to manage this technology and to change or amend the statutes as needed. 319

Regulation of the Internet is inevitable. Congress should take this
opportunity to extend America's leadership in information technologies
by establishing a successful model of electronic commerce that other
nations will emulate, rather than being forced to fit our laws within a
framework established by other countries that were more willing to take
the lead. 320 A new framework that maximizes the untapped potential
of both access providers and content providers would increase copyright
authors' willingness to make their products available through electronic
commerce, thereby reducing transactions costs and providing for costeffective global marketing of America's information products. 321
Likewise, a stable legal environment for service providers would also
help reduce their costs, thereby ensuring that Americans continue to
enjoy affordable access to information.

It's in the Cards, 535 N.W.2d at 14-15 (emphasis added).
As an intellectual property attorney urged Congress:
I believe legislation on this issue is inevitable, if not here, then abroad. Use
of the Internet is widespread and rapidly growing in many other nations.
Some of these countries are now becoming part of the Internet and are taking
actions and considering legislation that will have a direct impact on the way
U.S. companies operate on the Internet. . . . It is just a short leap until ...
other countries consider legislation delineating the liability of ISPs, including
American companies, for online copyright infringement. Some of this foreign
legislation may have a distinct chilling effect on the Internet in the absence of
guidance from Congress. Therefore, while Congress is now in a position to
determine the future of intellectual property on the Internet ... Congress may
soon find itself following the lead of other countries.
Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 287-88 (statement of William J. Cook,
Attorney, Willian, Brink, Hofer, Gilson & Lione).
321. Without a secure online environment, content providers are reluctant to offer
their most valuable works online. As noted by an executive with publisher McGrawHill:
[T]he material that The McGraw-Hill Companies and its information industry
counterparts make available directly over the Internet provides only catalogs
or sample selections of works. We do not and cannot offer more because there
is too great a risk to our valuable intellectual property in an environment
where the culture and technology offer so little protection for the rights of
content producers. As a result, many of our most popular and successful
products ... are not as readily available as either we or our customers would
like.
Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 72 (statement of Barbara Munder, Senior
Vice Pres., The McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc.).
319.
320.
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A.

Congress Should Set Broad National Policy Goals and Delegate
Rulemaking to the FCC

This new statutory framework must be uniform in order to be
effective. Any regulations that negatively impact an ISP's subscribers
must be uniformly applied so that the marketplace does not punish
disproportionately regulated providers. 322 Further, the most promising
technological solutions to online copyright infringement can be effective
only if they are standardized and uniformly applied. 323 Finally, many
of the existing laws that impact ISPs, such as copyright, are exclusively
federal and, either expressly or by implication, preemptive. 324

322. This provides further support for total federal preemption of the field. If one
state were to impose more stringent requirements than another, users could easily switch
to the out-of-state provider. Additionally, large providers may be disadvantaged more
than small providers if regulations are not mandatory and uniform.
[S]elf-regulation should be not be voluntary, but should be mandated through
legislation. A voluntary duty would not provide sufficient protection to
copyrights. While major ISPs would most likely shoulder a voluntary duty,
the smaller ISPs would have a direct incentive to ignore a voluntary duty.
These smaller ISPs can more effectively compete with the bigger ISPs by
giving their subscribers access to content not available on the bigger systems
The likely compliance of only the major ISPs with a voluntary duty will not
provide any protection to copyrights. If copyright infringing material is
available anywhere online, it can be disseminated worldwide in a matter of
minutes.

Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 293 (statement of William J. Cook, Attorney,
Willian, Brink, Hofer, Gilson & Lione).
323. Since competing standards require wasted research and development effort and
leave producers open to the threat of obsolescence, both hardware and software-based
protection systems, like most computer technologies, require standardization to be
successful in the marketplace. See, e.g., supra note 264 and accompanying text
(describing the need for standardization for successful deployment of a smart card
system). Additionally, development and standardization of easy-to-use software
protection solutions would help to relieve the negative market pressures currently
suffered by those manufacturers who choose to copy-protect their programs. See supra
note 276 and accompanying text.
324. The Copyright Act is expressly preemptive. See 17 U.S.C. § 30l(a) (1997).
See also Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes and Gardner, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir.
1987) ("A state law is preempted by federal copyright law if (I) the work at issue comes
within the subject matter of copyright; and (2) the state law rights are 'equivalent to
rights within the general scope of copyright.'"); Ohio v. Perry, No. C-960297, 1997 Ohio
App. LEXIS 453 (Ohio App. 1997) at *18-19 (overturning a pirate BBS operator's
criminal conviction based on a state "unauthorized use of property" statute due to
preemption of the Copyright Act).
See generally Trotter Hardy, Contracts, Copyright, and Preemption in a Digital World,
1 RICH. J.L. & TECH 2 (1995) <http://www.urich.edu/similarjolt/vlil/hardy.html>
(providing overview of copyright preemption and the Internet).
Other laws affecting ISPs are also preemptive. See, e.g., Communications Decency
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104 § 502, 110 Stat. 56, (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1)(2))
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As a threshold matter, however, it must be recognized that the Internet
is a global medium and that the United States obviously can only
regulate what occurs within its territories. This does not, however,
present quite the impediment that it might seem. First, seventy percent
of all Internet traffic starts and stops within the United States. 325
Second, ninety eight percent of all Internet servers are located in North
America, Western Europe, Japan, and Australia, countries historically
friendly to the United States. 326 If our laws are successful in establishing a secure environment for online commerce, these other countries
might be persuaded to emulate them or to join a US-lead coalition. 327
If enough nations were to unite, even historically recalcitrant nations
like China might be persuaded to join.
In order to provide uniformity, Congress should wholly preempt state
regulation of service providers and create uniform national regulations. 328 Congress should confine its statutes in this area to only broad
statements of policy objectives, delegating to an administrative agency
the task of giving effect to these broad goals with appropriate regulations.329 Specific regulations would require more careful study than
any House or Senate subcommittee could provide, even if its members

(expressly providing for federal preemption, although allowing for "complementary state
regulation or oversight for intrastate communications").
325. Prepared Testimony of Allee Willis, Songwriter, on Behalf of Broadcast Music,
Inc., Before the House Judiciary Comm., Courts and Intellectual Property Subcomm.,
Regarding H.R. 2180 ("On-Line Copyright Limitation Liability Act") and H.R. 2281
( "WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act"), Federal News Service, Sept. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Fednew File.
326. Zgodzinski, supra note 4.
327. Global laws would, of course, be ideal. The recent progress in the development of international treaties makes it more likely that other nations would be willing
to employ similar systems in their countries. See generally IITF WHITE PAPER, supra
note 173, at 135-39. In December 1996, at an international conference sponsored by the
World Intellectual Property Organization, the WIPO Copyright Treaty was agreed upon.
As of March 10, 1998, the WIPO Copyright Treaty had been signed by 50 nations and
the European Community, but had been ratified only by Indonesia. The full text of the
treaty, as well as a current list of signatories, is available at the WIPO Web site (visited
Apr. 5, 1997) <http://www.wipo.org>.
328. Given the inherently interstate nature of the national information infrastructure,
any regulation of ISPs seems clearly within Congress' commerce power.
329. "Congress has long recognized that copyright laws must be written broadly in
order to maintain the necessary flexibility that information providers and their customers
require to meet changing marketplace demands." Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note
160, at 75 (statement of Barbara Munder, Senior Vice Pres., The McGraw-Hill Cos.,
Inc.).

317

worked on the issue to the exclusion of all other business. The intensely
technical nature of Internet technology and the certainty that it will
undergo constant evolution demands regulation and oversight of ISPs by
a specialized agency.
Since Internet access is inherently related to communications
technologies already under the regulation of the FCC, it would be the
obvious choice for an administrative agency. 330 Additionally, the FCC
already has much of the technical expertise and infrastructure required
to enact the regulations, monitor compliance, and hear cases involving
failure to comply. The FCC should be empowered to establish and
maintain specific guidelines for ISP conduct in areas such as access
control, implementation of technological solutions, investigation and
resolution of infringement claims, and subscriber education. ISP conduct
should be governed by these specific rules and procedures and ISP
liability should be accessed solely in light of compliance with those
procedures.
B.

A Negotiated Rulemaking Approach Should be Used to Help
Assure Balanced and Responsive Regulations

Content providers, access providers, the media, and free speech
organizations have bitterly clashed on the issue of service provider
liability. In order to assure that these and other stakeholders have a seat
at the table, regulations should be adopted using the negotiated
rulemaking process. 331 Contentious litigation can be replaced with
enlightened discussion and cooperation.
Rather than Draconian legislation by uniformed legislators, a flexible
negotiated rulemaking approach would also provide an ideal forum for
the development of industry-driven, rather than government-driven,
reform. The government-sponsored establishment of a dialog among
information industry representatives promises to provide the most
responsive and effective means of providing solutions to both the
problems of today and the problems of tomorrow. 332 Agency coordi-

330. Internet access inherently requires the use of some communications technology.
Although Internet access is today primarily limited to telephone lines, emerging
technologies for high-speed Internet access such as cable modems, satellite Internet
access, and wireless access have already been employed and will undoubtedly become
more popular. Since the FCC already regulates each of these technologies, it would be
uniquely situated to keep pace with changes in the particular methods by which users
will connect to the Internet in the future.
331. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-580 (1997) (outlining the basic negotiated rulemaking
approach).
332. As observed in the White Paper:
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nation of private research efforts would provide the greatest opportunity
for the development of new technological solutions. Further, as these
solutions are developed, the government would be able to provide
essential standardization and uniform implementation.
Congress,
however, must ensure that the primary goal of any regulation in this area
is to provide useful standardization, not merely standardization for its
own sake. Since excessively rigid standardization hinders rather than
promotes innovation and progress, Congress should regulate no more
than is required. 333 Such an approach would be consistent with the
history of the Internet, which was created through a flexible cooperative
effort between government and private industry. 334
Regulations that might have a negative impact upon affordable access
to information must be prudently crafted. In order to avoid costly and
ineffective regulations, all such regulations should be subject to careful
cost/benefit analysis. 335 In addition to making sure that the costs of
enforcement do not exceed its benefits to content providers, the needs of
content providers must be balanced against America's need for
affordable access to information. The negotiated rulemaking approach
would ensure that all stakeholders would have an opportunity to present
data on all relevant economic and social costs.

Different service providers play different roles-and those roles are changing and
being created virtually every day. At this time in the development and change in
the players and roles, it is not feasible to identify a priori those circumstances or
situations under which service providers should have reduced liability. However,
it is reasonable to assume that such situations could and should be identified through
discussion and negotiation among the service providers, the content owners and the
government. We strongly encourage such actions in the interest of providing
certainty and clarity in this emerging area of commerce.
I!TF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 123.
333. See. e.g., The Information Marketplace: Market Forces and Competition Will
Build the Information Marketplace (visited Mar.
16,
I 998)
<http://www.bsa.org/piracy/infomkt/forces.htm> (noting that "[r]egulated standards would
be a major departure and a potential disastrous destabilizing force" in the software
market and pointing to the technological superiority of computer monitors (which are not
subject to government mandated regulated) to television sets (which are subject to
decades-old government standardization) as a parallel example in hardware).
334. See supra notes 32, 37 and accompanying text (describing, respectively, the
governance and historical origin of the Internet).
335. See generally Byron F. Marchant, On-Line on the Internet: First Amendment
and Intellectual Property Uncertainties in the On-Line World, 39 How. L.J. 477 (1996)
(arguing that the complex economic relationships presented by the national information
infrastructure mandate a cost-sensitive approach; without such an approach, the benefits
of monitoring may be outweighed by the costs).
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By adopting the agency regulation approach, service providers would
benefit by being subjected to specific, workable, and technologically
realistic standards and by having their compliance with those standards
judged by technologically savvy agency personnel. Likewise, content
providers would benefit by having a secure uniform platform for online
distribution of their works. Thus, by adopting a flexible negotiated
rulemaking approach, both ISPs and content providers could be confident
that each is being asked to do no more than is currently technologically
and economically feasible.
C.

Regulations Can Reduce Losses Due To Infringement by
Promoting Prevention and Deterrence

The current debate over ISP liability has tended to divert attention
from the area most needing additional consideration-prevention. The
issue of ISP liability is inherently more retrospective than copyright's
general goal of promoting innovation; it is focused on finding the proper
defendant after the harm from infringement has already occurred.
Unfortunately, this retrospective focus often obscures the more important
underlying goal of prospectively preventing the harm from occurring in
the first place.
The real harm to a copyright holder from online infringement occurs
at the ends of the line, when infringing copies are created by
downloaders. The initial act of infringement, the creation of copies on
Internet servers, does not directly cause any economic damage to
authors, as no sales have yet been lost. Once this initial act is complete,
however, the work may be potentially downloaded millions of times,
with each resultant copy potentially representing a lost sale. 336 Fur-

336. Additionally, under the current infrastructure, once material is uploaded to the
Internet, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to delete. See, e.g., Purcell Testimony on
H.R. 2441, supra note 223.
[I]t is difficult and may be quite time-consuming to eradicate an infringing
posting after it has been identified.
Although a service provider may be able to locate and remove or block a
particular posting on its own server, the interconnections between servers
means that no service provider could guarantee that a removed posting would
not be accessible via another server or would not return to its server after the
initial removal or blocking. Just a few minutes after a customer posts a
message, it has likely already traveled to thousands of other servers.
Id. A message posted to Usenet, for instance, is immediately propagated to servers
around the world. Messages can be deleted ("cancelled"), but currently this may only
be done by either the posting parties themselves or by the administrator of the server that
the message was posted from. There is no facility built in to the Usenet system for an
individual server administrator to cancel any particular message from their server's
storage. The system-wide Usenet administrators will only cancel messages if they are
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ther, even the quickest legal action will always be outpaced by the speed
of the Internet, 337 Therefore, it is vitally important to prevent material
from being made available on the Internet in the first place-in
cyberspace, an ounce of prevention is worth tons of cure.

I.

Standardized Subscriber Agreements Would Promote Subscriber
Education and Accountability

Service providers should be required to provide standardized
subscriber agreements. 338 The subscriber agreements should educate
their subscribers about Internet abuse in general and online intellectual
property theft in particular. 339 Not only would such notices help to
prevent unintentional infringement borne out of ignorance, 340 but also

abusive of the system as a whole, not based upon the message's content. See supra note
73 and accompanying text.
337. As noted by one intellectual property attorney:
Considering the speed with which online infringement can utterly destroy the
value of a copyright, courts are institutionally ill-equipped to prevent online
copyright infringement with the required alacrity. Even the speediest court
procedures, such as temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, require
the intervention of a middleman-the court-between the service provider and the
copyright owner. Therefore, court procedures are not sufficiently immediate to
prevent substantial damage from online copyright infringement.
Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note I 60, at 29 I (statement of William J. Cook, Attorney,
Willian, Brink, Hofer, Gilson & Liane).
338. Virtually all service providers already require subscribers to manifest assent to
detailed subscriber agreements. If the agreement is executed as part of an online signup
process, the new subscriber is typically required to manifest assent to the terms by
pressing a series of on-screen buttons. The penalties for willful infringement could
easily be presented as a discrete item that must be specifically agreed to.
339. Other items to be addressed in such a standardized notice might include
summaries of subscribers' potential liability for such offenses as online defamation,
invasion of privacy, and indecent materials. Further, the notice might also inform
parents as to the availability of tools designed to screen out sites inappropriate for their
children. See, e.g., Project OPEN (visited Apr. 5, 1997) <http://www.isa.net/projectopen/index.html> (model notice from a cooperative effort between service providers and
content providers, seeking to promote understanding about intellectual property issues,
safe computing for children and other users, understanding about privacy rights, and
consumer protection).
340. An understanding of intellectual property rights is particularly important for
the new generation of Internet users:
[M]any cyberspace users are completely unfamiliar with any of the existing
copyright laws and the implications that their Internet actions may have. Most
are completely unaware that downloading material into the RAM of their
computers, even if they never actually print the material or share it with
anyone else, technically constitutes a reproduction under current U.S. copyright
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they would put existing and would-be intentional infringers on notice as
to the civil and criminal consequences of their actions. Additionally,
providers should be required to supply subscribers with standardized
software solutions that will allow them to voluntarily screen out
unwanted content. 341 Since most providers require subscribers to secure
their accounts with a credit card, a standardized agreement might also
provide that ISPs are authorized to directly deduct court-awarded
damages from the subscriber's credit card account, thus providing
infringed authors with a convenient method of collecting judgments, as
well as drawing further attention to the seriousness of infringement. 342

2.

Restrictions on Unauthorized Access and File Transfer Logging
Would Provide Subscriber Accountability

The majority of the abuses occurring on the Internet are the result of
one of its most valuable characteristics: anonymity. Internet users
law and thus makes them infringers, albeit unintentionally. To aggravate the
problem even further, although children currently account for only approximately two percent of total Internet users, their numbers are expected to
dramatically increase in the next decade. Unless children can be taught the
complexities of the current copyright statute early on, lessons that most of their
adult counterparts have yet to learn, they too will join the ranks of copyright
infringers.
Anyone with a personal computer, a modem, and a telephone can now access
vast amounts of copyrighted material at the touch of a button and become
"infringers." Furthermore, there exists the apparent widespread belief that it
is not a crime to "copy" the latest computer software or to give a downloaded
program to a friend. As long as this type of attitude persists, infringement will
be rampant on the Internet under the current regulation regime.
Cohen, supra note 276, at 412-14 (footnotes omitted).
341. This would not present a hardship to service providers, as virtually all supply
software packages to new subscribers. There is presently a wide array of software
available to assist users in screening out unwanted content based on the IP address of
sites known to contain objectionable material, key words in the content, or authorestablished content rating systems. See generally American Civil Liberties Union v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 838-46 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (describing many of the currently
available content screening methods).
342. The agreement should also clearly establish that the subscriber, even if
institutional, is fully responsible for any civil damages caused by the use of that account,
irrespective of whether the subscriber was the actual wrongdoer. If the subscriber fails
to control access using his account. he should be primarily liable. The subscriber could
then seek indemnity from the actual wrongdoer. The harsh effects of such a system
could be mitigated by requiring the provider to make provisions for multiple user
name/password combinations from a single account. The subscriber would, however,
have to agree to remain primarily responsible for all damages caused by the use of his
account, especially for the activities of his minor children.
In the common situation where all users of a business access the Internet through a
single account, it would be the responsibility of the business to manage accountability
on its network.
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quickly learn that, under the present infrastructure, their activities often
cannot easily be traced back to them. No matter what liability is
imposed upon infringing users, enforcement of online copyright
violations cannot be successful without an effective means of identifying
them.
As a threshold matter, the often-overlooked distinction between
apparent anonymity, or "pseudonymity," and absolute, or "true"
anonymity, must be recognized. 343 Since Internet communications do
not inherently identify their author, anyone wishing to voice an opinion
on the Internet can do so with apparent anonymity by simply using a
pseudonym (or no name at all). 344 Only by obtaining true anonymity,
however, can the author be certain that his actions will be free from any
possibility of reprisal. Pseudonymous communications usually leave an
evidence trail that can be traced back, although often with great
difficulty, to one or more Sysops or access providers who can identify
the user. 345 As one author noted, "The single biggest myth about the
Internet is that it's 'anonymous. "' 346 True anonymity must be specifically sought after using one of two methods: ( 1) by gaining access to the
Internet using an account that cannot be traced back to the user, or (2)
by using a server that either does not require that the user identify
himself or removes the user's identification before his messages are
transmitted to another server. 347 It is only true anonymity that presents

343. See generally Lance Rose, Anonymity Online: Its Value, and Its Social Costs
(last modified June 1995) <http://www.boardwatch.com/mag/95/jun/bwm45.htm>. See
also Karina Rigby, Anonymity on the Internet Must be Protected (visited Feb. 13, 1998)
<http ://s wis snet. ai. mi I. edu/609 5/s tudent -papers/fa] 19 5-papers/rig by-anonymity. html>
(describing the history and methodology of true anonymity on the Internet).
344. A Web page, for instance, only displays the text or images selected by its
author. Therefore, a Web page author may choose to use his real name, a pseudonym,
or no name at all. A Usenet or !RC message is identified by the name supplied by its
author and many, if not most, users choose to be identified by a pseudonym. An e-mail
message, although it has a return address, only identifies its author's name if the author
includes it in the text of the message.
345. In the case of a Web page, the Web server Sysop will typically know the
identity of its author. Similarly, e-mail and Usenet messages contain information that
can be used to trace the message back to the originating server, whose Sysop will
typically know the author's identity. Even !RC Sysops can identify a user's IP address.
346. K.K. Campbell, Anonymity: Internet's Great Myth (last modified Dec. 5, 1996)
<http://www.kkc.net/toronto-star/1996/ts 1205 .him>.
347. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (describing anonymous
remailers), supra note 233 and accompanying text (describing http proxy servers and
anonymizers).
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copyright enforcement problems, since pseudonymous communications
can be traced back to their authors.
The unqualified removal of anonymity on the Internet, however, has
obvious negative free speech implications and would undoubtedly be
vigorously opposed, both by civil libertarians and users themselves. 348
That, however, is a larger issue that Congress need not resolve in the
pursuit of copyright abuse prevention. The following recommendations
would narrowly provide increased accountability for copyright violations,
yet only have a minimal impact upon free speech. 349

a.

Internet Access and Server Access Should Be
Uniformly Controlled

Regulations should establish a uniform system of Internet access
control. Subject to certain exceptions described below, access providers
should be required to restrict access to known users, to keep a log of the
IP addresses assigned to each subscriber when he connects to the access
server, and server Sysops should be required to restrict uploads to known
users or known IP addresses. 350 Uniform access control measures are
necessary in order to establish the identity, and therefore the accountability, of infringers. 351 Although nearly all Sysops and access providers
do not allow anonymous use, 352 those that do are popular with Internet
pirates. 353
The impacts upon free speech from such access controls can easily be
minimized. First, it must be remembered that access control measures
would not interfere with pseudonymity; users would enjoy exactly the
same level of apparent anonymity. Further, if access control regulations

348. A recent survey of Internet users showed that they highly value anonymity and
the ability to use pseudonyms. See GVU's 5th WWW User Survey, supra note 231.
349. Further, the alternatives may be worse. See, e.g., supra notes 239-44 and
accompanying text (describing the potential harms to free speech and privacy that may
occur under a strict liability system where service providers were pressured to screen
subscriber content).
350. For those ISPs that control server access by allowing access only from the IP
addresses that they own, the identity of an uploading subscriber can be determined by
matching the server log with the its access server's IP address assignment log. See
supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing dynamically assigned IP addresses).
351. Many commentators have argued that service providers should be strictly liable
because often the infringing user cannot be identified. Strict liability is not-needed to
address this problem; a rule that allowing unauthorized access or uploading (subject to
the limitations described below) is per se contributory infringement will address this
concern without making service providers liable in all other situations.
352. See IITF WHITE PAPER, supra note 173, at 184.
353. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (describing abuse of anonymous
Web sites); supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (describing abuse of anonymous
FTP servers as pirate drop sites).
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were accompanied by specific restrictions on both an ISP's ability and
duty to disclose recorded information, Internet authors would actually
enjoy increased apparent anonymity. 354 Only if the message were
illegal would the ISP or Sysop be required or permitted to disclose the
logged information.
Second, access control measures can easily be subject to exceptions
that will avoid unnecessary impacts on free speech. For example, server
Sysops could be permitted to allow the anonymous transfers of messages
that do not exceed a specified maximum size. While this limitation
would permit the anonymous exchange of even lengthy messages, it
would present a substantial impediment to the anonymous transfer of
work such as computer programs, sound recordings, and large images.3ss
Public Internet access points like libraries and universities could also
provide similarly limited anonymous access. Alternatively, they could
be exempted from access restrictions entirely, thus providing a safe
haven for unrestricted anonymity, Although leaving these access points
would also provide a safe haven for infringers, the added inconvenience
of traveling would undoubtedly prevent them from being a significant
loophole for infringers. A third alternative would be to hold public
access points liable, but provide a "good faith" defense for those that can
show that they have taken reasonable measures, considering the
circumstances, to prevent infringement. 356
Although these proposed access control measures would neither
completely prevent anonymous infringement nor be completely free from

354. See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text.
355. If such a system were adopted, there would also need to be a daily cumulative
limit from any particular IP address. An individual message size limitation might be
defeated by splitting a large work into several smaller anonymously posted messages.
Imposing a maximum daily limit would help discourage this type of abuse. Given
current technology, such a system could be defeated by a user who reaches the
maximum, disconnects from the provider, and then reconnects (in all likelihood being
assigned a different IP address) and resumes transfers. See supra note 41 and
accompanying text (describing dynamically assigned addresses). A daily cumulative
limit would prevent this.
Like any other copy prevention measure, pirates would find ways around the
limitation, service providers would close these loopholes, pirates would find a way
around the new system, and so on. A maximum daily limit, however, would at least
present a sizeable "speed bump," deterring all but the most determined software pirates.
356. This alternative could also be applied to server sysops as an alternative to a
message size limitation.
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negative free speech consequences, they would at least strike a fair
balance between the two competing objectives. 357 Further, these
recommendations are but one proposed solution; consideration by those
most knowledgeable in technology and civil rights may well reveal
superior alternatives.
b.

File Transfers Should Be Uniformly Recorded

Although access control measures would be an important step, Internet
server Sysops should also be required to record file transfers. Access
control measures would only establish the identify of those who upload
infringing content; server logs are required in order to identify where
subsequently downloaded copies come to rest. Unlike complicated and
unworkable content-based filtering systems, server activity logging is
simple, passive, and effective. Servers would simply record the IP
addresses of the computers that upload or download files from the
server, a task which most servers are already configured to perform. 358
Since Internet servers and ISP access servers together comprise "both
ends" of a file transfer, combining server logs (which identify visitors
only by IP address) with ISP address assignment logs (which match an
IP address with the particular subscriber using that address at the time
of the transfer) would result in a complete record of all file transfers.
This combining would provide a simple but exceptionally powerful file
tracing system that would assist both law enforcement and infringed
authors in locating infringers and establishing the extent of their
357. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld "time, place, and manner"
restrictions on speech when they are content-neutral, narrowly tailored, and enacted to
advance an important governmental interest. See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative
Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
358. The following excerpt taken from an actual Web server log illustrates how
simple this collection process is:
198.53.172.27 1997-09-03 16:41 :28 GET
/chat/chatcrnd.ap
198.53.172.27
1997-09-03 16:41:28 AP_SERVE_FILE
c:\sdweb\home\chat\chatcmd.ap
24.1.130.243 1997-09-03 16:41:29
GET
/chat/dir.ap
24.1.130.243 1997-09-03 16:41:29
AP_SERVE_FILE
c:\sdweb\home\chat\dir.ap
GET
/chat/dirtop.jpg
24.1.130.243 1997-09-03 16:41:29
SEND_FILE_BINAR
24.1.130.243 1997-09-03 16:41:29
c:\sdweb\home\chat\dirtop.jpg
Smar/Desk Personal Web Server Server Log List (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.
internetsolutions.com/websuite/websrvsrc3.html>. This excerpt shows two different users
(identified in the far left column by the IP addresses of their computers), the files that
they requested, and the files that the server transferred to them. This data, from left to
right, represents the IP address of the visitor, the date and time, the particular files sent
("get" is a request from the visitor's computer and "ap_serve_file" and "send_file_binar"
indicate that a file was transmitted to the visitor's computer).
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wrongdoing, Using this information, a procedure could be easily
developed whereby nationwide activity involving an infringed work
could be relayed back to its author or law enforcement officers. 359
A file tracing system would not only assist authors in finding
responsible parties, it would also prevent a great deal of further harm
from occurring, as all infringing copies on Internet servers would be
blocked or destroyed within a matter of hours. Such a system would
allow the power of digital communications technology to be harnessed
to fight the very ills that it facilitates; unlike the printing press, the
photocopier, the audio recorder, or the VCR, the Internet can also
provide the means to inhibit infringement.
c.

Regulations Should Protect Against Unauthorized Disclosure of
Recorded Information

A file tracing system raises a legitimate concern about the possibility
that the recorded information would be misused either by private parties,
the government ("Big Brother"), or even the ISPs themselves. Although
IP address assignment and server logs by themselves do not convey
much information and, as most Internet users are aware, 360 ISPs
routinely collect this information anyway, the synthesis of this discrete
information into a single system raises the specter of abuse. Appropriate

359. As an example of how such a system might work: The author, using a
standardized procedure, could file his claim with any convenient ISP. That ISP would
then, using secure encrypted communication, send out an automated tracing request to
the server or servers identified in the claim. The servers would remove or temporarily
block the challenged work, check their logs to determine the IP address of any
downloads of the work, and then forward the claim to the ISPs that own those addresses.
Those ISPs would then check their IP address assignment logs to determine which of
their subscribers downloaded the work. This information would then be returned to the
requesting ISP, which would then assemble the information and return the completed
report to the infringed author, who would then be in possession of a complete log of all
potentially infringing activity related to his work.
360. Most Internet users are aware that servers record their activities. See GVU's
5th WWW User Survey, supra note 231.
Most users are aware the time of the request (85.1 % ) as well as the name
of the requested page (82.7%) are loggable. Following in order of response
rates, the name of the user's machine (71.0%), the name of the user's browser
(59.0%), the user's email address (45.2%), the user's operating system name
(37.9%), a site id the persists across sessions (a.k.a. cookies) (37.7%), and
finally tbe user's physical location (31.7%). 14.7% reported not knowing what
information is loggable.
Id.
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safeguards, however, can minimize this risk. First, regulations should
specifically define under what circumstances a claim may be brought and
should provide for penalties against frivolous claims. Second, the claim
process itself should have appropriate procedural safeguards to minimize
the risk of fraudulent claims. 361 Finally, statutes could protect user
privacy by providing that any unauthorized disclosure or other use of the
collected information would subject the offending provider to civil and,
in appropriate cases, criminal sanctions. 362 Since server usage data is
routinely recorded, yet currently no restrictions are imposed upon its use,
a file tracing system with these procedural safeguards would provide
users with greater security and privacy than they currently enjoy.
3. Changes to the Copyright Act and Increased Criminal
Enforcement Efforts Would Provide Enhanced Deterrence
Although increasing user accountability for copyright infringement
would be a significant step, it would not, by itself, be sufficient to
provide effective deterrence to Internet copyright abusers. This is
because users understand (either explicitly or implicitly) that virtually no
one is being prosecuted, either civilly or criminally, for infringement.
Since many infringers are, as a practical matter, judgment-proof, 363 the
only real threat for these users must be provided by criminal penalties.
It was precisely for this reason that in 1997 Congress passed the No
Electronic Theft (NET) Act, amending the Copyright Act to remove the
requirement that the defendant have realized or anticipated some
financial gain. 364 Unfortunately, the NET Act provisions are ambigu-

361. Such safeguards might include requirements that the claimant first procure a
subpoena, post a bond, or sign the claim under penalty of perjury.
362. For example, it is generally a violation of federal law to intercept or view
private electronic communications. See supra note 48. Sysops that fail to follow
specific procedures for the lawful disclosure of private electronic may be subject to fines
or imprisonment, or both. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(3)(a), 2511(3)(b), 2511(4) (1997).
363. "Most operators of pirate sites have nothing we can collect." Will Rodger, Bill
Would Erase Copyright Loophole (last modified Sept. 22, 1997) <http://www.zdnet.com/
intweek/print/970922/inwk0065.htm> (quoting Sandra Sellers, Vice Pres. of Enforcement
and Educ. for the Software Publishers Ass'n).
364. Considering that the vast majority of online piracy is noncommercial, the pre1997 "for purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain" language of
section 506(a) made it impossible to criminally prosecute most online pirates. One case,
United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535 (D. Mass. 1994), drew national attention
to this problem. LaMacchia operated an FfP drop site on a university's computer. Over
one million dollars worth of software was pirated through the site. LaMacchia was
indicted on wire fraud, since his lack of "for-profit" motive precluded criminal
prosecution under copyright law. The court reluctantly upheld the trial court's granting
of LaMacchia's motion to dismiss, finding that although the Copyright Act controlled
over the wire fraud statutes, it provided no penalty for LaMacchia's conduct. This
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ous about when liability is triggered and fail to reach some of the most
harmful and egregious acts of infringement A comprehensive plan
aimed at reducing losses for copyright holders should include further
statutory clarifications and aggressive enforcement efforts,
a.

A File Tracing System Would Enable More Effective Criminal
Enforcement of Copyright Laws

In order to avoid criminal liability for "minor, isolated instances of
willful infringement," 365 the current provisions attach criminal liability
for "the reproduction or distribution ... during any 180-day period ...
of 1 or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more
than $1,000." 366 Unfortunately, unless file activity is recorded, most
violations will go undetected. Since very few works have a retail value
over $1,000, criminal liability for distribution will usually attach only if
a user distributes multiple works collectively worth over $1,000. If these
works are uploaded to a single site, the violation will be obvious. If,
however, as is the more typical scenario, the user instead spreads out
these uploads over multiple sessions or to multiple sites, his criminal

decision, responsible for the coining of the phrase "LaMacchia loophole," was
understandably the subject of widespread commentary and criticism.
In response to this criticism, the NET Act, The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17, 18, and
28 U.S.C.), amended section 506(a) of the Copyright Act to alternatively define criminal
infringement as willful infringement "by the reproduction or distribution, including by
electronic means, during any 180-day period, of I or more copies or phonorecords of 1
or more copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000." 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (I 997) (emphasis added), Other NET Act provisions combine with
existing provisions to include fines and imprisonment up to one year for violations
involving copies of one or more works with a total retail value of $ I ,000 or more, up
to five years for violations involving copies of one or more works (ten or more works
in the case of phonorecords) with a total retail value of $2,500 or more, and up to six
years for subsequent violations. See 17 U.S.C. § 506; 18 U,S,C. §§ 2319, 3571.
The NET Act's removal of the for-profit requirement is consistent with many software
pirates' view of pirated programs as being merely the currency of the hardcore Internet
software piracy world, See McCandless, supra note 6, at 175.
365. Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Before the House
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property, on H.R. 2265, (last modified Sept. 11,
1997) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41109.htm> (suggesting clarifications to H.R.
2265 (the bill which was enacted as the NET Act) to prevent criminal liability for
"minor, isolated instances of willful infringement"; these suggestions were incorporated
into the bill as enacted).
366. 17 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1997).
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liability will likely go unnoticed. As an illustration of this problem,
assume that a user uploads $999 worth of software to Usenet every two
weeks. Since the vast majority of Usenet servers delete binary messages
only a few days after they are received, 367 that user's violation of the
$1,000/180-day minimum would not be recognizable at any given time.
A similar situation would exist if the user instead uploaded $999 worth
of software simultaneously to several different sites. These violations
would go unnoticed and unpunished, even though the user would have
greatly exceeded the threshold for criminal liability. Similarly, although
the NET Act also attaches criminal liability for possession of works with
a total retail value over $1,000, there is currently no way for investigators to identify even those users who have downloaded huge stockpiles
of infringing works.
A file tracing system would not only enable prosecutors and infringed
authors to recognize when an individual's infringement is cumulatively
sufficient to trigger criminal liability, but would also provide an accurate
measurement of the extent of his wrongdoing. Thus, a file tracing
system would increase the likelihood that infringers would be caught and
held fully accountable for their misconduct, thereby greatly enhancing
the deterrent effect of the current criminal laws.
b.

Additional Amendments Should Be Enacted to Close Gaps in the
Copyright Act

The existing criminal liability provisions in the Copyright Act do not
address many of the most common and harmful online copyright
violations. The NET Act, while it removed the "for profit" loophole,
failed to close other significant gaps in criminal and civil liability. In
order to bring them in line with the realities of online piracy, the
criminal liability provisions of the NET Act should be supplemented and
clarified.
First, the NET Act failed to include criminal liability for the increasingly popular use of software copy protection cracks. 368 Since cracks
and serial numbers have no "retail value," pirates that distribute them
will escape criminal liability, even though their acts are willful and
capable of causing tremendous losses to copyright holders. The
Copyright Act should be further amended to specifically include criminal

367. See supra note 238 (describing Usenet server retention time).
368. See Holleyman Testimony on H.R. 2180 & H.R. 2281, supra note 275 (noting
increasing use of software protection cracks); Sellers Statement on H.R. 2265, supra note
13 (calling for criminal penalties for persons who create and distribute utilities to
circumvent software copy protection).
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liability for the knowing possession or distribution of any device,
program, or other data specifically intended to defeat software copyprotection schemes, 369 Additionally, the Copyright Act should be
amended to attribute the retail value of a work to any device specifically
intended to defeat its copy protection, thus effectively giving each crack
the value of the work itself.
Second, the NET Act failed to explicitly include criminal liability for
conspiracy to infringe, Organized software piracy groups supply much
of the software that is distributed on the Internet. 370 Without their
expertise, these programs could not be pirated. 371 Reducing the
activities of these groups would have a dramatic influence on the supply
of pirated computer software.
Finally, the Copyright Act should be amended to explicitly provide
civil liability for the full extent of damages created when a user makes
a protected work available for widespread copying. In order to ensure
that courts assess damages that comport with the realities of online

369. Several bills pending in Congress would prohibit such devices. One of the
provisions of H.R. 2281, for example, would amend the Copyright Act to provide that:
(2) No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide or
otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or
part thereof that (A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological protection measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological protection measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person
for use in circumventing a technological protection measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title.
WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act, H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1997). See also
Digital Era Copyright Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. (1997) (prohibiting the
intentional removal, deactivation, or circumvention of copy protection measures and the
alteration or removal copy management information).
370. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
371. Many of the programs illegally distributed on the Internet require extensive
cracking and other preparation for online distribution, procedures requiring effort or
expertise greater than the causal infringer is able or willing to provide. See, e.g.,
McCandless, supra note 6, at 180 (describing one program of which there were "only
three or four crackers in the world" who could successfully break its copy protection
scheme). See also infra notes 378-82 and accompanying text (describing the activities
of one organized cracking group).
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infringement, 372 the Copyright Act should be amended to specifically
provide that those who willfully upload infringing material will be held
liable for the value of the copies that are subsequently downloaded, with
server logs considered to be presumptive proof of the number of copies
downloaded. 373
c.

Increased Criminal Enforcement Efforts Would
Reduce Online Piracy

No matter what criminal or civil liability is imposed upon Internet
infringers, however, those provisions must be enforced if they are to
have a significant deterrent effect. The NET Act, for instance, has yet
to have any noticeable effect on the trafficking of copyrighted works on
the Internet. 374 Although news of the NET Act was the subject of
much discussion throughout the Internet, particularly in the software
piracy newsgroups, the lack of any subsequent enforcement efforts has
caused the infringing activities to continue unabated.
The power of high-profile enforcement efforts should not be underestimated. Although there have been few widely reported actions taken
against online software pirates, and none since the passage of the NET
Act, the few actions that have been taken have had a remarkable chilling
effect upon the open trading of pirated software on the Internet. One
example is "Operation Cyber Strike," a quick-strike campaign launched
in January 1997 by the FBI's International Computer Crime Squad. 375
The FBI targeted organized piracy groups in seven states using private
BBSs, FTP, and Internet Relay Chat. Although no arrests were made,
the FBI seized the BBS operators' hardware. 376 Even these limited
enforcement actions were sufficient to send shock waves throughout the
372. It must be noted, however, that the value of the number of copies downloaded
does not represent an accurate measure of losses to infringed authors. See supra notes
11-14, 277-82 and accompanying text. Despite this, courts should resolve doubts as to
the extent of actual losses against the infringing party.
373. Liability should be limited to all "first-generation" copies that ultimately come
to rest in the hands of a human being. The fact that copies were automatically created
by intermediate Internet servers should not relieve the defendant of liability. If,
however, another user downloads the work and then later uploads it to another server,
the second user's act should be seen as a superseding act, cutting off the chain of
liability for the original uploader.
374. Indeed, it is unlikely that the NET Act will have any effect at all on piracy of
some works. Since the Act only attaches liability to acts of infringement over any 180day period with a "total retail value" of $1,000 or more. image piracy, for example, will
largely escape its reach, since it would take hundreds or thousands of images to
aggregate to over $1,000, even if a "retail value" could be established for each discrete
image. A similar problem exists for sound recordings and other lesser-valued works.
375. See Macavinta, supra note 53.
376. See McCandless, supra note 6, at 177.
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Internet piracy groups, 377 Activity in the Usenet software piracy
newsgroups slowed dramatically and most of the prominent Internet
piracy organizations kept a very low profile, Since there were no
subsequent enforcement efforts, however, the infringing activities
resumed to their normal level within a few weeks,
Another example occurred two months after Operation Cyber Strike,
On March 17, 1997, in what was labeled a "first," Microsoft Corporation
filed suit against Christopher Fazendin, alleging that he authored a Web
page containing a crack to defeat the 90-day limit on the trial version of
its Office 97 product, 378 A Microsoft attorney was candid about the
fact that Microsoft brought the action to make an example of Mr,
Fazendin: "This particular crack was so widely distributed and so serious
an infringement on Microsoft's copyright on Office 97 that we thought
it was appropriate for litigation," 379 Microsoft subpoenaed the router
and server logs from Fazendin's ISP in an attempt to determine the
amount of Microsoft's losses and announced that it might also use the
Jogs to take action against those who downloaded the infringing
materiaL 380 As with Operation Cyber Strike, the Usenet software
piracy groups were instantly flooded with discussion over the Microsoft
suit and activity in the Usenet cracks groups dramatically slowed, Three
days after the Microsoft announcement, the notorious piracy group that
originally conceived and distributed the crack announced that it was
disbanding, 381 Sixteen days later, "The Inner Circle," perhaps the most

377, One pirate even hastily set up a Web page to spread the news of which
software pirates had been "busted," FBI Busts at Inept (visited Feb. 3, 1997, now no
longer in existence) <http://inept.pheared.com/index2.html>.
378. See Renee Deger, Microsoft Files First Lawsuit Against Security Code Cracker,
PC WEEK ONLINE (last modified Mar. 18, 1997) <http://www5.zdnet.com/zdnn/content/
pcwo/0318/pcwo00l l.html>. Since the crack was merely a replacement file from the
fully functional version of the Office 97 product, Microsoft sued Mr. Fazendin for direct
infringement. Interviews with Christopher Fazendin via e-mail messages (Mar. 1997).
379. Deger, supra note 378. The crack had been floating around Usenet for weeks
and had received a great deal of publicity. See Kristi Coale, Microsoft Hardballs Office
97 Cracker, WIRED NEWS (last modified Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.wired.com/news/
technology/story/2661.html>; Rebecca Sykes, Microsoft Sues Over Office 97 'crack,'
(last modified Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.computerworld.com/search/AThtml/online/9703/9703 l 9officecrack.html>.
380. See Coale, supra note 379.
381. The full text of the Usenet message read:
This is an OFFICIAL Statement from Phrozen Group to announce that Phrozen
Crew will not I repeat WILL NOT be posting cracks to any newsgroups
anymore. Furthermore all public ftp sites and web sites have been closed
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high profile and prolific Internet software piracy group ever, also
announced that it was disbanding. 382 As with Operation Cyber Strike,
however, the lack of subsequent enforcement efforts caused the
infringing activities to resume their normal level within a few weeks.
Without high-profile enforcement efforts, open and widespread online
piracy will continue. The FBI and content providers, now empowered
by the NET Act to seek criminal charges against online infringers, have
indicated that they intend to increase enforcement efforts. 383 While
aggressive enforcement efforts will not stop online copyright infringement, it would certainly make many Internet infringers determine that
the benefits from online piracy simply are not worth the risks. Further,
those pirates that persist would be driven "underground," forced to use
private sites and e-mail exchanges. 384 This would reduce the availabil-

PERMANENTLY. Phrozen Crew would like to reinstate [sic] that they
NEVER DID support alt.binaries.cracks.phrozen-crew and alt.phrozen.cracks
[Usenet newsgroups]. No emails will be entertained. Phrozen Crew wishes
to thank all those who have supported PC in anyway [sic]. U know who u
are:)!
Usenet message posted by "Saltine," Phrozen Crew member (Mar. 20, 1997) (on file
with San Diego Law Review). Subsequent Usenet messages from Phrozen Crew
members confirmed that the threat of legal action from Microsoft was a key factor in the
group's decision to disband.
382. See generally McCandless, supra note 6 (providing an in-depth look at the
Inner Circle and its members). "The Analog Guy," a long-time Inner Circle member,
cited "personal reasons" as the basis for the group's decision to disband. Usenet
message posted by "The Analog Guy," Inner Circle member (Apr. 2, 1997) (on file with
San Diego Law Review). Later communications revealed tbat the recent media exposure
from the Wired article and the increased perceived threat of prosecution were likely the
true motivating factors. One of the Inner Circle members, "Irrelevant," disclosed in a
subsequent message that it was fortunate "that none of us ended up in prison (yet) for
our good intentions." Usenet message posted by "Irrelevant," Inner Circle member (Apr.
2, 1997) (on file with San Diego Law Review).
383. Although it outlined many practical difficulties with prosecuting computer
crimes, the Department of Justice claims to have "made great strides toward addressing
[those] difficulties" and has recently "stepped up" enforcement efforts towards software
pirates with its 1996 formation of the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
within the FBI. See DiGregory Testimony on H.R. 2265, supra note 68. "We hope that
by bringing criminal laws to bear on some of the worst offenders, we will deter others
from engaging in these illegal activities." Id.
Similarly, content providers have become emboldened by the passage of the NET Act
and have indicated that they will seek to hold pirates criminally liable.
Armed with a new federal law. the No Electronic Theft Act, the [Recording
Industry Association of America] is trying to track down the biggest MP3
piracy sites, even going after sites that aren't profiting from the piracy. The
trade group employs three full-time staffers to chase pirates-and has shut
down more than 250 in the last year.
Brown. supra note 8.
384. As an example of this, the recent enforcement campaign by the music industry
against pirate sites resulted in the pirates "moving even further underground, backing
away from the Web in favor of IRC. ICQ, and secret mailing lists." Id.
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ity of pirated works to casual offenders, which undoubtedly account for
the vast majority of unauthorized copies. Consequently, much of the
unique infringement threat posed by the Internet would be eliminated, as
losses from these private trading sessions would more closely approximate the losses suffered in the physical world when neighbors trade
copies of computer programs or tape each other's CDs and videotapes.
D.

ISPs and Content Providers Should Jointly Develop
Technological Solutions

The most significant weakness in any program designed to locate
infringing works is that it inescapably places the burden on copyright
holders to discover and identify infringement of their works, since, in all
but the most obvious cases, only the copyright owner can accurately
determine whether a copy is infringing. Some content providers have
reacted to the increasing problem of Internet piracy by assigning
employees to seek out infringing copies of their works 385 and others
have recruited the assistance of specialized Internet infringement "detectives."386 Some content providers have automated this process by
tagging their works with digital fingerprints and employing software
programs that automatically scan the Internet for infringing copies of
their works. 387 Although in each of these cases the content providers
385. See Shapley, supra note 13; Brown, supra note 8; McCandless, supra note 6.
386. Industry groups have formed detective squads and there are several new
companies specializing in seeking out infringing copies. See, e.g., Shapley, supra note
13, (describing "Internet detectives," "private sleuths, hired by corporations to guard their
wares-from corporate logos to comic strips, from music to software-from the pilfering
that computer technology makes so easy"); Markwatch Licensing Page (visited Nov. 15,
1997) <http://www.markwatch.com/license/> (describing "Markwatch," a service that
will monitor the Internet for trademark "infringement, dilution, and genericide
situations").
387. Automated scanning systems are already in place for print media and music,
and systems have been developed that will allow for similar identification of video,
multimedia works, and online print media. See, e.g., BM/ Introduces Musicbot to
Monitor Music Use on the Internet (last modified Oct. 15, 1997) http://bmi.com/reading/
news/musicbot.html>.
Performing rights organization BM! today announced the creation of
"MusicBot," a new web robot designed to gather market information and
music trends while monitoring the use of music in cyberspace. The
"MusicBot" will comb the web, quantifying the use of music on different sites.
The robot, working 24 hours a day, seven days a week, provides BM! with the
equivalent of a full-time staff of nearly two dozen web surfers at a fraction of
the cost.
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have reported great success in their efforts, 388 a file tracing system
would dramatically increase their effectiveness. Once a single copy is
located, a file tracing system would automatically find all other copies
by looking forward and backward in the chain of distribution.
As previously described, both content providers and service providers
have speculated about the possibility of developing some sort of
automated system that would constantly scan a service provider's
computers for the presence of infringing works. If such a system could
be developed and uniformly implemented by all service providers, it
could provide a massive reduction in online piracy. While service
providers cannot unilaterally implement systems to locate infringing
content, they can, however, execute a standardized author-developed
identification system. Without cooperative efforts between content
providers and service providers, no such system is possible. A
negotiated rulemaking approach would provide a forum whereby service
providers and content providers could work together to develop a system
that is effective, yet not unduly burdensome on service providers, content
providers, or their customers.

This groundbreaking technology is part of a series of initiatives introduced
by BM! to address the concerns of the more than 200,000 copyright holders
it represents ....
Id. See also Robert E. Calem, 'Digital Watermarking' Scheme Protects Photo
Copyrights, N. Y. TIMES CYBERTIMES (last modified May 21, 1997) <http://www.
nytimes.com/library/cyber/week/052197watermark.html> (describing the release of
"MarcSpider," a program that "will scour the Web looking for images bearing its own
PictureMarc tags and report its findings to the copyright holders").
Not only can digital fingerprints identify the works, but, when used in combination
with uniformly implemented end user software or hardware, can also prevent
unauthorized use, copying, or alteration of the works. See, e.g., Nick Wingfield, A Tool
to Stop Image Snatchers (last modified Apr. 22, 1997) <http://www.news.com/News/
Item/0,4,9946,00.html> (describing "ThingMaker," a program that "will allow designers
to 'lock' ordinary graphics and sound [and multimedia] files so that they cannot be
duplicated or modified"); Levin, supra note 271 (describing "DiscGard," a system that
prevents CD and DVD duplication by "etching a digital fingerprint into the pits and
lands of optical disks"; playback devices encoded with the system would not allow
duplication and will thus "stop pirates in their tracks").
388. See Brown, supra note 8 (music industry executive reporting that pirates are
"not hard to find" and "[e]very pirate we've gone after, we've caught"; music trade
association reporting that three employees have shut down more than 250 pirate sites in
the last year); Shapley, supra note 13, (describing success of companies specializing in
searching for infringing materials on the Internet); Larry Lange, Copyright Fight Rocks
the Net (last modified Feb. 25, 1997) <http://techweb.cmp.com/eet/news/98/995news/
copyright.html> (automated scanning systems are "already putting a huge dent into the
copyright piracy phenomenon"). But see McCandless, supra note 6 (anti-piracy
specialists employed by software producer Novell report success, but fear that Internet
piracy is too widespread to control).
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E,

New Regulations Would Assist Copyright Owners in
Obtaining Civil Relief

Realizing that no system can realistically provide perfect deterrence or
detection, copyright owners will always suffer some losses from online
infringement, Regulations establishing a file tracing system would,
however, greatly assist copyright holders in obtaining more complete
civil relief,
In addition to allowing an infringed author to identify those responsible for uploading infringing copies, something that may be difficult or
impossible today, a file tracing system would also allow the author to
reach a whole new class of civil defendants-downloaders, All reported
civil actions for online copyright infringement actions have been brought
against either the uploader or his service provider, Downloaders are
equally guilty of infringement, yet since their activities are not uniformly
logged, they currently cannot be easily found, 389 Similarly, an infringed author seeking injunctive relief against a pirate site presently has
no reliable method of accurately determining the location of other sites
that may have downloaded the work, Although in many cases, if not
most, actions against downloaders would be impractical due to jurisdictional and economic realities, a file tracing system would at least offer
this as an option to infringed authors, 390
A file tracing system would also help infringed copyright holders to
be more fully compensated for their losses, Where an uploading
defendant earned no profits from the work, copyright holders currently
face significant challenges in proving damages, since there is usually no
reliable method of determining how many infringing copies were

389, See supra note 380 and accompanying text (describing Microsoft's subpoena
of the router and server logs from the defendant's ISP in order to locate downloaders of
its infringed work),
390. The previously suggested provision in a standardized subscriber agreement
(providing that ISPs are authorized to deduct court-awarded damages from subscribers'
accounts) might make some actions against downloaders feasible. At the minimum,
some authors might wish to have at least the capability to send demand or "cease and
desist" letters to downloaders. See, e.g., Lange, supra note 388 (describing campaign
by Viacom, owner of rights to old Star Trek television show, of sending "cease and
desist" letters to Web site authors who were infringing trademarks and copyrights). But
see supra note 337 and accompanying text (describing inadequacies of even speedy
injunctive relief when works can be transmitted over the Internet so rapidly).
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ultimately downloaded. 391 If a file tracing system were combined with
the previously suggested amendment explicitly creating liability for all
downloaded copies, an infringed plaintiff would be more likely to be
awarded his full damages. 392
F.

ISPs That Fully Comply With Regulations Should Be
Shielded From Liability

ISPs, like common carriers, 393 should be regulated by specific

391. "Civil damages are often insufficient. ... Pirates can be organized, they can
have financial backing, be nomadic, and create a great deal of harm, all without keeping
records of the damage they've caused." Heltzel, supra note 296 (quoting Mark
Traphagen, Vice Pres. of Intellectual Property and Trade Policy, Software Publishers
Ass'n) (emphasis added).
The Copyright Act allows civil plaintiffs to recover either statutory damages or the
sum of actual damages plus the infringer's profits. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1997). A civil
plaintiff seeking actual damages must therefore show either the extent of the defendant's
gain or the extent of his losses with reasonable certainty. Where the defendant earned
no profits, the plaintiff's losses are obviously the only relevant factor. Similarly, a
plaintiff seeking substantial statutory damages (which are only available to owners of
registered works (see id.§ 412)) must present evidence to guide the court's decision as
to a "just" amount. Among the factors a court may consider in setting statutory damage
amounts are: the expenses saved and profits reaped by the infringer, the deterrent effect
of the award on defendant and on third parties, and the infringer's state of mind in
committing the infringement. See, e.g., Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Intern.,
40 F.3d 1007, !Oll (9th Cir. 1994).
392. The burden of proof could then be shifted to the distributing defendant to prove
that any particular downloader did not actually use or keep the infringing material. If
the downloader testifies that he immediately eliminated the infringing copy, the court
might allow for a reduction or elimination of damages based on the innocent infringer
doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1997). This consideration would only come into
play, however, if the value of the infringed work was less than $200, since that is the
minimum allowable award, even for innocent infringers. Id. It would be up to the
uploader to seek indemnity from the subsequent downloaders.
Note that imposing liability for downloads upon uploaders would also effectively
eliminate jurisdictional issues, since the uploader would, in essence, be held indirectly
liable as a contributory infringer. Similarly, a file tracing system would allow infringed
copyright holders to effectively extend their reach beyond the shores of the United
States, even to nations that refuse to cooperate with the enforcement of international
copyright treaties; so long as the infringing uploader is located in the United States, he
could be held accountable for damages resulting from all infringing copies made, even
if those copies were made by downloaders located abroad.
393. Under the Copyright Act, common carriers are exempted from secondary
liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (1997). Internet service providers, however, do not fit
under the existing definitions. The Communications Act of 1934 defines a common
carrier as one that is required to furnish service upon request. See 47 U.S.C. § 201
(1997). See also supra note 197 (describing the Netcom court's refusal to extend the
statutory definition to encompass service providers).
In order to bring ISPs under this definition, either the definition would have to be
changed or the ISPs would be required to furnish service upon demand. Even the largest
networks on the Internet, the backbone providers, don't have to accept all traffic; they
only accept traffic from those networks with which they have agreed to "peer" with or
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uniform national regulations and, so long as they comply with these
regulations, should be immunized from liability for subscriber-supplied
content. 394 "Good Samaritan" provisions should also be enacted to
help provide an incentive for service providers to voluntarily undertake
good-faith editorial measures in excess of the regulatory minimums.
Compliance should be determined not by the courts, but rather by an
administrative agency with the expertise to hear such technical matters.
The FCC should also be empowered to sanction ISPs who fail to comply
with regulations. As a prerequisite to pursing a lawsuit for damages
against an ISP, an author should be required to first obtain an administrative determination that the ISP failed to comply with one or more
relevant regulations. 395
If these standards of conduct are formulated by an informed and
responsive regulatory agency, with input from both content providers and
service providers, content providers would be assured that service
providers are doing the best job technologically and economically
feasible. Likewise, service providers would be assured that they are
being asked to do no more than is currently feasible.

to sell bandwidth. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Further, unlike the
physical monopolies enjoyed by local telephone companies, dial-up customers can, with
the economic limits imposed by long distance calling, choose any service provider in the
nation. It would therefore be most appropriate to either change the definition of
common carrier, or, alternatively, create an entirely new exemption for Internet service
providers.
394. Immunity and regulation go hand in hand. As observed by one intellectual
property attorney:
Giving ISPs a common carrier exemption [without regulation] would be the
equivalent of allowing them to have their cake and eat it too. Common
carriers in other fields, such as phone companies, have exemptions from
certain types of liability because they also are extremely tightly regulated and
have a host of legal duties ....
If ISPs want the benefits of a common carrier exemption, they must accept
the tight regulation that accompanies it.
Hearings on H.R. 2441, supra note 160, at 295-96 (statement of William J. Cook,
Attorney, Willian, Brink, Hofer, Gilson & Lione).
395. Administrative agency adjudication would not entirely replace the courts,
however, as infringed authors should have immediate access to the courts in order to
obtain prompt injunctive relief. Further, the author would be able to seek judicial review
of the agency decision, subject to the limitation that the agency's findings of fact would,
of course, be given great deference.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

Information technology is an increasingly vital component of the
American economy, making immeasurable economic and educational
opportunities available to a wide spectrum of society. Abuse of the
Internet, however, threatens to hamper the growth of information
technology. Online theft of intellectual property reduces content
suppliers' willingness to make their products and services available
online. Additionally, uncertain liability for service providers threatens
to increase information access costs by providing a disincentive for new
business investment in the Internet. If the Internet is to realize its full
potential, it must provide a secure legal environment for electronic
commerce.
A framework based on litigation and liability is a poor choice. The
threat of liability is far too crude of a tool and too inherently retrospective in nature to properly distribute economic incentives to prevent
online copyright abuses. Further, leaving the question of service
provider liability with the courts will continue to provide uncertainty, as
even the best informed judges cannot be expected to render consistent
decisions when they are presented with an intensely technical and
constantly evolving factual setting, which they are then required to apply
to a statutory framework that has been outpaced by technology.
Additionally, copyright is wholly statutory in nature and the application
of its fundamental purposes to new technologies requires a careful
balancing of policy considerations that is within the exclusive purview
of Congress. Most importantly, however, a liability-based regime is the
worst choice possible for encouraging cooperation between service
providers and content providers.
New problems demand new solutions. Congress should supplant the
current environment characterized by hostility and litigation with a
flexible regulatory framework that ensures all interested parties a seat at
the rulemaking table. A negotiated rulemaking approach would help to
replace counterproductive distributive thinking with a more prospective
viewpoint, thereby encouraging the creative thinking that will be
required to develop workable and socially sensitive technological
solutions to the increasing problem of online copyright infringement. A
regulatory approach would provide the best forum for development of
solutions that harness the power of the Internet to correct and prevent the
very abuses that it makes possible.
Content providers and access providers, rather than viewing each other
as adversaries in a zero-sum game, must be encouraged to recognize that
they are actually partners mutually dependent on the secure widespread
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availability of online content. Ultimately, as stated by the Information
Technology Industry Association, a broad-based coalition of service
providers and content providers:
The "debate" as it were should not be "who is responsible," but rather, how
to best work together to protect this valuable medium and the content which
will be distributed on it. The Internet access and service providers and tbe
copyright holders and content providers are allies, not enemies. As with any
successful community, the citizens of this digital community must work
together to efficiently, economically, profitably deliver to the legitimate enduser, enhanced and copyright protected valuable content. 396

TIMOTHY L. SKELTON

396.

ITAA Discussion Paper, supra note 25, § 3 ("Introduction").
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